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ABSTRACT
This study "The Emirate of Damascus During the Early
Crusading Period 488-549/1095-1154 deals with this
Emirate which was established in 488/1095, after the
defeat and the murder of Taj al-Dawla Tutush near Rayy
in 488/1095 by his nephew Sultan Berkiyar5q Ibn Sult-an
Malik-Sh5h. The dominions of Ti al-Dawla, mainly in
Syria and the Jazira divided between his elder sons King
Fakhr al-Mullik Ridwan in Aleppo and King Shams al-Muliik
Ducfaq in Damascus. The Kingdom of Damascus comprized
south Syria and some parts of the Jazira such as al-
Rahba and Mayyafäriqin.
Zahir al-Din Tughtekln, who was Atabek of King
.	 .
Duclaq, became the de facto ruler of Damascus during the
reign of King Duqaq 488-497/1095-1104. After the death
of Duqaq, Tughtekin was to be the real Amir of Damascus,
and his dynasty was to gain control of the Emirate until
its fall at the hands of Niir al-Din Mahmild of Aleppo in
549/1154.
In this thesis, the following matters are discussed:
1. The conditions which led to the foundation of this
Emirate.
2. The role of Tughtekin in establishing
 his authority
in the Emirate.
ix
3. The foreign policy of the Emirate, and the factors
which shaped this policy.
4. The effects (on the Emirate) of the coming of the
Crusaders particularly those of Jerusalem.
S. Internal rivalries in the Emirate, and their
influence on the stability of the Emirate and its
external relations.
6. The policy of alliances adopted by the Emirate and
the factors which affected this.
7. The influence of the growing power of Zangi of
Aleppo and Mosul (521-541/1127-1146) on Damascus and
why he did not succeed in annexing Damascus to his
united front in Syria and the Jazira aimed at
challenging the power of the Crusaders.
8. The reasons which helped Mir al-Din Mahmüd Ibn Zangi
of Aleppo to annex Damascus to his state in
549/1154.
9. The importance of the military power of Damascus and
Its role in protecting the Emirate.
Finally a concluding section sums up the achievement
of the Emirate of Damascus in maintaining its
Independence during the period and the role of the
Emirate in the Counter-Crusade.
INTRODUCTION
The historical "jund" of Damascus during the early
Crusading period (late 5th till mid 6th century after
Hijra/late 11th century till mid 12th century A.D.) has
not been the subject of close study. Unfortunately, most
modern studies of Syria during this period concentrate
only on north Syria (the historical "jund" of Aleppo;
examples are C. Alptexin The reign of Zang', 1972, 'I.
Khalil 'Im5d al-Din Zang!, 1972, N. Elisseef 1,115r al-Din,
1967, C. Hillenbrand, "The Career of Najm al-Din 11-
Ghazi a , Der Islam, Vol. 58, 1981. It is hoped that this
study "The Emirate of Damascus During the Early
Crusading period 488-549/1095-1154" will fill a gap in
the specialist treatment of this area and epoch.
Researchers in this topic are faced by a paucity of
Information, and a	 scarcity of original historical
sources. Syria as a whole, especially Damascus, suffered
during the period under discussion, 	 not only
politically, and as regards economic and social
problems, but from a decline in intellectual life as
well. Only two contemporary Muslim historians in Syria
appeared during this era. Abt-I'1-05sim 'Ali Ibn 'AsLkir,
the writer of Th-rilch Madinat Dimashq and Namza Ibn al-
Oalklisi, writer of Dhayl TgrIlch Dimashq. Unfortunately,
the great study of Ibn 'As5kir, comprising over forty
xi
volumes, does not help us very much with political
history during the period in question. Ibn 'Asäkir
devoted this vast work to the study of scholars, (the
911,mi' and the Rumit of Hadith), he rarely mentions
political leaders in detail especially during the period
under discussion. Ibn al-Gala-nisi is still the main
historian not only for Damascus, but all Syria, and to
7
some extent for the Jazira and Iraq during our period.
Most later Muslim historians, derive the bulk of their
information	 about Damascus	 from	 Ibn al-Gala-nisi,
including e Izz al-Din Ibn al-Athir, Kamal al-Din Ibn
'Adim, 'Izz al-Din Ibn Shaddad, Ibn Kathir, Shih .ab al-
Din Abli ShAma and Ibn Khaldt-in.
The main Crusader historian of this epoch is William
of Tyre. His book A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea
is one of the main sources for the relationship of
Damascus with the Crusaders. Many modern general studies
of the Crusades have been consulted in the course of
this study particularly K. M. Setton A History of the
Crusades. (The first hundred years), London, 1969, S.
Runciman, A History of the Crusades, Vol. II,
Cambridge, 1952, J. Riley-Smith, The First Crusade and
the Idea of Crusading,	 1986, R. Small, Crusading
Warfare (1097-1193), Cambridge, 1956 and many others.
The study is divided into eight chapters. The first
one concerns the situation in Syria before the
xii
establishment of the Emirate of Damascus. Each chapter
from chapter two to seven concentrates on the reign of
-	
-
one amir of Damasucs, from Zahir al-Din Tughtekin 488-
_
522/1095-1128 to the last ruler of the emirate Mujir al-
7
Din Abaq 534-549/1140-1154. Chapter Eight is devoted to
the army of Damascus. In this study, I deal with the
major points of interest with regard to this emirate
during this problematic period. Furthermore, I shall
examine how the emirate managed to survive during the
period, and account for its eventual fall.
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CHAPTER I
SYRIA ON THE EVE OF THE CRUSADES
The Emirate of Damascus in the early Crusading
period 488-549/1095-1154 which is the theme of this
dissertation requires introduction by way of a brief
historical background survey of the situation in Syria
in general and the conditions which helped to establish
the emirate during the period in particular.
Fatimid authority in Syria from the time of their
first occupation in 359/969 had wavering fortunes. I The
honeymoon of Fatimid rule in Syria did not last long.
The people of Syria including the Twelver Shl'Is did not
recognize the Fatimid authority willingly. One of the
main opposition movements in the fifth century after
Hijra/the eleventh Christian century, against the
Fatimid supremacy originated among the Twelver Shi'is of
Aleppo. Tyre and Tripoli, and the Sunni's especiall y of
Damascus.
In 455/began 4 January 1063, the Q5(41 of Tyre, gAYn
al-Dawla Muhammad Ibn 'Aq11, the twelver Shi'i,
announced his independence from the Fatimids. Tyre's
independence would endure until 482/1089 when the
Fatimid forces headed by Munir al-Dawla al-Juyashi
managed to restore the Fatimid suzerainty over Tyre. 2
 In
2457/began 13 December 1064, the Twelver Shi'l cbidi Amin
al-Dawla Ibn	 'Ammar announced his independence in
Tripoli .° 	In 462/1070,	 (after seven years of
independence in Tyre), the Amir Mahmal Ibn Salih Ibn
Mird5s of Aleppo, (Twelver Shi q ), promulgated his
allegiance to the growing power of the Saljaqs at a time
when Saijilq power in Baghdad was established, following
their wresting of the Abbasid Caliphate from the sway of
the Bayids who were Twelver Shl'is in 447/began 2 April
1055. 4 The emirate of Tripoli, which had been founded in
457/began 13 December 1164 as mentioned above contained
Tripoli, Antartiis, 'Arqa and Jubayl, and in 473/began 22
June 1080, Jabala, on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea
twenty miles south of Lattakia, would be annexed to this
emirate. This emirate would lose its independence to the
Fatimids in 501/1108, within only a few months of its
being captured by the Crusaders in 502/1109.'
In 463/1071 a Turkoman commander called Atsiz Ibn
Uq, who was one of the followers of the Saljt5q Sultan
Malik- Shah, succeeded in restoring Ramla, Tiberias, and
Jerusalem to the Saijiiqs. 6 After five years, in Dh511-
0Deda 468/1076, Atsiz managed to take the city of
Damascus from the Fatimids after a long siege.'
Although Atsiz did not recover all Syria for the
Abbasid Caliphate, he carried out an ambitious plan to
overthrow the authority of the Fatimids in Egy pt itself,
after he had established his authority in Damascus. In
3469/1077, only one year after his recovering Damascus
for the SalJaqs, Atsiz advanced with twenty thousand men
towards Cairo with the object of capturing the city and
dominating the whole of Egypt. But the aspirations of
Atsiz dissolved in Rajab 469/1077 in east Cairo, when
his great army was annihilated by the Fatimid forces
headed by al-Afdal the wazir of Egypt. Atsiz escaped
death with only fifteen horsemen and fled to Gaza, then
to Damascus. The rest of the army were killed or
imprisoned. Although the Damascenes had been suffering
under the tyranny of Atsiz, before his defeat by the
Fatimids in that battle, they willingly agreed to be
under his rule. It seems that the Damascenes still
remembered the oppressive rule of the Fatimids. In any
event, when Atsiz returned to Damascus, they asked him
to improve conditions in their city which had suffered
from his confiscation of their properties and his
Imposition of high taxes." It seems that Atsiz had
milked the Damascenes to provide for his campaign
against the Fatimids.
After the disaster of Atsiz's forces in east Cairo,
the governors of Jerusalem, Ramla and Gaza, then under
Atsiz's authority, revolted against their Lord Atsiz and
reverted to pronouncing the khutba in the name of the
Fatimid Caliph. But Atsiz recaptured these cities and
reestablished the Saljiicis' rule there in this year
(969/1076).'
4In 470/1078, Sult. 5n Malik-Sh5h gave his brother T5j
al-Dawla Tutush Syria as an 1scit5' and promised him
whatever he could capture from the Fatimids there for
himself. It seems that Su1t5n Malik-Sh5h was doubtful of
the loyalty of Atsiz of Damascus; therefore, he granted
all Syria including Damascus to his brother Tutush. The
historical sources of the time do not mention whether in
this year Tutush tried to subdue Atsiz of Damasucs or
not. Anyhow, the conditions in Syria would help Tutush
in the next year to annex Damascus peacefully to his
authority. Tutush marched with a great army to take over
Aleppo from its rebel governor S3biq Ibn Mahmad Ibn
Mird5s, who, eight years previously had recognised the
authority of the SaliTiqs over his emirate as mentioned
above. One senior commander of Tutush, Muslim Ibn
Ouraysh, governor of Mosul, conspired with this rebel
governor of Aleppo to force Tutush to give up the siege
of the city. Ibn Ouraysh had informed Ibn Mird5s about
the reinforcements for Tutush led by Turkom5n al-Turki,
-
one of the amirs of Khur5s-an, in the Wadi Batn5n between
Manbij and Aleppo. Ihn Mird5s managed to ambush this
relief expedition, and captured it. The disaster which
befell the relief expedition, forced Tutush to abandon
the siege of Aleppo, and he went back to Dly5r Bakr to
spend the winter there. Then he captured Manbij, the
fortress of al-Gh:iba between Manbij and Aleppo, in the
spring of this year. With these successes behind him he
5occupied the fortress of Buzia l a, fifteen miles to the
east of Aleppo and massacred the inhabitants who had
plotted a year before against his commander Turkom5n al-
Turd, as mentioned above. Then Tutush advanced towards
the fortress of A 1 z5z and captured it. Afterwards, he
surprised Aleppo, but he failed in his attempt to take
it."
The Fatimids of Egypt were not prepared to tolerate
these great successes of the Saljaqs over them,
particularly the reca pture of the city of Damascus, the
most Important city in Syria at the time. Therefore, in
471/1079 the Fatimid army headed by Nasr al-Dawla al-
Juyilshi recovered Ramla, Tiberias and Jerusalem in
Palestine from Atsiz of Damascus. Then it marched to lay
siege to Damascus;
	 Atsiz then appealed to Tutush
offering to hand over the city to him and to serve
himself under Tutush's command. Tutush hurried to
Damascus and was given control of the city before the
arrival of the Fatimid forces. Tutush then plotted
against Atsiz and eventually had him executed. Tutush
was thus successful in taking Palestine, with the
exception of the coast from the Fatimids. 11 After his
annexation of the city of Damascus to his dominions, he
made this city his main base to control all Syria.
especially Aleppo, the second most important city in
Syria.
6In 472/1080, the twelver Shi'l Muslim Ibn Ouraysh of
Mosul took over the cit y of Aleppo with the help of the
Ahdath of Aleppo, who opened the gates of the city to
him. Then Muslim Ibn Ouraysh who had been promised help
by the Fatimids, advanced to lay siege to the city of
Damascus which was the headquarters of Tutush, who was
Involved in fighting against the Byzantine empire In
North Syria. Despite their failure the previous year,
the Fatimids did not give up their attempts to recover
Syria especially Damascus. Tutush hurried to Damascus
and foiled this attempt to capture his capital."
In 477/1085 Sulayman Ibn Outlumish of Konya restored
the city of Antioch to the Muslims from its Byzantine
governor al-FirdUs al-Rum!. When Muslim Ibn Ouraysh
learnt about the capture of Antioch, he demanded a
tribute from Ibn Outlumish, which the former Byzantine
governor had been accustomed to pay him. When Ibn
Outlumish rejected this demand, Muslim Ibn Ouraysh
marched to take Antioch from him. Muslim Ibn Ouraysh's
forces were comprehensively defeated near Antioch and he
was himself killed in the battle. Ibn Outlumish hastened
to take Aleppo from Ibrahim Ibn 'Aqil the successor of
Muslim Ibn Ouraysh. But when the news of Ibn Outlumish's
advance reached Ibn al-Nutayti, the commander of the
Ahd5th of Aleppo, he appealed to Tutush for help and
promised that he would surrender the city to him.
Although Tutush's forces had defeated Ibn Outlumish's
7army, Ibn al-yutayti refused to hand over Aleppo to
Tutush as he had promised. Ibn al-putayti sent to the
Saljiiq Sultan Malik-Shah inviting him to take control of
the city instead of his brother Tutush. Tutush however
with the help of one of the Aleppo amirs, called Ibn al-
Ra'awl, managed to take over the city, but he withdrew
from it towards Damascus when the news of the SaljTiq
Sultan's advance reached him. According to Ibn al-Athrr,
some of Tutush's commanders advised him to fight his
brother the Sultan Malik-Shah near Aleppo. He adds that
although there was an opportunity for Tutush's army to
win in battle against his Lord the Sultan, he refused to
fight against his brother. Ibn al-Athir says that Tutush
justified this by saying that "I shall not destroy my
brother's throne under the protection of which I have
been granted this power, because that would enfeeble my
authority first"."
It seems that the problems surrounding the fate of
Aleppo worsened the already cool relations between
Tutush and his Lord the Sultan Malik-Shah. Therefore,
the Sultan proposed to check the as pirations of his
brother Tutush upon whom he had bestowed all Syria as an
icit5'. The first step to weaken Tutush (taken in the
same year 479/1086) was that sultan Malik-Shah gave the
new governor of Mosul, Muhammad Ibn-Muslim Ibn Ouraysh,
the rival of Tutush, the main cities in the Jazira
especially those of Diyar Mudar in order to check
8Tutush's expansion into Dl y5r Bakr which lies to the
north east of Diyar Mudar.
The second step towards weakening Tutush was the
designation of a strong governor in Aleppo called Oaslm
al-Dawla Aq-Sunqur al-N5jib in 480/1087. It seems as
though nobody could check Tutush's aspiration to control
Syria, except oasim al-Dawla one of the strongest
governors loyal to the Sultan Malik-Shah. We shall see
in the series of events that Tutush conceived the subtle
Idea of appointing Oasim al-Dawla Aq-Sunqur as his own
wall of Aleppo in northern Syria, in an attempt to
retrieve the situation."
In Rajab 481/20 September 1099, Aq-Sunqur al-Hajib
of Aleppo succeeded in bringing 'Izz al-Dawla Nasr Ibn
Munqidh of Shayzar, who was nominally under the
authority of Täj al-Dawla Tutush, under his own
authority. It seems that iq-Sunqur al-Hajib had done
this to weaken the power of Tai al-Dawla Tutush in north
Syria by getting approval for this from his master the
Sultan Malik-Shah, and thereby to thwart the plan of
Tutush to unite all Syria under his control.
In 482/1089,	 twenty seven years after the
independence of Tyre from the Fatimids, the Fatimid
armed forces led by Munir al-Dawla al-Juyiishi recovered
Tyre from its rebellious governors the sons of the 05d1
9
'Ayn al-Dawla Ibn Abl 'Aq11. Then the Fatimids
recaptured Sidon and the remaining dominions of the
Emirate of Tripoli, for example, 'Arqa and Jubayl, about
twenty miles north of Beirut. It can be suggested that
after the success of this Fatimid campaign, all the
Syrian coast was recovered by the Fatimids except for
Jaffa which was still under the authority of T5j al-
Dawla Tutush. 15 The reason for the inability of the
SaljEtqs to hold the coastal cities in Syria, was their
weakness in establishing a sufficient fleet to confront
the strong fleet of the Fatimids.
In 483/1090 Taj al-Dawla Tutush after a
rapprochement with Sultan Malik-Shah marched with his
own forces, combined with the army of Aleppo led by Aq-
Sunqur and the forces of Edessa led by the Amir B5zan to
subdue Khalaf Ibn Mula s ib, the twelver Shi'l, lord of
Films. They succeeded in recovering this important city
.	 .
for the SaljEqs peacefully, and gave Khalaf Ibn Mula'ib
permission to depart to Egypt."
It seems that this was the first time, since the
designation of Aq-Sunqur al-Najib as governor of Aleppo
by the Sultan Malik-Shah that Aq-Sunqur of Aleppo and
Brizan had agreed to cooperate with T5j al-Dawla Tutush.
No doubt they did this after getting approval from their
master the Sultan Malik-Shah.
10
In 485/1092, Sultan Malik-Shah ordered Aq-Sunqur al-
Hijib, his governor of Aleppo, and Brizbn, his governor
of Edessa, to obey his brother T5j al-Dawla Tutush of
Damascus with the aim of recovering the whole Syrian
coast from the Fatimids of Egypt, the only remaining
area in Syria which was still under the authority of the
Fatimids. Then they should march to overwhelm the
Fatimids in Egypt itself.'' It can be suggested that this
attempt to recapture Egypt, the centre of the Fatimids,
for the Abbasid caliphate was the first serious and
official endeavour of the Saljiaqs to do so. As mentioned
above, in 469/1077 "King" Atsiz Ibn & I of Damascus tried
to recover Egypt from the Fatimids, but his attempt was
foiled. It seems that "King" Atsiz Ibn jig of Damascus
had prosecuted this endeavour without getting official
consent from his lord the Sultan Malik-Shah.
In 485/1092, Täj al-Dawla Tutush, Aq-Sunqur of
Aleppo and Brizan of Edessa marched with their forces to
blockade Tripoli, which was ruled by Jalal al-Mulk Ibn
'Amm5r as an independent ruler. As mentioned above, the
emirate of Tripoli had announced its independence from
the Fatimids of Egypt in 457/1066. According to Ibn al-
Athir, Ibn 'Ammar managed to persuade Rq-Sunqur of
Aleppo to give up the siege, after Ibn 'Ammar had showed
_
Aq-Sunqur an ordinance from the Sultan Malik-Shah
confirming his right to Tripoli. Rq-Sunqur therefore
refused to carry on the siege of the city,
11
notwithstanding that T5i al-Dawla had commanded him to
resume it. He said to Taj al-Dawla Tutush: "I am under
your orders (except when you order me) to disobey the
Sultan". When Aq-Sunqur of Aleppo abandoned the siege
with his forces, Tai al-Dawla Tutush reluctantly gave up
the siege and Biiz:in did likewise." It seems that after
this incident Sultan Malik-Shah had learnt of the
disloyalty of his brother Tai al-Dawla Tutush, and so
Tutush himself hurried to Baghdad to obtain the direct
support of the Sultan. As mentioned above, Rq-Sunqur of
Aleppo was one of the closest commanders to the Sultan
Malik-Shah, and the Sultan had appointed him as governor
of Aleppo in 480/1087 only to block the ambition of his
brother Tutush in Syria. While Tutush was on his way to
Baghdad, the news of the death of the Sultan reached
him, whereupon, he went back to Damascus, to announce
himself as Sultan. The divisions among Sultan Malik-
Shah's sons helped Tutush to win support of all the
governors in Syria for his claim to the Sultanate
including Aq-Sunqur of Aleppo, Lighi-siy5n Ibn Muhamffiad
al-Turkomani of Antioch, and 13Fizn of Edessa and
Harran." This was the first time since the invasion of
Syria by the Saljais in 463/1071 that the whole of
Syria, except for the coast of Palestine, which was
still held by the Fatimids, came under the direct
sovereignty of Taj al-Dawla Tutush as sole ruler.
Tutush marched with ten thousand men to capture
12
Mosul, the most important city in the Jazira, from
IbrAhim Ibn Ouraysh Ibn Badran.
	
He completely
overpowered the Banii-'Aqil, the bedouins of the Mosul
area, whose number was estimated at some thirty thousand
men near the city of Mosul. Then he took the city of
Mosul and
	 its district, for	 the first time, and
appointed 'Ali Ibn Ouraysh, the brother of the former
governor, as his wall in Mosul. After his capture of
Mosul, and his establishment of his power in Syria and
the Jazira, Tutush sent to the Abbasid Caliph al-Muqtadi
to request that he announce his name as Sultan in the
khutta. But al-Muqtadi refused to do so, until such time
as Tutush might be able to dominate all the Saljfiqs
including his nephew BerkiyarEq Ibn Malik-Shah who had
established his authority in Isfahan. Then Tutush
marched towards Diyar Bakr and brought it under his
control including its two main cities Amid and
Mayyafariqin.20
Then he advanced towards Isfahan to subdue the new
Saljaq Sultan Berkiyartiq who was his nephew. While he
was on his way towards Isfahan, Aq-Sunqur of Aleppo and
Bazan of Edessa deserted his army, and joined Sultan
Berkiyartiq. For this reason, Tutush was compelled to
return to Diyar Bakr. Then he marched towards the city
of Antioch whose governor Yaghl-Siyan had revolted
against his rule as indeed had the governors of Aleppo
and Edessa. But, he could not recover the city and went
13
back to Damascus in late	 Hijja 486/began 20
January 1094. 1 In Rabi' II, 487/began 21 April 1094,
Tutush marched with ten thousand men and pillaged the
countryside around Aleppo. Aq-Sunqur of Aleppo, BUzan of
Edessa, Karbaqa, (a new governor of Mosul), and l'asuf
Ibn Abaq of al-Rahba marched with more than twenty
thousand men to meet Tutush there on 8 Jumada I, 487/3
September 1085 near the river Sab'in, a few miles from
Tall al-Sultn. The allies were severely defeated and
all the leaders were captured in the field. Tutush
killed his traditional rivals Aq-Sunqur of Aleppo and
BUzan of Edessa and kept the others as prisoners. Then
he marched to capture the city of Aleppo. Some people of
Aleppo opened one gate of the city to Tutush's forces.'
According to 2 Imad al-Din Muhammad al-Ratib, the writer
of Nusrat al-fatra wa 'usrat al-fitra. Sultn Berkiy5rTiq
was responsible for this disaster to his allies. He
claimed that Sultan Berkiy5rUq not only disappointed his
allies by not helping them against Tutush, but also did
not even read their appeal for help, as he was engaged
in enjoying himself by listening to music and drinking.'
After he had recovered all Syria, except the Palestine
coast which still belonged to the Fatimids, Tutush
managed to take control of Edessa and Sar5j, fifteen
miles south east of Edessa. Then he marched towards
Diyar Bakr, and changed his normal route to avoid the
road to the city of Mosul because Berklyariiq at that
time was besieging his younger brother Sultkl Mahmild, in
14
the city of Mosul. On 15 Shawwal 485/17 June 1093 Tarkan
Khättln daughter of Tafghaj Khan proclaimed her son
Mahm5d, who was onl y four years old, as Sultan after the
death of his father Sultan Malik-Shah, and she set
herself up as a regent for her son Mahmiid. The city of
Isfahan became the centre of SultAn Mahm5d Ibn Sultan
Malik-Shah, and the Abbasid Caliph al-Muqtadi recognized
his Sultanate. While Tutush was on his way to Diyar
Bakr, Tarkan Khatiin advanced with her forces to join
him. She was proposing to get married to Taj al-Dawla
Tutush in an attempt to gain his cooperation against the
Sultan Berkiyartiq whose Sultanate the Abbasid Caliph
would recognize on 14 Shawwal 487/29 October 1094,
instead of his younger brother Mahmal. But in Ramadan
487/began 15 September 1094, she died during her march
to meet Taj al-Dawla Tutush. In the following month,
Shawwal 487/began 15 October 1094, Mahm5d, her son,
himself died of smallpox in Isfahan; then Sultan
Berkiyarbq recovered Isfahan, the only remaining
dominion of his brother Mahm5d. 24 The forces of Tarkan
KhatOn which were some ten thousand horsemen, were
divided into two groups. One joined Taj 	 al-Dawla
Tutush's forces, the other joined Sultan Berkiyarriq.
On the other hand, many detachments from the army of
Sultan Berkiyariiq deserted him and joined the army of
his uncle Taj al-Dawla Tutush. It seems that when the
new Abbasid Caliph al-Mustazhir Bi-'llah Ibn al-Muqtadi
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observed the growing power of Taj al-Dawla Tutush, he
recognized TaJ al-Dawla as the new Sultan instead of his
nephew Berkiyarbq. According to Ibn al-Oalanisi the name
of Sultan Taj al-Dawla Tutush was pronounced in the
Ahutba in Baghdad itself. When the Sultan Taj al-Dawla
Tutush acquired this title, he wrote to his elder son
Fakhr Ridw5n in Damascus to send the remaining
forces of Syria to join him in suppressing Berkiyar5q.
Then he marched with his great army towards the village
of D5sh115, thirty-six miles from Rayy. During his
advance the Sultan Taj al-Dawla Tutush sent to the
commanders of Berkiyariiq asking them to accept his
authority. They promised him help especially as they had
been offered extravagant presents by Taj al-Dawla Tutush
and their master was ill. Yet, they changed their mind
when their master Berkiy5riiq recovered from what had
been a serious illness. Many new forces joined
Berkiyariiq in Jarbadhaq5n, one hundred miles east of
Rayy. In Safar 488/1095,- the armed forces of Berkiyariiq,
some thirty thousand, met the army of his uncle the
Sultan Ta.i al-Dawla Tutush in Dash115, and defeated him.
According to Ibn al-Galanisi the Sultan Tutush himself
was killed by one of his own troops, who had formerly
been a slave of Aq-Sunqur of Aleppo, who had been
murdered by Taj al-Dawla Tutush in the previous year, as
mentioned above.'
After the defeat and murder of Sultan Taj al-Dawla
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Tutush, his son Fakhr al-Munk Ridwan hurried to keep
his father's dominions in Syria and the Jazira.
. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter II. but
a knowledge of the political geography of the dominions
of Sultan Taj al-Dawla Tutush is necessary to a proper
appreciation of what follows. It seems that Syria, most
of the Jazira, parts of Iraq and parts of contemporary
Iran were under the authority of the Sultan Taj al-Dawla
Tutush. All Syria except the coasts of Palestine was
under his direct authority, and most of the Jazira
including Edessa, Sartlj, Harran, Mayyafariqin, Amid,
Hisn Kayfa and al-Rahba were under his authority as
.	 .
well. After his death, Syria kept her loyalty to his
sons including its main cities such as Damascus, Aleppo,
Jerusalem, Antioch, Hims, Hama, Baalbek and Busr-a. Most
-
of the cities in the Jazira were lost except for
Mayyafiriqin, and al-Rahba; furthermore, all Iraq and
Iran were recovered by Sultan BerkiyarTiq. King Shams al-
Mult5k Dusqq Ibn Sultan Táj a/-Dawla Tutush established
his own kingdom in Damascus, without getting permission
from his elder brother King Fakhr al-Munk Ridwan of
Aleppo. The kingdom of Damascus won many great cities in
Syria such as Hama, Baalbek, Busra and probably
Jerusalem."
It can thus be seen that the period immediately
prior to the one with which this thesis deals was one of
17
almost continuous struggle for power within the salitiq
family. stretching territorially throughout the Fertile
Crescent and extending beyond the Zagros mountains to
the east and occasionally even involving forays against
the Fatimids in Egypt itself.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE REIGN OF ZAHIR AL-DIN TUGHTEKIN
488-522/1095-1128
This chapter deals with the reign of Zahir al-Din
Tughtekin who was the real ruler of Damascus during the
reign of King Shams al-Multik Duqaq, one of Tutush's
sons. According to Ibn al-Oalanisi, the most important
historian of Damascus at the time, as Tughtekin had been
designated in 488/1095 as Atabek of King Shams al-MulGk
Duqäq, King Shams al-MulGk Duqaq relied on Zahlr al-Din
Tughtekin to rule the Kingdom of Damascus.' It seems
that King Shams al-Munk won in this year only the title
as King of Damascus, but the real ruler of this kingdom
was his Atabek Tughtekin.
Tughtekin in his early life was Sultan Taj al-Dawla
Tutush's slave, "Mamllik". When Tughtekin was young,
Sultan Tutush discovered his braveness, nobleness and
keenness. Tutush promoted him above his fellow-slave
Turkomans in his court and appointed him to different
middle-rank positions. This was referred to by Ibn al-
Oalanisi who was the only historian to make mention of
it but he did not describe it in detail. After his
success in his positions, Tutush appointed him
Isfahsalar of Damascus, the leader of the army of
Damascus, and his regent in Damascus when he was out of
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the city.' During his administration in Damascus as
regent of Sultan TaJ al-Dawla Tutush, he demonstrated
his ability in administering its affairs. He ruled
justly and firmly, therefore the people of Damascus
liked him and he secured a good reputation in Taj al-
Dawla Tutush's court. In 486/began February 1093, T5j
al-Dawla Tutush gave him Mayyafariqin, an important city
in Diyar Bakr, which is considered his first Iqt5-1.
Besides that, Taj al-Dawla Tutush sent his son Ducl5q to
Tughtekin in Mayyaf.iriqln to give him training.
Mayys5fariqin gained many advantages from Tughtekin's
rule; it became safe and flourished. He succeeded in
crushing a	 plot against his	 rule and killed the
conspirators.'
During the year 488/began 11 January, 1095, there
was a plot against Tutush's regent who was in Amid.
Tughtekin succeeded	 in returning the city to his
. master's authority.4
During the rivalry between Taj al-Dawla Tutush and
his nephew, BerkiyarLici from 485 till 488/1092 till 1095,
to gain the sultanate, Tughtekin joined him in his last
battle near Rayy on 17th Safar 488/1094 when his master
was defeated and killed. Tughtekin was one of Tutush's
few leaders who were not killed, but he was captured by
the Sult5n Berkiyar5q.'
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When the news of the disaster at RaYY reached Fakhr
al-MulUk Ridwan, the elder son of Sultan Taj al-Dawla
Tutush, while he was on his way to help his father, he
hurried to Aleppo and took it over from his father's
wazir AlDU al-Oasim al-Hasan al-Khwarizmi. After a while
Duclaq, Tutush's younger son, arrived from Diyar Bakr in
Aleppo after he had managed to survive the disaster at
Rayy. While he was at Aleppo, Shams al-Mullik Duqaq sent
secretly to S5wtekin al-Khadim, the regent in the
citadel of Damascus, to arrange his flight from Aleppo
to Damascus to establish his own kingdom in Damascus
independent of his elder brother King Ridwan. Duqaq
managed to escape from Aleppo and arrived at Damascus,
and SâwtekIn persuaded the 'Askar and Ajnad of Damascus
to listen to and obey Duqaq. Although the authority of
King Duq.5q was settled, his brother King Ridwan of
Aleppo would not tolerate this rebellious action of
Duqaq. Janah al-Dawla Husayn Ibn Aytekln, husband of
. Fakhr al-Munk Ridwan's mother, was appointed by Taj al-
Dawla Tutush as AtBbek for his son Ridwan. It seems that
Janah al-Dawla Husayn became the first man in Tutush's
sultanate after Taj Tutush's death.' On the
other hand, during his reign, Sultan Taj al-Dawla Tutush
appointed Tughtekin as Atabek for his second son Shams
al-MulUk Duq5q of Mayy5f5riqin, but he had recommended
-
his amirs and commanders to listen to and to obey his
elder son Fakhr al-MulUk Ridwan before the battle at
Rayy.7
24
It seems that because of the death of Tutush, Sultgn
Berkiy;riiq might decline to avenge his chief Oasim al-
Dawla iq-Sunqur al-H gjib , his former governor of
Aleppo, who was executed by Taj al-Dawla Tutush in Rabi'
II 487/1094 after his defeat and Tughtekin was fortunate
that Sultan Berkiyar5q accepted the exchanging of
prisoners. As mentioned above, while Tughtekin was in
prison, Shams al-Muliik Duqaq Ibn Sultan 'raj al-Dawla
Tutush took over Damascus in cooperation with the Amir
Sawtekin al-Khgdim, the regent of Sultan Tutush in
Damascus, without informing his brother Fakhr al-Munk
Ridwgn. When Shams al-MulUk	 Duq gq became King	 of
Damascus, he became independent from his brother Ridwgn
-
of Aleppo," and when Tughtekin was released in 488/1095,
he returned to Damascus. He was well received by King
Shams al-Muliik Duqaq and was reconfirmed in his rank as
Isfahsalär of Damascus which he had held since Tutush's
time. It does not seem to be of critical importance
-
whether Tughtekin got married to Duqaq's mother before
-
_
his capture, as Ibn al-Athir mentions, or later as Ibn
al-Oal;nisi says. In any event Tughtekin became the
master and the first man in Damascus, after he had got
rid of Sawtekin al-Khadim, in the year 488/1095 by
killing him with the compliance of his master King Shams
al-Muliak Duq gq. He reformed the situation in Damascus,
and stabilized his rule there.' It seems that during the
rivalry between Ridwgn and Duqgq, Tughtekin had no
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option but to get involved in this rivalry. In 490
(began 19th December 1096), King Ridwan and his At5bek
Janah al-Dawla Husayn, governor of urns, marched to
capture the city of Damascus. They withdrew towards
their ally Suqmgn Ibn Artuq, of Jerusalem, when they
were informed that Yaghl-Siygn Ibn Muhammad al-Turkomgni
of Antioch was hurrying to help his ally, King Duq5q and
his Atäbek Tughtekin. They pursued King Ridwan and his
Atabek, but Ridwan fled to Aleppo followed by his
Atabek, when most of his army had left him."
Later on, Ridwan and his Atabek advanced to attack
Yighi-Siyan of Antioch, but they withdrew again, when
they learnt about the march of Duq5q and Tughtekin to
_
help their ally. II Ridwan appealed to Sulaym gn, son of
11-Ghaz1 Ibn Artuq of Samosata and both marched to
Damascus for the second time. Ridwän and Duq5q decided
to negotiate peace by the Quwayq River, near Aleppo.
They failed to reach an agreement. Duci5q was defeated in
battle, and turned back with his At gbek to Damascus.
Their ally Ygghl-Siyan fled to Antioch. Suqmän Ibn
Artuq, ruler of Jerusalem, had played a great role in
Ridwan's victory in DhU'l-Hijja of 488/began 3 December,
1095. 12
 Ibn al-Athir believed that Duq5q agreed to
mention the name of Ridwan before his name in the khutba
in Damascus and Antioch." If that is indeed true, it
still did not mean that Damascus came under the real
suzerainty of King Ridwan.
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In 490/began 19th December 1096, Ridwan was very
disturbed when his Atabek Janah al-Dawla Husayn rebelled
in this year, and his brother Duqaq did not recognize
Ridw;n's real authority over him. In this year, Ridw5n
received a messenger from the Caliph of Egypt with
marvellous presents demanding that he recognize his
authority, make the khutba in his name and promise him
great military and financial aid for the recovery of
Damascus. Ridwan accepted this offer, but after a few
weeks, he changed his mind, when he was 	 severely
:
criticized by his commanders who were Sunni Turkomans
and	 antagonistic	 towards	 the	 Isma'ilf	 Fatimids.
Therefore, he reverted to pronouncing the khutba for
the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad." Thus can be seen the
extent to which the Kingdom of Damascus had faced a real
threat from the Kingdom of Aleppo.
In 490/1097, when numerous Crusader forces were on
the way to lay siege to Antioch, King Fakhr al-Mulilk
Rilwän, Y;ghi-Siy;n of Antioch, and Suqman Ibn Artuq of
Jerusalem were on the way to recover Hims from the rebel
Jan;h al-Dawla Husayn. Y 'ighi-Siyan required that the
whole army should hasten to the relief of Antioch, but
Suciman opposed him, demanding that the whole army should
on the contrary, march to capture Hims first, and only
.	 .
then advance to secure Antioch. Anyhow, it would seem
then that the Muslims of Syria at that time had no real
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appreciation of the serious menace the Crusaders posed.
Ridwgn was so disturbed by this disagreement that he
went back with the Aleppan forces to Aleppo. Y5ghi-Siyiin
hurried to fortify his city and dispatched his two sons,
one to Duq5q, Tughtekin, Janh al-Dawla, and Wathth;b
Ibn MahmGd, the leader of Bana Kilib, and the other to
the Turkomans, KarbUq g of Mosul and other governors in
the east to implore them to come to the rescue of
Antioch."
It seems that Ygghl-Siyin of Antioch had discovered
that his Lord King Ridw5n was not serious in helping him
against the great army of the Crusaders, who were
besieging his city Antioch. He, therefore, sent to these
leaders asking for help. Indeed it seems that Y5ghi-
Siygn regretted that he had shifted in his alliance from
King Duq gq of Damascus to King Ridwgn of Aleppo.
It appears that Ridw gn of Aleppo and Suqm:in Ibn
Artuq of Jerusalem did not appreciate that the imminent
threat of the Crusaders to Syria applied to their
dominions in Aleppo and Jerusalem, despite the fact that
it was well known at the time that the main objective of
the First Crusade was the capture of the holy city of
Jerusalem.
_
According to Ibn al-Athir, during their siege of
Antioch, the leaders of the First Crusade wrote to the
Kings of Aleppo and Damascus to inform them that they
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had no	 intention of
	
occupying their	 territories,
probably to prevent them from helping Antioch."'
' During their siege of Antioch, the Crusaders sent
about thirty thousand men to plunder and loot the
country around Aleppo. When they reached al-Bara, about
fifteen miles north east of Af5miya, they killed fifty
people there.
They eventually met the army of Damascus there
headed by King Ducl5q and his At5bek Tughtekin, which had
come to answer the appeal of the governor of Antioch.
According to Ibn al-OalSnisi, the army of Damascus
approached the Franks and killed a number of them. The
Franks were forced to turn back to al-RCO, a region a
few miles west of Aleppo, in the direction of Antioch to
join their main army, which was besieging Antioch.'
Matthew of Edessa who is the only non-Muslim historian
to mention Tughtekin by name in this campaign, believes
that the number of the army of Damascus was thirty
thousand and the Franks' army was seven thousand headed
by Duke Godfrey, the main leader of the first Crusade,
who was saved from death when "the amir of Damascus
called Tughtekin threw himself against the brave Godfrey
and felled him from his horse, but was unable to pierce
his coat of mail, and so the duke escaped unharmed".
Matthew believes, contrary to Ibn al-Gal;nisi, that the
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Franks defeated the army of Damascus and forced them to
flee and then returned to their camp in Antioch."
• When King Duci5g, Tughtekin and Karbriq, the Atilbek
of Mosul, learnt that Antioch had been captured by the
Crusaders, they hurried to try to rescue it. Later on,
they were informed that the citadel of the city had
still not been captured. They arrived at night at the
city; the Franks hurried to enter the city and closed
its gates. They became besieged after having been the
besiegers of the castle of the city. They built a wall
near the mountain to prevent the Muslims descending upon
them. They were threatened by starvation and their food
supplies were almost exhausted."
In Rabi' II 491/began 17 February 1098, while the
Muslims and the Crusaders were engaged with Antioch, one
leader of the Crusaders, Baldwin of Boulogne,
established the first Crusader state in the East, in
Edessa, a region of the Jazira. He managed to found this
new state after he had plotted and murdered its Armenian
King Thoros."
It is apparent however that an atmosphere of mutual
distrust prevailed amongst the Muslims and that the
alliance patched up to attempt the relief of Antioch was
a precarious one of convenience. The continuous
correspondence between King Ridwan and Karbala of Mosul,
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who established strong relations with King Ridw5n, the
traditional enemy of Duq gq and Tughtekin, made both of
them frightened of Karbala. Furthermore, Janah al-Dawla
of Hims, Ridwän's former At -abek, was frightened of •Y6suf
.	 .
Ibn Abaq at this time governor of al-Rahba. The Turks
and the Arabs, (the Bedouins) who came with the arm y of
Wathth-ab (the amir of BanG Kilab) deserted the relieving
force and returned home without permission. On 1st Rajab
491/5 June 1098 when the Franks decided that the
alternatives were to leave Antioch or die of starvation,
Karbala prevented his army from attacking the Franks
until they had all left the city. When the Franks
prepared for fighting Karbilq -6 was frightened by their
great number. His Turkomans fled without real fighting,
then he himself fled followed by Duqaq and Tughtekin.
The Crusaders then took over the citadel on 6th Rajab
491/11th June 1098, and obtained possession of Antioch,'
which was one of the most important and heavily
fortified Islamic cities in north Syria. The Crusaders
made this city and its surrounding area into a state
called	 the Principality of Antioch 	 led by Prince
Bohemond I. There is no doubt that the divisions among
the Muslim leaders, who hurried to the relief of
Antioch, was one of the main reasons for their failure
to achieve their aim of rescuing this important city.
In Sha t ban 491/began 3 July 1098, only one month
after the fall
	 of Antioch at
	 the hands	 of the
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Crusaders, the Fatimid army headed by the wazIr of Egypt
al-Afdal Amfr al-JuyGsh marched to Palestine to restore
it to the Fatimids. The Amir Suqm5n Ibn Artuq and his
brother i1-Gh5z1 failed with their Turkoman forces to
defend their iqta l of Jerusalem from al-Afdal's forces;
therefore, Jerusalem and all of Palestine returned to
Fatimid authority. (The holy city of Jerusalem was to
fall into the hands of the Crusaders in the same month,
on 22nd Sha t b-ân of the following year 492/began 14 July
1099. ) 22
Although the siege of Jerusalem by al-Afdal lasted
more than forty days, 23
 the historical sources mention
nothing as to whether Suqmin of Jerusalem requested help
from either Damascus or Aleppo. It seems that both the
Kingdom of Damascus and the Kingdom of Aleppo were not
ready at that time to protect the city of Jerusalem,
which was the main objective of the Crusaders' campaign.
Both Kingdoms conceived that even if they had managed to
save Jerusalem from falling into the hands of al-Afdal,
they would still not have been able to save it from the
innumerable forces of the Crusaders.
On 14th Muharram 492/began 28 November 1098, the
Crusaders captured Ma'arrat al-Nu t mgn, a big city on the
road between Aleppo and Hama, and treacherously
annihilated its people after they had promised them
safety. Then, the Crusaders advanced towards the city of
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Jerusalem in late Rajab of the same year. They laid
siege to the city and captured it on 22 Sha'b5n 492/14
July 1099 only four weeks before the Fatimids'
relief headed by the Fatimid Wazir al-Afdal arrived at
the city. The Crusaders killed all the people of
Jerusalem, including the Jews, with the exception of the
Christians of the city." It seems that the massacres of
Ma'arrat al-Nu'm5n and Jerusalem affected the Muslims'
approach towards dealing with their enemies, and we
shall see later how Muslims would retaliate for these
massacres by killing civilian Crusaders. It also seems
to have resulted in one of the few occasions in Islamic
history that Muslims killed civilian people in their
wars against their adversaries.
The victory of the Crusaders in 'Ascialan on 14th
Ramad:in 492/began 14 August 1099 over the Fatimid forces
headed by	 al-Afdal confirmed their superiority
	 in
Palestine, especially when al-Afdal and his close
commanders fled to Egypt by sea and left 'Ascialan to
face its fate. But the Crusaders accepted from the
people of 'Ascial5n twenty thousand dinars as tribute to
give up their siege of the city. According to Ibn al-
Gal5nis li, al-Afdal's forces numbered ten thousand men,
and they lost in battle before 'Ascialin about two
thousand and seven hundred men. 29 There is little doubt
that after this success of the Crusaders in establishing
their power in Jerusalem, Antioch and Edessa, the threat
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they posed to the Muslims of Syria especially those of
Damascus became critically serious.
In Safar 493/began 18 December 1099 King Ducigq
marched towards Diyär Bakr to suppress his rebellious
governor of Mayyáferiqin, a big city with a castle in
north east of Diygr Bakr; the governor, one Alt g sh, had
revolted against him there. King Duci -g q however managed
to restore order there and came back on the first of
Shawwg l the following year 494/6 November 1100. It seems
that even though the threat of the Crusaders to Damascus
and other Muslim cities in Syria was serious, that did
not stop the Kingdom of Damascus maintaining control of
its own territories. Later on the Kingdom of Damascus
would lose the city of Mayy5fgriqin, the only city of
its dominions in Diy'ar Bakr, after the death of Sultan
T5j al-Dawla Tutush. In Rabi' I of 494/began 4 January
1101, the Crusaders of Edessa gained a victory over the
TAmir Sucimgn	 Ibn Art6q
	 of Sar5j. Then	 they took
possession of the city of Saraj, a small city on one of
the tributaries of the Euphrates River, about eight
miles south east of Edessa, which had been under
Sugmn's control.' In Sha'bgn 494/began May 1101, while
King Duq.-aq was in Diya' r Bakr to suppress his rebellious
-
wali of Mayy -a- f;riqin, as mentioned above, Tughtekin
•
accepted the offer of Ibn Sulayha, the ci ggi of Jabala, a
city on the Mediterranean coast, south of the city of
L5dhicliyya, to
	 surrender Jabala	 to Damascus.	 Ibn
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Sulayha, who was ruling this city independently, had
succeeded in thwarting four attempts by the Crusaders to
capture his city. It seems that his forays against the
Crusaders	 were among the most remarkable feats of
resistance to the great forces of the Crusaders in view
of the small number of his troops, when we compare his
power with other Muslim powers in Syria such as Aleppo,
Damascus and Tripoli. Ibn Sulayha was convinced that the
Crusaders would never let him rule the city despite the
fact that they had failed to capture it four times. For
this reason, he wrote to Tughtekin to take over the
city, as has been mentioned above. It seems that Ibn
Sulayha conceived that Damascus was the only power in
Syria that was able to protect Jabala. While Ibn Sulayha
was in Damascus, Ibn 'Ammar of Tripoli suggested that
Tughtekin hand over Ibn Sulayha, his former governor of
Jabala, and his assets to him for which he would pay him
three hundred thousand dinars. Tughtekin refused to
betray Ibn Sulayha, who had trusted him. It appears that
Tughtekin's honesty would help him to gain many allies
later on. 27 BEIri Ibn Tughtekin, the new governor of
Jabala, is said to have misruled Jabala and according to
Ibn al-Oal .anisi, this kind of failure was unusual in the
Kingdom of Damascus during that time. The people of
Jabala wrote to Ibn 'Ammr of Tripoli to take over the
city which had been under his authority previously. He
took over the city and captured Burl. Ibn 'Ammar then
sent	 Burl to his father Tughtek-in and informed him
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about his bad behaviour and he justified what he had
done against Burl because he was afraid that if the city
remained under his son's rule, the Franks would occupy
In late Jum5d5 II 495/late April 1102, Tughtekin
received a demand from Ibn 'Amma'r of Tripoli concerning
the danger caused to his city, which was besieged by a
commander of the Crusaders called Raymond of Saint
Gilles. Tughtekin sent two thousand men, who joined the
army of Hims and marched towards Antartris, on the coast
.	 .	 .	 .
of the Mediterranean sea, about five miles south of
Maraqiya. According to Ibn al-Athir, the estimated
number of the Crusaders was three hundred men. 'Umar
Tadmurl, one modern Arab historian, believes that
further help came from the Maronites of Mount Lebanon
and the countryside around Tripoli.". When the army of
Damascus saw the flight of the army of Hims from the
Franks at the beginning of the fighting, it also fled to
Damascus. Then the Crusaders captured the city of
Antartiis,	 which	 had belonged to Ibn 'Ammir of
Tripoli.
In Sha'Can 496/began 2 June 1103,the people of Hims
wrote to Tughtekin to asking him to take over their
city. This request came after their city had reached a
desperate situation especially after the murder of their
ruler JanBh al-Dawla Husayn by the Batinis of Hims.
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Tughtekin hurried to the city arriving before the
Franks, who also marched to capture it. He took over the
city of Hims, which was ruled independently from the
Kingdom of Aleppo by Jan5h al-Dawla and restored order,
thereby relieving the city. When Raymond of Saint
Gilles learnt about TughtekIn's having taken control of
the city, he went back with his forces without achieving
his aim. 31 It seems that the internal dissension in Hims
and the threat of the Crusaders, facilitated the
annexation of this important city to the Kingdom of
Damascus.
In Ramad.in 496/began 9 June 1103, al-Afdal the wazir
of Egypt sent his fleet and army to Jaffa headed by his
-
son Sharaf al-Ma'51I Husayn. Then he wrote to Tughtekin
asking him to cooperate with his army against the
Franks. Tughtekin accepted this alliance, and ordered
his army to march to Jaffa.
But events in Damascus intervened to obstruct the
departure of his army. Ibn al-Gal5n1si, the only
historian of the time who mentions this relationship
between Tughtekin and al-Afdal, says nothing about these
events. 32
Also, in Jumda II 496/began 13 March 1103, King
Duq5q and his At5bek Tughtekin restored the city of al-
Rahba, a strategic city on the Euphrates river on the
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main trade route between Iraq and Syria. It was the
first stop for those travelling from Arabia to Syria,
and it was possible for any one who controlled al-Rahba
to dominate north Syria. The reason for their action was
that the rebel governor of al-Rabba, who was a Turkish
slave, called Hasan, announced his independence from the
Kingdom of Damascus and killed some of his own subjects
who rejected his revolution against his Lord King
Duclaq.23
In Sha t b5n 497/began 29 April 1104, King Baldwin I,
the new king of Jerusalem, occupied Acre, and its
Fatimid governor, Zahr al-Dawla Bani al-Juyilshi fled
from his own city to Damascus. Then the Crusaders of
Jerusalem took the city by the sword. The Fatimid
governor went back to Egypt, and justified his flight
-from the Crusaders. Al-Afdal, wazir of Egypt, accepted
his excuse as being his only means of escape from the
Franks.' It seems that this easy victory and others of
the Crusaders over the Fatimids of Egypt, assisted the
Crusaders in establishing strongly their power in Syria,
thus threatening all the Muslims of Syria including the
Kingdom of Damascus.
On 12 Ramaci gn 497/8 June 1104, King Duq.;c1 died after
a long illness. Ducraq's mother Safwat al-Mulk who was
the wife of Tughtekin, persuaded her son Duq;c1 to give
Tughtekin the succession to his kingdom until such time
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as Dug:Ws son Tutush, who was only one year old, become
mature.' It appears that Tughtekin became the regent of
the young King Tutush Ibn Duclaq and de facto ruler of
Datascus.
In the same year, TughtekIn recovered from a
dangerous disease. It seems that this illness caused him
to try his best to rule justly and he pardoned many of
his own dissidents. Many people moved to Damascus, when
they heard about his justice and generosity. The Emirate
of Damascus became much safer than it had been before.'
Before his death, King Ducfici had put his brother
Arfish in jail in the town of Baalbek which belonged to
the Emirate of Damascus. After King Ducl5q's death,
Tughtekin freed Artash, and appointed him as King of
Damascus instead of his nephew Tutush Ibn Duciag in 25
Dhii'l-Hijja 497/18 September 1104.37
It seems that Tughtekin had designated Art'Ssh to be
king of Damascus in order to win the support of Sultin
Muhammad who had accused Tughtekin of taking charge of
Damascus without getting his own approval. According to
Ibn Art5sh's mother warned her son against
Tughtekin who, she thought, was plotting to murder him.
Art5sh believed his mother and fled to Baalbek to gather
an army to fight Tughtekin. He wrote to King Baldwin I
of Jerusalem asking for help against Tughtekin, but
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Baldwin could not grant his help to Artash. Then Artash
marched with his ally Aytekin al-Halabl, the rebellious
governor of Busra towards the city of al-Rahba to
assemble forces agaisnt Tughtekin. Aytekin al-Halabi
probably gambled in his alliance with Artash against his
-lord Tughtekin. 313 It happened that in Safar 498/began 22
October 1104, Tutush Ibn Duqaq died," which meant that
Tughtekin had no obligation to designate any person to
rule Damascus because King Dug -6g had no other successor.
_
In the same year 498/began 23 September 1104, Tughtekin
received a letter from the head of the Egyptian army in
'Asqalan called San' al-Hulk, son of al-Afdal, wazir of
Egypt, requesting military help to fight the Franks. It
seems that al-Afdal, who was an Isma'ili was trying at
that time to establish good relations with the Sunnis of
Syria especially Tughtekin of Damascus."
-
Tughtekin without hesitation sent first of all an
-
armed force, being about thirteen hundred cavalry.
According to Ibn al-Athir, this army included his best
Turkoman Archers, headed by his main commander,
Isbahbudh Sibgwu. On the other hand, Ibn al-Oal;nisi
believes that Tughtekin headed this army by himself.41
It seems that in spite of the fact that Tughtekin
was nominally under the authority of the Abbasid Caliph
in Baghdad, he believed that the Fatimid Caliphate would
help the cause of fighting against the Franks, who were
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enemies of both the Fatimid Caliphate and the Abbasid
one. Also, Tughtekin's support for the Fatimid Caliphate
would	 help	 the interests	 of Tughtekin	 in Syria
especiall y in the remaining Fatimid dominions such as
Tyre and 'Asqalan, which would possibly be dominated by
him in the future. According to Ibn al-Oal5nisi, the
Fatimid army consisted of more than ten thousand men. On
_
the other hand, Ibn al-Athir estimated the number of the
Fatimid forces to be five thousand plus thirteen hundred
from Damascus, and the Crusaders to be thirteen hundred
horsemen and eight thousand foot soldiers. Both armies
met near the city of Ramla; Fulcher of Chartres mentions
that when the Egyptians surrounded the Franks, under
King Baldwin I, the Damascus archers showered them with
arrows. When the Damascene archers finished firing, they
drew their swords and attacked the Franks in close
combat. King Baldwin with a few men managed to save
those under Damascene attack. Once he had managed to
overpower the Damascenes, he crushed the remainder of
the army.42
_
In the same year, Tughtekin suffered from another
serious disease. During his illness he received a
request for help for Tripoli from its independent ruler
Amfr Fakhr al-Hulk Ibn 'Ammar against the Franks.
Furthermore, he also learnt that Suqman Ibn Artuq of
Wirdin had allied himself with Jekermish of Mosul to
fight the Franks. Because of his fear of dying and
41
because there was nobody, not even his son BUri, to
defend Damascus from the Frankish threat, he wrote to
Suqm5n of M5rdin to take over Damascus. Suqm5n marched
-
to Damascus to receive it from Tughtekin, then to
Tripoli to rescue it from the Franks. While Suqmk) was
on his way to Damascus, Tughtekin regretted having
invited him, when Tughtekin's commanders warned him
about the dangers inherent in this, recalling that
Sultin Taj al-Dawla Tutush had killed Atsiz of Damascus
in Rabl' I, 471/began 12 September 1078, when Atsiz gave
Tai al-Dawla the city.' At first, Tughtekin's disease
got worse, but he recovered quickly, when the news of
Suqman's death on his way to Damascus reached him. Upon
Suqman's death, his army turned back to m5rd1n. 44 It
seems that the death of Suqman ensured the independence
of the Emirate of Damascus, and prevented the Artuqids
from playing any particular part in the history of Syria
at this stage. The Artuqids would have the opportunity
during the reign of 1l-Ghazi Ibn Artuq of Aleppo from
511 till 516/May 1117 till November 1122.
In early Sha l b-án 498/began 17 April 1105, Tughtekin
suppressed the rebellion of Kumushtekin al-Khadim of
Baalbek. The rumour about the disloyalty of this
governor made Tughtekin do this.' It seems that
-
Tughtekin was not prepared to tolerate suspicions about
the loyalty of his governor whose city Baalbek was on
the main highway between Damascus and the city of
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Tripoli, which was suffering from the attentions of the
Crusaders." He then marched to the city of RafLniya,
about fifteen miles north west of the city of Hims,
which belonged to the Franks. He succeeded in destroying
its fortress and killing many Franks and returned to
Hims. 47 It appears that this was the first success of
.	 .
Damascus over the Crusaders.
According to	 Ibn al-Galanisi, in 498/began	 23
September 1104, the Amir Sharaf al-Ma l-ill, son of al-
_
Afgal the wazir of Egypt, wrote to Tughtekin asking him
to be his ally against the Crusaders. Tughtekin replied
-
that he was too busy. It seems that Tughtekin was
engaged in establishing his authority in the Emirate. He
soon marched to Busr5, the main city in Hawr -in in south
Syria, ten miles west of Sarkhad, to take action
against his rival, King Art5sh, son of Sult5n Tutush and
his rebellious governor Aytekin al-Halabi of Busr5, who
had allied themselves with the Franks against him. But,
while he was on his way to Busr5, he changed his mind
and Joined the Egyptian army in 'Asqa15n to fight the
Franks. After the usual defeat of the Egyptian army,
Tughtekin advanced to Busr1 again. He brought King
Art5sh and his ally Aytekin under control, accepted
their excuses and gave them robes of honour and some
iqt;'s to	 placate them. Anyhow, Tughtekin did not
reappoint Art;sh to his former position.40
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In Rabi' II, 499/began 12 December 1105, Tughtekin
destroyed and looted the Frankish fortess called 1A111,
between the Sawki of Tiberias, which lies on the east of
Lake Tiberias, and the region of al-Bathniyya, which
Is located between the River Jordan and the region of
Hawr5n. Then he went back to Damascus."
In 500/began 2 September 1106, the Franks devastated
al-Saw:id, a big region which lies between the east of
al-Ghiar of Jordan and the region of al-Bala', Hawr-an,
and Jabal Bani 'Awf, a mountain between al-Sawad and
region of al-Shurat. The people of the area, who were
probably under the authority of Damascus, complained to
Tughtekin about the Franks. While Tughtekln was camping
in al-Saw5d, Amir (Izz al-Hulk of Tyre attacked the
Frankish fortress Toron (Tibnin), which was ten miles
east of Tyre.
When Saldwin of Jerusalem learnt about this, he
hurried from Tiberias to save the fortress of Toron,
which had just been built by Hugh de St. Omer, Lord of
_
Tiberias. At the same time, Tughtekin
	 marched and
attacked the Frankish fortress near Tiberias, only Ibn
al-Oalanisi mentions this event but does not give its
name; Tughtekin occupied it and killed its guards. Then,
he withdrew to Zurra in Hawran, probably to fight the
Franks in open combat in this big region. According to
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Ibn al-Oalanisi, the Crusader forces turned back 	 to
the city of Tiberias, while the Damascene forces were
preparing themselves for fighting. Then Tughtekin went
back to Damascus. According to William of Tyre, contrary
to Ibn al-Oalanisi, the attack on the fortress of Toron
came from Tughtekin, not from the governor of Tyre. He
•
adds that the seventy Frankish guards succeeded in
defeating the Damascene forces which were estimated
at four thousand, but Hugh de St. Omer, the leader of
the Frankish guards, was killed in this engagement.5°
In Shathan, 501/began 16 March 1108, the Amir of
Tripoli, Fakhr al-Hulk Ibn 'Ammar visited Damascus to
discuss the matter of visiting Baghdad to plead for help
from Sultan Muhammad against the Franks, especially
those besieging Tripoli. Tughtekin sent his son Mini"
with Ibn 'Amm5r to Baghdad. In Ramadan 501/be gan 16
April 1108, during the visit of Ibn 'Ammar to Baghdad,
his cousin and regent in Tripoli called Ab5 al-Managib
Ibn 'Ammar, announced his independence from Ibn 'Amm5r
himself and returned Tripoli to Fatimid allegiance. This
was the first time Tripoli had been returned to Fatimid
authority since its revolution against the Fatimids in
457/1066 as mentioned in Chapter One.
It can be suggested that one of the main objectives
of Tughtekin's sending Burl to Baghdad was to persuade
Sultan Muhammad that he was still loyal to his rule.
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Biiri succeeded in achieving this objective, by producing
extravagant presents for the Sultan.' It appears that
_
Tughtekin used his money to achieve his aims not only
with Sultan Muhammad Ibn Sultan Malik-Shah and the
Abbasid Caliph al-Mustazhir Bi!ll -ah Ab5 al-'Abbas Ahmad
Ibn al-Muqtadi, but also with many others even with the
Franks, as we shall see, when he was to make an alliance
with King Baldwin of Jerusalem and the count of Antioch
in 509/began 27 May, 1115.
Ibn 'Ammar had been promised help by the Salj5q
Sultan Muhammad, who ordered Sharaf al-Dawla MawdEd to
capture Mosul from the rebellious Jawli Suclawa and then
march to rescue Tripoli. Fakhr al-Mulk Ibn 'Ammar turned
back to Damascus, joined the Damascus cavalry, and
managed to take over the city of Jabala, which had been
one of his dominions during his rule over the Emirate of
Tripoli," but it seems that Tughtekin could not help him
to recover his capital Tripoli from the Fatimids. It
seems that the fall of Tripoli to the Fatimids in
Ramadan 501/began 13 April 1108, was a contributory
factor in its fall to the Crusaders on 11 DhITI'l Hijja
502/12 July 1109, as indeed had been the restoration of
the Fatimids of Jerusalem in Sha l ban 491/began 5 June
1098 which was followed by the capture of the city by
the Crusaders in the following year on 17 Safar 492/13
January 1099."
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In the	 same year,	 501/began 22 August
	
1107,
7Tughtekin with two thousand horsemen and many foot
soldiers defeated a nephew of King Baldwin, Gervase of
Basoches, the Crusader governor of the city of Tiberias.
According to Ibn al-Athir, the number of the Crusaders
in Tiberias was four hundred horsemen and two thousand
foot soldiers. Gervase was captured with some troops by
Tughtekin. Tughtekin demanded that the price of the
liberation of Gervase of Basoches and his knights should
be the three cities of Tiberias, Acre and Haifa. It
seems that Tughtekin had chosen these cities because if
he ruled them, he would cut the main route which
connected the Kingdom of Jerusalem with the northern
Crusader states in north Syria. Bearing in mind that
Sidon, north of Acre, was still in the hands of the
Fatimids, King Baldwin refused to pay this ransom and
suggested the payment of thirty thousand dinars to free
his nephew. Tughtekin refused this 	 suggestion, and
killed Gervase and some Frankish prisoners with his own
hands and sent the others as a present to the Saljiici
Sultan Muhammad possibly in order to gain credit for
himself in the eyes of the Sultan. According to Ibn al-
-
Athir, this victory of Tughtekin forced King Baldwin I
to make a peace treaty with the Emirate of Damascus for
four years, and this peace would soften the defeat of
Tughtekin the coming year in Sheb;r1 502/began 6 March
1109 1 near the fortress of al-Akama." Also in the same
year, King Baldwin laid siege to Sidon from the sea with
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the Genoese fleet and from the land with his own forces.
The Egyptian fleet surprisingly succeeded in defeating
the Genoese fleet, but Baldwin continued his siege by
land. When Baldwin learnt that Tughtekrn was on the way
to rescue Sidon, he gave up his siege of the city." This
success of Damascus in rescuing the Fatimid dominions in
Syria would go farther later on, and would strengthen
the relationship between both sides.
As mentioned above, in Ramadan 501/began 13 April
1108, during his visit to Baghdad to appeal for help to
relieve his city, Fakhr al-Mulk Ibn 'Ammar lost his
control of Tripoli. Abri al-Manclib Ibn 'Ammar, his
cousin, and his regent in Tripoli plotted with the
Fatimids and returned Tripoli to Fatimid authority for
the first time since 457/began 13 December 1064.
On 1 Sha'bn 502/6 March 1109, five hundred horsemen
of the forces of the three Crusader states and many foot
soldiers with the help of sixty ships provided by the
Genoese laid a formidable blockade on the city of
Tripoli from sea and land. The people of Tripoli were
disappointed in their expectations of the help from the
Fatimid fleet which did not leave Egypt to rescue their
city, until 11 DhU'l- Hijja 502/12 July 1109. Four
months and ten days after the investment of Tripoli, the
Crusaders succeeded in capturing it by the sword.56
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It is clear that the fall of Tripoli, which had not
been achieved during the reign of Fakhr al-Mulk Ibn
'Ammar who had succeeded in resisting the Crusaders'
attempts for more than four years from Rajab 497/began
30 March 1104, till Ramad5n 501/began 13 April 1108, was
accomplished by the Crusaders within only fourteen
months of its returning to Fatimid authority. The
Fatimids failed to resist the Crusaders for more than
four months during their last attempt, from the first
Sha'ban 502/6 March 1109. It seems that the fall of
Tripoli would enfeeble the resistance of the Emirate of
Damascus against the Crusaders, and that the fall of the
city would make Tughtekin	 follow a lenient policy
•
towards the Crusaders especially when he was
disappointed in his expectation of SaljGq help which
they had promised to Fakhr al-Mulk of Tripoli during his
visit to Baghdad in Ramadian 501/began 16 April 1108.
In Sha'ban 502/began 6 March 1108, Tughtekin failed
to send help to 'Arqa, a city on the Mediterranean,
about ten miles north east of Tripoli, because of the
snow which continued to fall for two months. 'Arqa which
had been taken over by Tughtekin a few months before,
was threatened by the Franks who were headed by William
Jordan of Tripoli with three hundred horsemen. When the
snow stopped, Tughtekin marched with four thousand
horsemen to 'Arqa. He was surprised to find out that the
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Franks were besieging it. He, therefore, marched to lay
siege to the fortress of al-Akama near Raf5niyya, on the
road between Raf5niyya and Antartiis, which belonged to
_
the Franks. It seems that Tughtekin advanced towards
this fortress to make the Crusaders abandon the siege of
'Arqa. When the Franks learnt about this action against
their fortress, they gave up the siege of 'Arqa and
followed Tughtekin. Tughtekin withdrew towards Hims when
he was informed about the Crusaders'advance towards the
fortress of al-Akama. The Crusaders looted Tughtekin's
camp without fighting; then they went back to 'Arqa
which they occupied peacefully."
It seems that in late 502/1109, especially after the
capture of Tripoli on 1 Sha'b5n 502/6 March 1109, and
_
his defeat near 'Arqa, Tughtekin was reluctantly
compelled to reach a ten-year peace treaty with King
Baldwin I of Jerusalem. He agreed in this treaty to
divide the revenues of Jabal 'Awf and al-Saw:id, an area
in the north of al-Balq:i . in northern of Transjordan,
into three parts. One part for Damascus, the second for
the Crusaders and the third for the farmers who were
living there.'"
In 503/began 31 July 1109, after the capture of
Tripoli by the Franks, Tughtekin succeeded in securing
Raf;niyya from them. After their failure to occupy it,
they signed a peace treaty with Tughtekin. Accordin g to
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this treaty, the Franks gained a third of the produce of
al-Biqg
 and they received the fortress of al-Munaytira,
(ten miles north west of Baalbek), and the fortress of
'AkkLr, eight miles east of 'Arqa. Besides that, the
fortresses of Masyaf, (fifteen miles south west of
Hama), al-Tawf5n, (ten miles north west of Hims), and
Hisn	 al-Akrad, (fifteen miles west of Hims), were to
.	 .
pay a yearly tribute to the Franks.' It seems that in
this treaty, Tughtekin granted the Crusaders of
Jerusalem further concessions.
In Muharram 503/began 31 July 1109, the Franks
captured Jubayl, a city on the Mediterranean about
twenty miles south of Tripoli, which was held by Fakhr
al-Mulk Ibn 'Ammar, the former prince of the city of
Tripoli. The capture of Jubayl came a few days after the
ocupation of Tripoli by Bertram of Toulouse, son of
Raymond of Saint Gilles. Ibn 'Ammar refused to settle in
Shayzar with Ibn Munqidh, the ruler of Shayzar. He
preferred to settle in Damascus with Tughtekin, who gave
him a big icrtE0 in the territories of Damascus called
al-Zabadani, about fifteen miles north east of the
city."
In Jumada I 503/began 28 November 1109, the Saljrrq
sultiln Muhammad wrote to every Muslim governor and
commander to place himself in readiness to fight the
Franks each with his own army under the nominal
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leadership of Mawdad of Mosul and Sultan Muhammad
demanded that Tughtekin sta y in Damascus until the
Sultan's own army had marched to Join him there. When
•
_
Tughtekin noticed that the Sultan's army had been
delayed, he decided to visit the Sultan in Baghdad to
encourage him to hasten the despatch of the army. This
visit came after the fall of Tripoli to the Franks in
the previous year, when their threat to Syria and
Mesopotamia "al-Jazira" became serious. Tughtekin
escorted Fakhr al-Hulk Ibn 'Ammar, the former ruler of
Tripoli bringing unique and rare presents to the Sultan
and the Caliph. He appointed his son Bliri as his regent
in Damascus, and ordered him not to break the peace with
the Franks of Jerusalem until he returned from Baghdad.'
It appears that Tughtekin still did not trust the
ability of his son to face the Franks, especially King
Baldwin I of Jerusalem.
While Tughtekin was on his way to Baghdad, he heard
•
a rumour that the Sultan would replace him with a new
-
Amir of Damascus. He, therefore, went back to Damascus.
Ibn 'Ammar continued his journey to Baghdad. He was well
received by the Sultan. Sultan Muhammad was disappointed
because of Tughtekin's belief in this rumour and his
'
consequent return to Damascus."
In Sha'b'an 503/began 25 February 1110, Tughtekin
learnt that his governor Kumushtekin of Baalbek had
five1105, years
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established an alliance with the Franks against him and
incited them to launch forays against the frontier
districts of the Emirate of Damascus. Kumushtekin sent
his brother BaytekIn to the Sultan to worsen relations
between the Sultn Muhammad and Tughtekin. Tughtekin
tried peaceful means to persuade Kumushtekin to give up
his aggressive actions. But this rebel governor refused,
and persisted in his alliance with the Franks. This was
the second time that one of the rebel governors of the
Emirate of Damascus had contracted an alliance with the
Crusaders against his lord Tughtekin. The first one was
Aytekln al-Halabl of Busra in 498/began 23 September
1104, as mentioned above. Also this was the second time
_
that	 the same Kumushtekin had revolted	 against
-	 -
Tughtekin. As mentioned above, Kumushtekin rebelled in
early Shathan 498/late	 April
previously, but Tughtekin had managed to subdue him.
Tughtekin marched to Baalbek and invested it. He
received some of the Ahdath of Baalbek, (people's army),
who came to fight with him against their governor, into
his army. He gave them robes of honour and presents.
After a short battle, Kumushtekin suggested surrendering
his city if he were given another iqta' as compensation.
Tughtekin accepted this proposal and gave him the castle
of Sarkhad and accepted his apologies as was his custom
in forgiving his disobedient subordinates." It seems
that in this sort of way Tughtekin gained many new
followers, who had earlier refused to be under his
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authority. On 21 Shawwal 503/13 May 1110, the Crusaders
of Jerusalem and Tripoli captured Beirut	 from the
Fatimids after a long siege by sea and land. Then they
6
occupied Sidon peacefully. 4 It seems that the occupation
of Beirut by the Crusaders deprived the trade of the
city of Damascus of its nearest trading port (Beirut).
In this year, Sultan Muhammad sent the first well-
.	 .
organised army in the name of the Abbasid Caliphate,
headed by Sharaf al-Dawla Mawdild of Mosul to fight the
Franks. According to Ibn al-Oalanisi, this great army
could have defeated the entire Crusader forces in the
East. While Mawdal was laying siege to Edessa, the
forward outpost of the Crusaders in the East, Tughtekin
was informed about the advance of the Crusaders of
Jerusalem, Tripoli and Antioch across the Euphrates
towards Edessa. He crossed the Euphrates before the
-
Franks. Tughtekin's army and a part of Mawdi]d's army
prevented the Franks from crossing the river in the
direction of Edessa. After a long discussion with his
commanders, Mawdild decided to give the Franks a chance
to cross the Euphrates, and tried to trick them into
meeting his army in the region near the city of Harr;n
which lies in a large plain with which the Franks were
not familiar. MawdGd then waited for Tughtekin's army,
which was on its way to Harra. n to join the Sultan's
•
army.
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The Franks saw through the stratagem and, therefore,
hurried to Edessa and supplied it; they then turned back
by crossing the Euphrates towards their home
territories. Even Baldwin, Count of Edessa, joined the
Franks and left the city to the Armenians, who were the
majority of the population of the city, to protect their
city by themselves. Matthew of Edessa, the main Armenian
historian at the time, gives us the reason for the
Frankish withdrawal from Edessa. He believes that
Tancred of Antioch discovered a plot against himself
among the Franks in the Levant; he therefore, left
Edessa for Antioch, thereby occasioning a withdrawal of
all the Franks.' It seems that the reason for the
withdrawal of the Crusaders was in fact that they had no
power to face the army of the Saljiicis headed by Mawdrid
of Mosul. When the news of the Franks crossing the
Euphrates reached Mawd5d, he sent an army to follow
them. This army succeeded in killing and capturing some
of the Frankish army, especially the Armenian elements
who remained with the baggage in the rear. They looted
their baggage there, and turned back to the main army.
The Sult gn's army advanced to besiege Edessa again. When
the news of the Franks' return to their homes reached
Tughtekin, he hurried to protect his own dominions from
King Baldwin, who might be expected to take revenge on
Tu ghtekin for helping Mawdrid's campaign."
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Most of Mawdars army left him especially the
Turkomans, who had come only to loot, and not for a very
long campaign. For this and other reasons, Mawca3d
abandoned the siege of Edessa. It seems that one of the
main fruits of MawdZd's campaign for Tughtekin was that
he acquired a strong ally in Mawdild, who was one of the
foremost commanders of the Saljilq Sult5n." Furthermore,
it seems that Tughtekin had observed how envy among the
Sult.in's amirs, who had joined Mawdiad's army, caused the
failure of this campaign. We shall see later the
importance of this mutual accord of Tughtekin with
Mawdild in the great cause of the struggle against the
Franks.
After MawdEld's campaign of 503/1110, King Baldwin of
Jerusalem started to retaliate against Tughtekin. It
appears that the justification of Tughtekin in joining
Mawad's expedition was, that his truce with King
Baldwin applied only between Damascus and the Kingdom of
Jerusalem and did not apply to the county of Edessa.
King Baldwin wrote to the Count of Tripoli demanding
help against Tughtekin, and that he gather his army in
Tiberias to join Baldwin's army there. Then Baldwin went
back to Jerusalem for some reason about which Ibn al-
Oalnis1, the only source mentioning this event,says
nothing. Baldwin fell ill for a few days there, which
could be held to account for his return to Jerusalem. In
late	 DhiP1-1:11jja	 504/early
	 July	 1111,	 Tughtekin
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descended to Ra's al-Ma', north of the region of Hawriin
in south Syria, then to Lujat of Hawran, a desert of
Hawran in the north of this region. Baldwin's army
followed him to al-Sanamayn, twenty miles south of
Damascus. When Tughtekin learnt about the advance of the
Franks, he divided his army into several detachments to
cut off their supplies. By this plan, he succeeded in
exhausting the Frankish army and forced King Baldwin to
sign a new treaty with him instead of the old one of
502/began 11 August 1108. By this peace, King Baldwin I
would get a half of al-Sawad (east of the Lake of
Tiberias), Jabal 'Awf, al-Hababiyya, (east of Jabal
'Awf), and the territory in which the tribe of Banii'l-
Jarrah lived. As mentioned above, in the former year
503/1110, the Damascenes had given the Crusaders of
Jerusalem a third of the revenue of al-Sawad and Jabal
l Awf. But in this treaty, the Crusaders got half of the
revenue of al-Sawad, and Jabal 'Awf and al-Hab5biyya as
well. It seems that the failure of the Sult5n's campaign
forced TughtekIn to accept these new conditions."
In late 504/1111, Sultan Muhammad sent a new
expedition to fight the Franks. Mawdad of Mosul kept the
leadership of the army. The Sultan's army on this
occasion consisted of Mawdiad's army, sugm5n al-Gutbi's
army, (governor of Akhlat, Armenia and mayy5f;rigin) and
Ahmad-Il's army, governor of Mar5gha. These armies
assembled in Harr5n, fifteen miles south east of Edessa.
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When they were in Harnin, they received a letter from
Ibn Munqidh of Shayzar, ten miles north west of Hama,
requesting urgent support against Tancred of Antioch who
had built a new fortress opposite Shayzar, near Tall Ibn
Ma'shar, as Raymond Saint Gilles had done in 'Arqa a few
years previously, when he had blockaded Tripoli. When
the Sultan's armies learnt about the siege of Shayzar,
they crossed the Euphrates towards Tall-Bashir which
belong to Joscelin, son of the lord of Courtenay.
Joscelin succeeded in paying Ahmad-Il to abandon the
siege of his city. Because Ahmad-Il had the majority of
the Sultan's army, when his force abandoned the siege,
the rest of the Sultan's army therefore would be forced
to give up the siege also which lasted according to al-
Hafiz al-Dhahabl forty-five days. Then the Sultan's army
.	 .
marched towards Aleppo. Ahmad-Il's forces plundered the
territories of Aleppo and it seems that MawdEld had no
power to stop this plundering.
-
Tughtekin had received some letters from the amirs
who joined the Sultan's army before their crossing of
the Euphrates inviting him to join them. He doubted the
seriousness of their commitment to fight against the
Franks. He, therefore, hesitated about combining with
their forces. But when he received an official order
from the Sultan to Join them, he decided to cooperate
with them in fighting the Franks. Tughtekin advanced to
join them near Aleppo. He was well received by them
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especially by those	 who were expecting extravagant
presents from him for he seems to have had a good
reputation for generosity. Although they pretended to be
pleased when they saw Tughtekin, Tughtekin noticed that
they had no serious intention of fighting. Tughtekin
worked hard to retain the services of these armies by
paying them to stay in Syria to fight the Franks. Also,
he learnt that King Ridwan of Aleppo, the traditional
7enemy of Damascus, had written to some of these amirs
inviting them to conspire against him. Tughtekin
suggested that the armies of the Sultan besiege Tripoli,
which had been captured by the Franks on 1 Sha'b5n
502/6March 1109, and promised them all the supplies they
would need; also if the winter came they would be able
to stay in Damascus. But they refused this proposal.
Owing to his illness, Suciman al-Outbi turned back home,
then Ahmad-Il and Bursuci Ibn Bursuci of Hamadhan followed
him. Only	 Mawdal's personal	 'Askar remained	 with
Tughtekin, Mawdal being the only one serious about
fighting ihe Franks. They advanced to al-'itsi (the
Orontes river) in the direction of Shayzar to rescue it
from the Frankish siege. When the Franks were learnt
about the withdrawal of most of the Sultan's army and
the march of the Muslim army to the Orontes river, they
forgot their rivalries and cooperated against Tughtekin
and MawdOd.69
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King Baldwin, Tancred of Antioch and Bertram of
Tripoli marched to Tall Ibn Ma'shar which is mentioned
above. Tughtekin and Mawdllid were well received by Ibn
Munclidh of Shayzar. By cutting their supplies, the
Turkomans forced the Franks to give up the siege of
Shayzar. Then Mawdild went back to Mosul after which his
alliance with Tughtekin, who went back home as well,
became stronger than before.'
In 505/began 10 July 1111, the people of Tyre wrote
to Tughtekin asking him to take over their city before
King Baldwin I could capture it. They did this, because
of their disappointment with the Fatimid Caliphate,
which sent them no relief. Also, they warned him that if
he did not come to help them soon, they would have to
surrender to the Franks. Tughtekin sent two hundred
horsemen, with many supplies to them and promised them
more relief soon. When this news reached King Baldwin I,
he hurried to Tyre. He gathered all his powers to lay
siege to the city from the land. According to William of
Tyre, he blockaded the city from the sea also.'
When Tughtekin learnt about the siege of Tyre, he
hurried to rescue the city. He sent his men to cut the
Frankish supplies and they succeeded in destroying the
bridge over the Orontes river on the road which
connected Tyre with Sidon. The Franks were then forced
to bring	 their supplies by sea from Sidon. When
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Tughtekin perceived that, he attacked the harbour of
Sidon, demolished twenty ships and killed some sailors
there. Also, he had occupied one of the strongest
fortresses called Habis Jaldak prior to his march to
Tyre."
The Franks built two wooden towers higher than the
_
towers of Tyre. Tughtekin determined to destroy these
towers before the Franks used them in attacking Tyre. He
attacked the Franks several times to keep them busy, and
to give the people of Tyre ample opportunity to burn the
Frankish towers. The Franks understood Tughtekin's plan.
They, therefore, dug a huge ditch to protect their
towers from fire.' According to Fulcher of Chartres and
William of Tyre, the people of Tyre built two towers
upon their walls on the same night that the Franks
finished their towers. Because of these towers which
were higher than the Frankish towers, the people of Tyre
succeeded in burning the Frankish towers. On the other
hand, Ibn - al-Oa15nisi, who describes the siege of Tyre
in detail, believes that the height of the towers on
both sides was equal. Once their towers had been burnt,
the Franks withdrew to Acre after four and a half months
siege of the city. According to Ibn al-Qa15nisl, the
-
Franks lost two thousand men, Tughtekin's army had lost
only twenty men and the people of Tyre four hundred men.
There is no indication in the major Western sources of
the time of the losses of the Franks or the role of
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Tughtekin in rescuing Tyre. After the withdrawal of the
Franks, Tughtekin refused to take over Tyre but promised
its people help when they faced any threat from the
Franks. It seems that by this action, Tughtekin proved
that his fighting against the Franks was not being used
as a justification to annex new dominions to his
Emirate. 74 One year after this event, in 506/began 28
June 1112 the people of Tyre wrote to Tughtekin asking
him to take over their city, as they had despaired of
any relief from the Fatimids of Egypt. It appears that
now TughtekIn had little option but to accept this
offer. He believed that if he did not take over
responsibility for Tyre, King Baldwin would take it
sooner or later. TughtekIn took over the city and
strengthened its fortifications. But he retained the
nominal authority of the Fatimids in the city. According
to Ibn al-Galinisl, the people of Tyre "continued to
profess allegiance to the ruler of Egypt, and strike
coins in his name, and no outward change was made in
their	 practice". King Baldwin meanwhile hurried to
capture the city, but was surprised when he learnt that
-
Tughtekin had taken it over before his arrival."
While Baldwin was on his way back towards Acre, he
plundered the Damascus caravan on its way towards Egypt.
King Baldwin used to intercept the Damascus caravans,
which was however considered a breach of his truce and
peace treaty with Tughtekin. Tughtekin maintained the
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normal authority of Fatimid Egypt over Tyre. He wrote to
_
the wazir of Egypt, al-Afdal, explaining the reason for
his taking over the city, and he pressed him to pay
greater attention to the security of Tyre, by protecting
it more effectively against the Frankish threat. He
emphasized that the Franks would never miss any suitable
opportunity to occupy it. Tughtekin also informed al-
Afdal that his army would withdraw from the city soon,
if al-Afdal could send any one able to protect it from
the Franks. Ibn al-Qa15nisi makes no comment about any
-
reply	 from	 al-Afdal	 in	 Eygpt	 to Tughtekin's
letter.76
In this year of 506/began 28 June 1112, Ridwa- n of
Aleppo faced considerable domestic problems largely from
his governors and commanders who objected to his
alliance on this occasion with the Crusaders. Because of
his domestic difficulties and the threat posed by the
Franks, especially Tancred of Antioch, he wrote to
TughtekIn asking for help. Ridwa'n promised Tughtekin
twenty thousand dinars and many other supplies, if he
would help him against Tancred, who was preparing to
seize the fortress of A'za- z, the main strategic fortress
in the immediate vicinity of Aleppo. Tughtekin accepted
this offer from his traditional enemy Ridw5n. This could
suggest that Tughtekin viewed a weakening of Aleppo as
contributing to an overall weakening of his position in
Syria as a whole, faced as he was in Damascus with
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continual threat from the Franks. When	 Tancred of
Antioch was informed about the march of Tughtekin
towards Aleppo, he abandoned his plan for the occupation
of A t zgz. Tughtekin and Ridw gn promised to cooperate
against the Franks by helping each other in every way.
Also, Tughtekin decided to pronounce the khutba in the
name of Ridwgn in Damascus. But when Ridw gn broke his
promise by sending, during Mawdilid's campaign of
506/began 28 June 1112, only one hundred cavalry to help
Tughtekin, Tughtekin realized that Ridw gn was not to be
7trusted. Tughtekin, therefore, terminated his agreement
with Ridwgn. He seems to have thought (mistakenly as it
turned out) that Ridwgn would change his previous
peaceful policy toward the Franks and that Ridwgn would
cooperate with him against them.'
In 506/began 28 June 1112, Tughtekin wrote to Mawdild
of Mosul for help against King Baldwin, who was
threatening the countryside around Damascus.'" Sultgn
Muhammad was suspicious of the relationship between
Tughtekin and Mawd5d especially when he heard a rumour
that Tughtekin and Mawdt5d were plotting against him. As
mentioned above, Tughtekin had pronounced the khutba in
the name of King Ridw5n of Aleppo. 'Imgd al-Din Khalil,
the writer of al-hfuggwama al-Isliniyya 111-ghazw 31-
Sa1ibi, suggests that Tughtekin and Mawdt-id were
Intending to pronounce the khutba in the name of King
Ridwgn instead of Sult5n Muhammad. Khalil suggests that
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their intention was that Tughtekin and Mawdtild would use
the name of Ridw5n to be free to unite al-JazIra and the
Muslims in Syria in one front to face the Crusaders in
the Levant, and they would not wait for commands coming
from Sultan Muhammad. But King Ridwa'n's failure to help
them caused this plan to miscarry. TughtekIn however
sent his son Biiri: to the Sultan to demonstrate his
loyalty to him. When BUri succeeded in persuading the
Sultan of the loyalty of his father, and MawdEd had done
likewise, the Sultan gave Mawdad permission to depart to
help Tughtekin." When Joscelin of Tall-Bashir, who since
he was himself in Palestine at the time, was nominally
under King Baldwin's authority, learnt about the march
of Mawdlid with a great army to help Tughtekrn, he wrote
to Tughtekin remarkably offering Hisn al-Thamanin and
.	 .
Jabal 'Amla. In turn, Tughtekin would compensate him by
giving him the fortress of Habis Jaldak, located in al-
.
Sawad, and half of the revenue of al-Sawad. Joscelin
thereby would be obliged not to plunder the Emirate of
-
Damascus. Tughtekin refused this offer and marched to
join Mawd5d's army in the countryside of Salamiyya, ten
Miles south east of the city of Hama."' According to Ibn
al-Oalfgnisi, on 11 Muharram 507/29 June 1113, the
Islamic army was surprised when they saw King Baldwin's
army near al-Ughuwana, three miles from the city of
Tiberias, on the Damascus road. One part of this army
hastily marched	 without real preparation to 	 fight
Baldwin's army and attacked it. After three assaults,
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the army managed to overpower Baldwin's army and killed
two thousand men. According to Ibn al-Qal gnisi, Baldwin
was captured and freed, because no one could recognize
him.al On the other hand, Fulcher of Chartres believes
that the Turks	 laid an ambush. They tricked Baldwin
into attacking their small army of about five hundred
men, then the main army attacked Baldwin's forces.e2
William of Tyre charges Baldwin with the responsibility
for this disaster. He believes that Baldwin hastened to
meet this army to win a great victory in his own name.
He, therefore, did not wait for the armies of Prince
Roger of Antioch and Count Pons of Tripoli." After this
disaster, the whole army of the Franks was surrounded
near the mountains of Tiberias. During this campaign,
_
Tughtekin appealed to the Arabs from Tayy, Kilb and
Khafaja to supply the army with water in this place."
The Frankish army faced great danger during this period,
which lasted about two months." On the other hand, the
Franks in their cities especially in Jerusalem, also
faced a real threat during the encirclement of their
field army near Tiberias. According to Fulcher of
Chartres, they did not dare to leave their cities, or
even to collect the harvest." Furthermore, according to
William of Tyre, the Muslims under Frankish authority
in the Kingdom of Jerusalem "treated the entire region
as if it had already been brought under their power."e7
Ibn al-Qal gnisi goes further; he mentions that all
-
Muslims under Crusader authority wrote to Tughtekin to
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accept them as being under his rule, and requested
guarantees of security from him." Mawdad and Tughtekin
decided after two months that fighting the Franks in
this place was not convenient either for the horsemen or
the footsoldiers. Besides, most of Mawdrid's army got
homesick and bringing supplies became too difficult. For
these reasons Mawdlid gave his army permission to go home
on condition that they promise to assemble the next
spring. 09 William of Tyre and Fulcher of Chartres believe
that because of the coming of new pilgrims who might be
expected to relieve the surrounded Frankish army, Mawdad
gave up the siege.' It is clear that Mawdad's and
Tughtekin's armies achieved more than the two previous
campaigns of 503 and 505/1110 and 1112.
In 507/began 18 June 1113, Tughtekin was accused by
the Sultan of arranging the murder of MawdEd of Mosul
who was killed by an assassin in the Great Mosque in
Damascus. The Saljaq Sultan, Muhammad, therefore, sent
Bursuq Ibn Bursuq of Hamadhan, Juyash Bek of Mosul and
other Muslim leaders with a great army to kill Tughtekin
first and his ally and son-in-law, 11-Ghazi Ibn Artuq of
Mardin, and to capture the Franks' dominions second:"
11-Ghazi, who was well-known for his disloyalty to
Sultan Muhammad, managed to defeat the Saljal army
7headed by Aq-Sunqur al-Bursuqi the former governor of
\
Mosul in late 508 near Hisn Kayfa. Sultan Muhammad sent
-
a warning to Il-Ghazi after his defeat of Aq-Sunqur al-
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Bursuql. For this reason Il-Ghazi left Diyar Bakr for
Syria requesting help from his father-in-law, Tughtekin
of Damascus, whose relationship with Sultan Muhammad had
got worse after the murder of MawdOd of Mosul, as
mentioned above. Before the march of the Sultan's army,
in Ramadan 508/began 30 January 1113, Lu'lu' al-Khadim
of Aleppo who was in effective control of Alp-Arslan,
(Ridwan's son, and successor), wrote to the Sultan
inviting him to take charge of the city before it fell
to the Franks. When Bursuq, at the head of the Sultan's
army, marched to take over Aleppo, Lu'lu' changed his
-
mind, and wrote to Tughtekin asking him to help him
against the Sultan's army and to take over Aleppo for
himself; he also requested compensation in the form of
an iqta' in the Emirate of Damascus. Tughtekin, who
probably did not expect this great opportunity, accepted
_
this offer and marched with his ally Il-Ghazi of Mardin
with two thousand horsemen to Aleppo. He arrived at the
city before the coming of the SaljGq forces and
fortified it:" When Bursuq found Aleppo formidably
fortified, he advanced to the city of Hama, which was
under Tughtekin's control. He succeeded in occupying
this city. Then he surrendered Hama to Khir-Khan Ibn
OarZja the ruler of Films. Khir-Khan of Hims and the BanG
Munqidh of Shayzar were the only Muslim rulers in Syria
still loyal to the SaljGqs that year. When Tughtekin
learnt of the fall of Hama at the hands of the Sultan's
general in Muharram 509/began 27 May 1115, he sent
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massengers to Prince Roger of Antioch, with precious
presents,
	 to establish an alliance against Bursuq.
Tughtekin gave him hostages to underpin the alliance.
•
The alliance was signed by Tughtekin and Roger. William
of Tyre believes that Tughtekin signed the same alliance
with King Baldwin.' It could be suggested that the
alliance of Tughtekin with the Franks was considered one
of the critical events during his rule of the Emirate of
Damascus. Fulcher of Chartres	 justifies Tughtekin's
alliance, citing his fear of	 losing his rule in
Damascus." And (as mentioned above), according to Ibn
al-Athir, the Sultan ordered Bursuq first to kill
Tughtekin and 1l-Ghazi, then to fight the Franks.
Therefore, Tughtekin made this alliance not only to keep
his suzerainty in the Emirate of Damascus, but also to
-
save his own life. 95 According to Ibn al-'Adim, Tughtekin
tried his best to prevent the Franks from fi ghting the
Sultan's army. He was afraid that if the Franks defeated
the Sultan's army,	 they would capture all	 Syria
including his Emirate. He, furthermore, believed that if
the Franks were defeated by the Sultan's army, he would
lose his Emirate to the Sultan.' After their waiting for
three months in Afamiya for the Sultan's army which was
in Shayzar, the Franks and their allies, Tughtekin and
Il-GhazI, went back to their respective territories.'
After their withdrawal, Roger of Antioch marched to
rescue Kafartab from Bursuq. He succeeded in Rabl'
509/began 26 August 1115 in defeating Bursuq easily in
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Dgnith, a village thirty miles south west of Aleppo, and
inflicting about	 three thousand	 casualties on the
Sult gn's	 army.
	
Fulcher of	 Chartres	 doubted	 the
seriousness of	 this alliance	 of the	 Franks with
_
Tughtekin and 11-Gh gzi. He stated that Roger of Antioch
alone with his own army achieved this great victory,
although the whole army of the Kingdom of Jerusalem
together with their allies "Tughtekin and 11-Ghzi" had
achieved nothing. This statement appears to confirm that
-
Tughtekin was not serious in his alliance, and succeeded
in persuading them to withdraw to avoid fighting the
Sultgn's army."
As mentioned above, Tughtekin took over Tyre in
506/began 28 June 1112 and appointed Mas'i -Id as governor
to defend the city from the Frankish threat in DhU-'l-
-
Hijja 506/began 18 May 1113; Tughtekin sent a messenger
-
to al-Afdal, -.-wazir of Egypt, to demonstrate to him the
truly desperate position in Tyre and the importance of
sending urgent help there." The messenger was promised
help and he got a letter from al-Afdal expressing his
consent to what Tughtekin had done with Tyre and he also
received robes of honour for Tughtekin and his son Burl..
Tyre became stronger when it received the help from al-
Afgal. It appears that the help from the Fatimids made
King Baldwin write in Rabl.' II 507/began 15 September
1113 to Mas'iid of Tyre proposing a truce and peace
treaty. Mas'Ud agreed to this suggestion and signed a
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treaty. Tyre flourished after the signing of the treaty
through the increase in its trade with its neighbours.10'
• -In Jumada II 509/began 21 October, 1115, Tughtekin
attacked the city of Rafaniyya, fifteen miles north west
of Hims, which had been captured by the Franks that
year, and recovered it. He also captured all the
Frankish guards in this attack. He handed the city to
one of his commanders called Shams al-Khawass, who was
formerly the commander of the 'Askar of Aleppo. Then
Tughtekin with his forces went back to Damascus. It
'
sounds as though by resuming his military operations
against the Franks, Tughtekin was trying to redeem his
previous bad record of making an alliance with the
Franks against the Sultan's army in early 509/began 27
May 1115, and it seems that he intended to show his
allegiance to the Sultan specifically by terminating his
_
undertaking to the Franks. Ibn al-Oal;nisi who does not
mention Tughtekin's alliance with the Franks at all,
claims that because of the great victory of Tughtekin
over the Franks, some envious people in the Sultan's
Court tried to damage Tughtekin's relations with the
Sultan's court. Although most of his intimate friends
•
warned him of dangers at the Sultan's court, Tughtekin
insisted on visiting the Sult5n personally. As was his
custom, he brought with him many precious gifts for the
Sultän and the Caliph. Sult5n Muhammad accepted his
apology and
	 issued a new ordinance to endorse
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Tughtekin's rule in Damascus and every region he could
capture from the Franks later on. Ibn al-Gala- nisi , by
mentioning the whole text of this long ordinance,
credited Tughtekin with a great reputation and a special
position in Syria.101
Carole Hillenbrand in her study "The Career of Najm
al Din il-Ghazi", Der Islam, Vol.58, 1981, suggested
that Tughtekin was not told to break off relations with
his ally and son-in-law 11-Ghazi. She adds that
Tughtekin mediated in Sultan Muhammad's court for 11-
Ghazi, but he failed.102
In 509/began 27 May 1115, King Baldwin I of
Jerusalem advanced with his forces and attacked the city
of al-Farama on the eastern coast of Egypt on the
Mediterranean for the first time in the history of
Crusades. The Fatimids were surprised by this unexpected
attack. It seems no official forces from the Fatimids
faced the Crusaders of Jerusalem who marched towards the
7 T
city. According to al-Macirizi, the eminent Egyptian
historian of the Fatimids, only some Arab (Bedouins)
faced the Crusaders. He adds that King Baldwin was
killed in this attack on al-Farama, but his forces did
not reveal his death.1°3
Al-Afdal, wazir of the Fatimids, sent a letter to
Tughtekin criticizing him strongly for his carelessness
in not informing him concerning the advance of forces of
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the Crusaders of Jerusalem. When Tughtekin received al-
Afgal's letter, he marched with his forces to help the
Egyptians of 'Asqa1n against the Crusaders, then he
went back to Damascus. 104 It seems he did this to soften
the anger of al-Afgal.
In 510/began 16 May 1116, Tughtekin won a new ally,
as powerful as his earlier ally Mawd0d. This new one was
-	 7Aq-Sunqur al-Bursuql, a new governor of al-Rahba, who
had been replaced by Juyilish Bek as governor of Mosul the
previous year. In this year, Bertram, Count of Tripoli,
established a strong fortress in Barin east of the
_
Nusairi mountains, to control the entrance to al-Biq;'.
He then plundered al-Biq -5' valley which belonged to the
Emirate of Damascus. When the news of the plundering of
al-Bic' reached Tughtekin,who was receiving Aq-Sunqur
al-Bursuqi governor of al-Rahba, they both marched
together with their forces to face the Crusaders. They
managed to ambush the army of Count Bertram of Tripoli
and slaughtered it in the land called 'Ayn al-Jarr,
about fifteen miles north west of Damascus. Count
Bertram and a few of his own army succeeded in escaping.
According to Ibn al-Qa15nisi, Bertram did however lose
about three thousand men and his main commanders were
captured. 1 °5 It seems that this victory is considered as
a fruit of the alliance between Tughtekin and al-Bursuql
and their alliance would strengthen the Muslims against
the Franks in the future.
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In 512/began 24 April 1118, during his advance into
the Kingdom of Jerusalem, by crossing the river of al-
Yarmiik, Tughtekin received a messenger from the new king
of Jerusalem, Baldwin II, the nephew of Baldwin I
requesting a new peace treaty. Tughtekin suggested
abolishing the previous treaty of 503/began 31 July 1109
concerning the Franks' half share of Jabal 'Awf, al-
Hababiyya, the city of Salt (about seven miles north
west the city of 'Amman) and al-Ghar, a great valley of
the river Jordan. The Frankish messenger refused this
offer as a demonstration of his power to Tughtekln.
Tughtekin then plundered Tiberias, which belonged to the
Franks. Then Tughtekin marched to 'Asqalan, which
belonged to the Fatimid Caliphate. At the same time, the
Caliph of Egypt sent seven thousand horsemen to 'Asqalan
to avenge the invasion of Egypt in 509/began 27 May
1115 by King Baldwin I. The head of this Fatimid army
met Tughtekin, and informed him that the Fatimid Caliph
required him to be under his authority. But Tughtekin
remained for two months in 'Asqalan without fighting
against the Crusaders and turned back to Damascus.
Meanwhile the guards of the fortress of Habis Jaldak
surrendered their fort to the Crusaders.
	 Then the
Crusaders plundered	 Adhru'at, (the modern town 	 of
Dar'), fifteen miles north west of Busr5, which
belonged to the emirate of Damascus. Soon Tughtekin was
appealed to by the people of the fortress of Habis
Jaldak and Adhru l at which had been pillaged by one
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hundred and thirty Crusaders. Tughtekin without
hesistation sent his son Bari to pursue the Crusader
forces. The Franks took resort to a mountain nearby to
regroup and were followed by alri. Tughtekin, who had
great experience in fighting the Franks, advised his son
not to pursue the Franks on the mountain. But Burl did
not listen to this advice, and pursued the Franks. The
Franks fought desperately and succeeded in slaughtering
Brirl's army.'"
After this defeat of the army of Damascus, Tughtekin
personally visited 11-Gh5z1 Ibn Artuq, the new governor
of Aleppo appealing for help against the Crusaders. It
can be suggested that the establishing of 11-Gha-zi's
authority in Aleppo would affect not only the emirate of
Damascus, but also the cause of the counter-Crusade from
511 till 516/1117-1123. The story of taking Aleppo by
il-Gh;zi Ibn Artuq of Kirdin and Mayy5f .ariqin in
511/began 5 May 1117, begins with the fact that in this
year Aleppo, the most important city in north Syria and
a strategic asset, faced a serious threat from the
Crusaders of Antioch and Edessa who were their
neighbours. The situation in the Kingdom of Aleppo was
aggravated (especially) after the murder of the eunuch
Lu'lu' the regent of King Sult -án-Sh.áh Ibn Alp-Arslan Ibn
Ridwn. The people of Aleppo reluctantly appealed for
help to appeal to 11-Gh -íz1 Ibn Artuq of M5rdin and
Mayyirariqin in Diy5r Bakr. Il-Ghzi Ibn Artuq accepted
75
that appeal, and took over the city in 511/began 5 May
1117.
Although Il-Ghsizi had kept his main bases, M5rdin
and Mayy5f5r1q1n in north east Mesopotamia, (al-Jazira)
and not Aleppo which was more important than these
rather smaller cities in Diyar Bakr, he would get
himself involved in fighting the Crusaders in Syria.'07
It seems that Tughtekin had peruaded his son-in-law
il-Gh5z1 Ibn Artuq to take Aleppo and to ally himself
with him against the Crusaders, especially those of
Antioch who were planning to take Aleppo.
As mentioned above, in Dhii'l-Hijja 512/began 11
March 1119, Tughtekin visited Aleppo and met the new
governor 11-Gh5zi Ibn Artuq. He succeeded in
establishing a strong alliance with him against the
-
Franks. While Tughtekin was in Aleppo, he learnt that
-
the Franks had plundered the regions of Hawr5n, which
belonged to the Emirate of Damascus, and killed some
people and captured others. Tughtekin marched to the
city of Damascus to defend his capital. il-Gh5zi made a
truce with the Crusaders of Antioch, and then went to
M5rdin to muster Turkomans from Diy5r Bakr to fight the
Crusaders.'"
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On 15 Rabl' I 513/26 June 1119, Tughtekin with the
forces of Damascus and his ally 11-Ghazi who succeeded
in assembling twenty thousand Turkomans, according to
Ibn al-Athlr, or forty thousand according to Ibn al-
'Adim, learnt of the advance of Roger of Antioch with
three hundred horsemen and nine thousand footsoldiers
_
towards the valley of 'Afrin near al-Atharib; they
surprised Roger's army and slaughtered Antioch's armed
forces in Balat, a few miles north of al-Atharib.
According to Ibn al-'Adim, the Muslim army lost only
twenty men, and virtually the whole army of Antioch
including Prince Roger of Antioch was slaughtered in the
field. Only twenty men escaped death. After this
disaster at Balat (the field of the Blood) il-Ghazi Ibn
Artuq did not march to capture Antioch, which had lost
almost all its forces. According to Ibn al-Oalanisi, the
Turkomans were delighted with their loot and were in too
much of a hurry to go home to Diyar Bakr. He adds that
Tughtekin did not join in this battle personally. il-
Ghazi had no "sincere advisor" like Tughtekin to
encourage him to capture Antioch. According to Ibn al-
' 'Adim, the Turkomans of il-Ghazl pushed him to fight the
Crusaders with his own army without waiting for the army
of Damascus, which did not arrive in time to join his
army at Balat. According to Ibn al-Qalanisi, Il-G/1311
missed a great opportunity to recover the city of
Antioch for the Muslims. 109 It seems that Ibn al Oalanisi
is wrong to blame Il-Ghazi for not capturing Antioch, as
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it appears that the Muslims at that time had no great
interest in obtaining the capitals of the Crusaders'
states because if they captured these important cities.
the Crusaders in Latin Europe would send another great
campaign as did indeed happen in 542/began 2 June 1147,
after the fall of Edessa at the hands of Zangi of Mosul
and Aleppo, on 26 Jum5d5 II 539/23 December 1144. This
means that the Muslims were planning to exhaust the
Crusaders in Syria, so that the Crusaders would be
forced to leave Syria to the Muslims. Later on,
especially in the earl y years of NUr al-Din Mahmiad Ibn
Zang]'s rule in Aleppo, Nfir al-Din would do the same
thing with Antioch, when he would annihilate its arm y in
Safar 544/began 11 June 1149 at Innab, thirty-five miles
south west of Aleppo.
Before his defeat on "The Field of Blood", Roger of
Antioch had requested help from King Baldwin II, who was
involved in fighting the men of Damascus near the River
Jordan. After his success in driving them away from his
territories, he hurried to aid the people of Antioch,
who had lost their army in "The Field of Blood". It
appears that Tughtekin had sent these forces to keep
Baldwin II busy in order to prevent him from helping
Antioch. King Baldwin II with the army of the Kingdom
and that of Edessa, which was still under his authority
as a count of Edessa, marched to Zardana, fifteen miles
south west of Aleppo. When the people of Jerusalem heard
about the march of 11-Gh5zi, they argued with each other
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about whether to advance to fight il-Ghazi or to stay in
Jerusalem. lio According to Fulcher of Chartres, Baldwin
II	 advanced to	 Antioch, which	 the Turkomans had
plundered, and its people did not dare to go outside
more than a mile. When they were notified of the
approach of Baldwin II, they withdrew towards Aleppo.
Then 11-Ghazi marched towards Artah, where the Damascene
army, headed by Tughtekin joined his army. Then they
succeeded in recovering al-Atharib and Zardana, whose
lord had gone to Antioch. Most of the Turkomans of 11-
Ghazi turned back home after his recovery of Zardana.
Then 11-Ghazi and Tughtekin advanced towards Danith, and
met Robert the Leper the former Crusader governor of
Zardana, who had been in Antioch, with four hundred
horsemen plus the footsoldiers. The Crusaders defeated
the Muslims at first, but the Muslims managed to force
the Crusaders to withdraw to Hisn Hab, which belonged to
.	 .
them. Then the Crusaders including those of Jerusalem,
Tripoli and the fortress of Zardana met the Muslims near
Danith. According to Fulcher of Chartres, many Turkomans
and Franks were killed or injured in an indecisive
7battle which lasted for three days near Ma'arrat Misrin,
ten miles north east of Danith. He adds that then
Baldwin II retired to Antioch and the great part of 11-
Ghazi's army turned back home. 111
 Ibn al-Athir believes
that the armies of il-Gh5zi and Tughtekin besieged the
Frankish army for three days. But they gave up the siege
because Tughtekin was afraid that the Franks would fight
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desperately. Also Tughtekin had doubts about the horses
of the Turkomans, which fled easily, not like the horses
of the Franks which were better trained for fighting
- Tthan those of the Turkomans. Besides, Il-Ghazi had not
enough money for the Turkomans to keep them for a long
time. 112
The year 515/began 22 March 1121, Tughtekin lost one
of his main allies, al-Afdal, wazir of Egypt. This wazir
and his father Badr al-Jam -611 had ruled Egypt for about
fifty years. They had been able to concentrate all the
powers in their own hands. The Fatimid Caliph al-Amir
bi-Ahk5mi'-1lah, had his wazIr murdered.11°
On 23 Jum5da I 518/7 July 1124, the important
strategic city of Tyre was captured by the Crusaders.
Eight years previously, in 510/began 16 May 1116, Tyre
became the onl y coastal city bar 'Ascjaliin not occupied
by the Franks. King Baldwin II established a fortress
called Scandelion between Acre and Tyre, to facilitate
its capture. This fortress would be a shelter for the
Franks, if they were defeated by the people of Tyre.124
Baldwin I tried, as mentioned above, in 505/1112 to
capture the city, but he failed. Tughtekin played a
significant role in foiling this attempt, as mentioned
above. William of Tyre believes that Tyre, before its
capture by the Franks in 518/began 19 February 1124, was
subject to the Fatimid Caliphate. Two parts of it were
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ruled by the Fatimid Caliph, al-Amir bi-Ahk5mi2 ll'àh,
and the third part of it was granted to Tughtekin to
protect against the Franks. This last part was not given
to Tughtekin as part of his own dominion."' On the other
hand, Ibn al-Oal5nisi gives us more details about the
position of Tyre before its capture. He mentions that in
516/began 12 March 1122, the Fatimids of Egypt recovered
Tyre from the Emirate of Damascus, when they plotted
against its governor Mas t ild. Tyre now became directly
under Egyptian authority. But when the new governor
discovered that he could not protect the city without
the support of Tughtekin, he wrote to him asking for
help. Tughtekin ironically replied that he should have
asked not him but the Caliph in Egypt for help. When the
Franks learnt about the dismissal of Masd and the
appointment of a new governor, they made preparations
for capturing the city. Anyhow, the new governor
persuaded the Fatimid Caliph to give the city back to
Tughtekin who did agree to take it back and appointed a
new governor whom he sent with a group of commanders to
protect the city. Tughtekin thought that the people of
Tyre, with their new governor, could be relied upon to
defend the city, but he was disappointed.116
Tyre was one of the most strongly fortified cities
at the time. It was like an island encircled by a stormy
sea. It was risky to enter the city from the sea,
because of its hidden rocks which could cause severe
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damage to ships if their sailors were not familiar with
the coast and so able to avoid these hidden dangers.
"On the seaside, Tyre was surrounded by a double
wall with towers of goodly height at equal
distances apart. On the east, where the appoach
by land lies, it has a triple wall with
enormously high and massive towers so close
together that they almost touch one another.
There was a broad mole also, through which the
citizens could easily let in the sea from both
sides. On the north, its entrance guarded by two
towers, was the inside harbour which lay within
the walls of the city. The outer shore of the
island received the first violence of the waves
and broke the force of the raging sea. Thus, a
safe harbour, for vessels was formed between the
island and the land, which was entirely
sheltered from all winds except that from the
north".117
In 518/1124, the Franks blockaded Tyre from the sea
and the land. According to William of Tyre, "The
Christians drew up all their ships on dry land near the
harbour, with the exception of one galley that was kept
ready for any emergency which might arise. The y then dug
a deep ditch from the sea outside to that within, thus
enclosing and protecting the entire army. " 118 They built
a great tower higher than the towers of the city, to
overlook the entire city. And they made machines to
throw big rocks to destroy the walls and towers of the
city. The Tyrians were exhausted by the continuous
attacks and skirmishes. But they succeeded through the
use of their machines in reducing the efficiency of the
Franks' machines. 119 Pons, Count of Tripoli, joined the
Frankish army during the blockade of the city. His
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arrival caused fear to the Tyrians on the one hand, and
strengthened the Franks on the other.12°
The Damascus horsemen in Tyre, who numbered about
seven hundred, played a major part in defending the city
and encouraging the Tyrians, most of whom were not
sufficiently professional in the arts of fighting to
defend their city effectively. During the blockade of
Tyre, the people of 'AscialAn, who were under the
authority of the Fatimid Caliphate, tried to decrease
the pressure on the Tyrians by invading the lands of
Jerusalem. But they were forced to withdraw. The Tyrians
were disappointed by the attempts at help by the
Fatimid Caliphate. Tughtekin marched with a great army
and encamped in the vicinity of Tyre about four miles
from the city, 121 and the Franks heard a rumour that a
great Egyptian fleet would come to aid the Tyrians. It
was revealed that Tughtekin would keep the Franks
sufficiently occupied and give the Egyptian fleet a good
opportunity to enter the harbour of the city. When the
news of Tughtekin's arrival reached the Franks, they
decided to divide their army into three parts. The whole
cavalry forces and the mercenary infantry led by the
Count of Tripoli and William de Bury, the king's
constable "because the King was a prisoner", were to
stop Tughtekin's army from advancing towards Tyre. The
second part, led by the Doge of Venice Domenico Michiel
was to prevent the Egyptian fleet entering the harbour
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of Tyre. The last part was to take part in the siege of
the city. Tughtekin planned to cross the Orontes towards
Tyre, but when he was informed about the Franks' advance
towards him, he withdrew to Damascus. No Egyptian fleet
had come, therefore the Venetian fleet pulled up their
galleys on the land again. All the Frankish armies
returned to the siege of the city. 122 When Tughtekin
learnt that the Tyrians would surrender to the Franks,
after they had been exhausted, he marched again towards
Tyre and camped near the river, a few miles from the
city. The Franks again sent a part of their army to stop
Tughtekin's army. He sent messengers to the Frankish
leaders to reach a compromise. On 23 Jum5d,i I 518/7 July
1124, after very hard arguments, they reached an
agreement. The agreement included the following terms:
first, the surrender of the city to the Franks,
secondly, the Tyrians were to be allowed to leave the
city with their money, and the last term was that the
Tyrians who wished to stay in the city would be granted
the right to keep their homes and their possessions.
Most Tyrians left the city except some old people, who
could not leave.'"
Two years before the fall of Tyre, Aleppo suffered
again from the Crusaders. On 6 Ramaq5n 516/8 November
1122, Tughtekin lost his reliable ally Il-Ghazi who died
in al-Fuhiil, a village near the city of Mayy5friqin.
After the death of 11-Gh -6zi, his nephew Badr al-Dawla
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Sulaym-an Ibn EAbd al-Jabbar Ibn Artuq, continued to rule
over Aleppo, since his uncle had appointed him as
governor. In the following year, Badr al-Dawla Sulayean
made a truce with the Crusaders of Antioch to surrender
the fortress of al-Atharib, twenty miles west of Aleppo.
In Rabi' I 517/began 28 April 1123, the Amir Balak Ibn
Bahram Ibn Artuq of Khartpirt, nephew of il-Ghazi,
captured the city of Aleppo from his cousin Ibn 'Abd al-
Jabbar, and managed to settle the situation in the city.
According to Ibn al-Athir, the surrender of al-Atharib
made Balak capture the city of Aleppo. The Amir Balak
had captured both King Baldwin II of Jerusalem in Safar
517/began April 1123 near Hisn Karkar (Gargar), and
Count Joscelin, Count of Edessa in Rajab 516/began 5
September 1123 near Saraj. The Amir Balak, however, was
killed in Rath: * I 518/began 18 April 1124, while he was
besieging Manbij which belonged to Hassan al-Ba'albakki.
After Balak's murder, Husam al-Din Timurtash Ibn 11-
Ghazi received Aleppo on 20 Rabi t I 518/8 May 1124. Then
he released King Baldwin II after the latter had paid a
great ransom. During the reign of Husam al-Din of
Aleppo, the city was almost captured by the Franks.
According to Ibn al-Athir, the fall of Tyre on 23 Jum5da
I 518/7 July 1124 induced the Crusaders to occupy
Aleppo. He adds that Dubays Ibn Sadaqa Ibn Mazyad, the
Twelver Shi q rebellious governor of Hilla in south
Iraq, encouraged and helped the Crusaders to occupy the
city of Aleppo. He did that in case they succeeded in
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capturing Aleppo, in the hope that he would be their
regent in Aleppo. Dubays Ibn Sadaqa Ibn Mazyad persuaded
the Crusaders that the people of Aleppo, of whom the
7 7
majority were	 Twelver Shi'is,	 would help	 him by
encouraging the surrendering of the city. On the other
7hand, the people of Aleppo wrote to Aq-Sunqur al-Bursuqi
of Mosul, who had been reappointed as governor of Mosul
in Safar 515/began 22 April 1121, to hasten to take over
their city before the arrival of the Crusaders and their
ally Ibn Mazyad. When 'Aq-Sunqur al-Bursuqi took over the
city, the Crusaders withdrew from their camp near Aleppo
towards their own lands.124
In this year, Tughtekin won for the second time the
alliance of Aq-Sunqur al-Bursuqi which compensated him
_	
- 7for the loss of his early ally Il-Ghazi in 516/1123.125
As mentioned above, in 510/began 16 May 1116, Tughtekin
had allied himself with Aq-Sunqur al-Bursuql of al-Rahba
against the Crusaders of Tripoli.
_
In 519/began 7 February, 1125, Tughtekin's army
_
joined al-Bursuqi's army in Hama and marched to capture
Kafart5b, which belonged to the Franks. They recovered
Kafartb on 3 Rabl' II 519/10 May 1125. 26
 Then they
marched to besiege the castle of Zardana, which belonged
to the Franks. They gave up the siege of Zardan:i because
of its strong fortifications."' According to Fulcher of
_
Chartres, Tughtekin joined al-Bursuqi's army, only when
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he advanced to besiege A'zaz, not after the capture of
Kafart5b. King Baldwin II with the armies of Antioch,
Tripoli and Edessa marched to rescue A'z5z. Tughtekin's
army and al-Bursucli's were nearly defeated by the Franks
on 16 Rabi' II 519/23 May 1125, and lost about two
thousand men according to Fulcher of Chartres. Then
Tughtekin withdrew to protect Damascus against the
Franks. 129
In any event, the city of Damascus itself, would be
the main target of the Crusaders in 519/began 7
February, 1125, for Baldwin II sent many messengers to
the West to assist him
	
in capturing the city of
Damascus. Many new soldiers (pilgrims) came from the
West to share in this campaign against Damascus. All the
princes of the Franks in the East agreed to join this
campaign. 129
 When this news reached Tughtekin, he wrote
to the Turkomans especially in Diyr Bakr for help and
made them generous offers. Two thousand Turkoman
horsemen joined Tughtekin's army near Man j al-Suffar.
According to Ibn al-Gannisi, when the news of the
assembly of Tughtekin 's army near Mari
	 al-Suffar
•
reached the Franks, they advanced to face him. But
according to Ibn al-Athir and William of Tyre, Tughtekin
marched towards one of the Frankish armies numbering
about one thousand men, who had come to plunder Man j al-
Suffar, which was one of the most important cultivated
areas in Syria. He succeeded in annihilating this army,
87
of which only a few Franks escaped. He took much loot
and obtained the famous holy objects which were in their
1camp. 30 The news of this disaster reached the main
Frankish army, which was besieging Damascus. Because of
this disaster, the Franks gave up their siege of
Damascus."' According to Ibn al-Oalänisi, Tughtekin was
nearly defeated in a counter attack directly after this
victory and was forced to turn back to Damascus. The
next day, he advanced to meet the Franks, but he found
out that they had left their camp on their way home.'
Unfortunately, on 8 Dhii'l-Hijja 520/26 December
1126, TughtekIn lost his ally al-Bursuqi, who was killed
by the Assassins in Mosul. 'Izz al-Din Mas i iid, son of
al-Bursuql, who took over Aleppo and Mosul after his
father's death, tried in the following year to capture
the city of Damascus. Tughtekin prepared to face him.
According to Ibn al-'Adim, 'Izz al-Din Mas'Ud thought
that the killers of his father were some people of Hama
which was under the rule of the Emirate of Damascus; he
therefore bore the people of Syria, especially of
Damascus, a grudge. Tughtekin prepared to face him.
Mas'Ud died after his capture of al-Rahba on his wa y to
Damascus. Ibn al- 1 Adim believes that he took some kind
of poison, while Ibn al-Athir and Ibn al-Qalanisi
believe that his death was caused by a serious
illness. 133
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In 522/began 6 January 1128, Tughtekin became
seriously ill. Before his death, he stipulated that his
eldest son Taj al-Munk BGri should follow his policy in
fighting the Franks and protecting his dominions. After
BGri had accepted this condition, Tughtekin gave orders
that he should be his heir in the Emirate of Damascus.
Tughtekin died on 8 Safar of this year/11 February 1127.
No indication from the main historical sources about his
age is given. But it is reasonable to suggest that he
was over fifty, because he became a grand father about
the twelfth year before his death. According to Ibn al-
oalanisi, on 12 Rabi' II 520/8 May 1126, Tughtekin had
sent his grandson MahmUd Ibn Bari to Tadmur with a
reliable commander as his Atabek.134
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CHAPTER III
THE REIGN OF TAJ AL-MUL5K BURI IBN ZAHIR
AL-DIN TUGHTEKIN
522-526/1128-1132
In understanding the reign of Taj al-MulOk Biari a
survey of the background of the Batiniyya in Syria is an
essential element, and of particular importance is the
history of the Batiniyya in Damascus. The Batiniyya
movement was the main issue facing Burl during his short
reign of four and a half years from 8 Safar 522/11
February 1128 till 21 Rajab 526/6 June 1132.
The Batiniyya movement was the sect, which split
from the Isma g lis of Egypt after the death of the
Fatimid Caliph al-Mustansir on 18 Dha i l-Hijja 487/30
December 1094 and were known as the Nizarls.' This sect
did	 not recognize the imamate of al-Musta'11, who
succeeded his father al-Mustansir 	 in 487/began	 21
January 1094. They believe in the imamate of Nizar the
eldest son of al-Mustansir. Al-Hasan al-Sabbah who
headed this sect from 487 till 518/1094 till 1124, 2 had
established himself in the castle of AlamTit three years
before this date. According to Ibn al-Athir, al-Hasan
al-Sabbah occupied this formidable castle in 484/began
23 February 1091. 3
 This sect is well-known by Muslim
historians by the name of the Batiniyya or Niz;riyya.
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This movement is well known by current historians
especially in the west as the Assassin movement. The
history of the movement in Syria is problematic as tends
to be the case with most secret sects. A possible reason
for this is	 that Batini
	
historical sources were
destroyed by their enemies or possibly the Batinf
historians were not interested in writing their own
history.'
The political confusion in Syria in the early
twelfth century helped the B5tinis to establish their
Da i wa in a short time there. The rivalry between King
Ridwan of Aleppo and his brother King Ducl5q of Damascus
gave the Batinis a great opportunity to gain the
protection of Ridwan in return for helping him against
his brother Duclaq. Also, the absence of a unified
authority in Syria helped the Batinis to establish their
Da i wa there. All independent states in Syria such as
Damascus, Aleppo, Tripoli and Shayzar, were eager to
expand their dominions at the expense of their
neighbours. This situation made it impossible for weak
states to cooperate against the Batinf movement.
Furthermore, the coming of the Crusaders, who
established themselves on the Syrian coast, kept Syrian
states occupied fighting the invaders rather than
fighting the B3tiniyya.° This was a particularly
intractable problem as, while the Crusaders presented an
obvious and easily identifiable threat, the insidious
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nature of the activities of the Batiniyya made
opposition to the Batiniyya difficult to mount, because
of the problems of establishing precisely the location
of the enemy within.
During the reign of Ridwan of Aleppo from 17 Safar
488/28 February 1095 till 18 Jumada II 507/28 November
1114, Aleppo became the main centre of the Batiniyya in
Syria. Ridwan granted the Batinis of Aleppo his
protection in 490/began 19 December 1096. In the same
year, the threat of the Crusaders became serious for
Aleppo. Many of Ridwan's commanding amirs denounced his
peaceful policy toward the Crusaders. Ridwan himself
compounded his difficulties by becoming a patron of the
Batinis in Syria. The reason for his protection of the
Batinis was probably his need for their help against his
brother King Duqaq of Damascus 	 and his Atabek
Tughtekin. 6
According to Ibn al-'Adim, the Da t i of the Bgtiniyya
in Aleppo called al-Hakim al-Munajjim introduced King
Ridwan of Aleppo to the sect of the Batiniyya. He adds
that this Da'l worsened the relations between King
Ridwan and his Atabek Janah al-Dawla Husayn of Hims.7
Ibn Taghribirdl	 in his	 study al-NujElm	 al-z5hira,
mentions that Ridwan was the first Muslim leader in
Syria at the time to build a Dar al-Da t wa in Aleppo,
effectively a school for spreading the Batini sect in
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Syria. He appointed al-Hakim al-Munajjim as the head of
this school.' It seems that al-Hakim al-Munajjim could
be regarded as the personal counsellor of Ridwan. Ridwan
gave another Bgtini leader called Ibrahim al-'Ajami a
very important position in Aleppo. This al-'AJaml became
the deputy of the citadel of Aleppo, a very sensitive
position in Aleppo.'
Because of the protection of Ridwan for the Batinis
and their efforts, the 135.tini movement spread through
-7Sarmin, al-JUz, Jabal al-Sammaq, BanT.1 'Ulaym, Buza'a,
al-Bab, A i zaz and Afamiya. Mustafa Ghalib (a modern
historian) in A i lam al-Ism5 e Iliyya, mentions that in
496/began 15 October 1102 Janah al-Dawla Husayn of Hims
conspired against the Bgtinis in Hims. Then al-Hakim al-
.	 .
Munajjim sent one of the fidawiyya "commandos" and
killed Janah al-Dawla. 1° Al-Munajjim died naturally
fourteen days after the killing of Janah al-Dawla of
Hims on 22 Rajab 496/2 May 1103. M. G. S. Hodgson, the
modern western historian, believes that the Batiniyya
assassinated Janah al-Dawla in order to take over Hims
.	
-	 -
and to get more support from Ridwan, who had strived to
get rid of his former Atabek Janah al-Dawla, his main
opponent in Aleppo. After the killing of Janah al-Dawla,
the people of Hims were frightened of the Batinis and
the Crusaders. Most Turks of the city fled to Damascus,
and the people of Hints requested help from Tughtekin.
Tughtekin marched to Rims, took over the city and
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settled the situation there. As mentioned in Chapter
Two, the Crusaders tried to capture this city after the
murder of its master Jan5h al-Dawla, but Tughtekin
anticipated them in this. They, therefore, returned
home." Whether the B5tiniyya killed Jan5h al-Dawla on
their own responsibility, or whether they got permission
from King Ridwan who was probably planning to get rid of
his rebel and former Atabek, the only person to derive
real benefit from the murder of Janah al-Dawla was
Tughtekin and the Emirate of Damascus. After the death
of al-Hakim al-Munajjim, a new leader was sent from
AlamUt by al-Hasan al-Sabbah. This new leader was called
Abil T5hir al-Sa'igh, (the goldsmith), from Persia as the
previous leader was. This new leader was more daring and
braver than the previous D5'I al-Munajjim. 12
After the death of Sult5n Berkiyar5q on 1 Rabi' II
489/31 March 1096, the new Sultan Muhammad had greater
sucess against the B5tinis of Persia. He, furthermore,
compelled Ridw5n to change his peaceful policy towards
the Batiniyya in Aleppo. In 499/1106, the Batinis of
-
Sarmin with the help of the local Batinis of Afamiya,
-
overthrew the regime of the city of Af5miya, which was
nominally under the suzerainty of Ridw5n. Although the
Batinis soon lost Af5miya to the Crusaders of Antioch,
Ridwan took this as reasonable justification for
distancing himself from the B5tinis. In the following
year Ridw5n oppressed some of the Batinis in Aleppo and
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expelled others from the city."
In 504/began 20 July 1110, a wealthy Iranian called
Abii Harb, who was well known for his hostility to the
BatinTs, was killed in Aleppo; the people of Aleppo
accused the Batinis of this assassination and launched
an attack on them. They killed some of the Ba' tinis, and
no one could stop them, not even Ridwan."
On 18 Jumada II 507/30 November 1114, King Ridwan of
Aleppo died and was succeeded by his son Alp Arslan who
was only sixteen years old at the time. During his
reign, the Batinis took over the fortress of Balls on
the road from Aleppo to Baghdad, from Alp Arslän.15
In the same year, under pressure from Sultan
Muhammad, the twelver Shl'a of Aleppo and the Ahdath of
Aleppo, Alp Arslan ordered his people to arrest every
-:Batini in Aleppo. According to Ibn al-'Adim, over two
:-hundred Bätinis were arrested including their leader Abii
Tahir al-Wigh, while a group of them succeeded in
fleeing. Among those who escaped were the Da'i Husam al-
-7Din Ibn Dimlaj who fled to al-Raqqa in Mesopotamia, and
the Da t i Ibrahim al- 1 Ajaml who escaped to Shayzar; this
was the deputy of the citadel of Aleppo, as has been
mentioned above. Al- t Ajami then fled to Shayzar, and was
well received by the governor of the city. According to
_
Ibn al-Qalanisi, some of the BEtinis who fled from
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Aleppo went to the Crusaders." In the same year, al-
'Ajami rewarded the hospitality of the people of Shayzar
by plotting against them and he succeeded in capturing
the fortress of Shayzar with one hundred Batinis from
Afamiya, Sarmin, Ma'arrat al-Nu'man and Ma'arrat Misrin
-
during the festival of Easter. He selected this time,
because the leaders of Shayzar, the Ban5 Munclidh, were
watching the Easter festivities of the Crusaders outside
Shayzar. The reason which attracted the BatinIs of Syria
to capturing this city was probably the strategic
position of its fortress on the top of a high mountain
and their intention was to establish for themselves a
base in Syria in order to settle their Da t wa there, as
their followers had already done in Persia when they had
the fortress of Alamlit. The people of Shayzar soon
recaptured their fortress and killed all the B5tinis in
the fortress including their leader Ibrahim al-
'Ajami.17
After the massacre in Aleppo and their failure in
Shayzar, the Batinis transferred their centre to the
neighbourhood of Aleppo and to the south of Syria in the
emirate of Damascus itself."
In 510/began 16 May 1116, Sultan Muhammad sent his
-
wazir Ahmad Ibn Nizam al-Hulk against the ilitinIs of
Alamilt. It is probably that Sultan Muhammad meant to
demolish this movement by destroying its centre in
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Alamat. This campaign failed because of the refusal of
the Bawandids, the neighbours of Alama, to help this
--	 1
wazir. 9 In the following year, another Saljriq attempt
led by the amir of Sawa, AnUshtekin ShIrgir, against the
Batiniyya, failed after a long siege of Alama. The
castle almost surrendered but the news of the Sultan's
death forced Shirgir to raise the siege. 2° It seems that
the failure of these attempts to suppress the Batiniyya
in Persia, strengthened the movement in Syria itself.
In 511/began 5 May 1117, il-Ghazi of M5rdin became
master of Aleppo. He decided to establish special
relations with the Batinis in Aleppo. According to Ibn
al-Qalanisi, he did so in order to avoid the evil
consequences of opposing the Batiniyya. 21 il-Ghazr
successfully employed a cunning stratagem against the
Bainis of Aleppo. In 516/began 12 March 1122, while 11-
Gh5zI was on his way towards M5rdin, he received a
messenger from Bahram al- t Ajami, the leader of the
Batinis of Syria who was living in Aleppo. Bahram
requested that 11-Ghaz1 cede the citadel al-Sharif which
was in the city of Aleppo to himself. il-Ghazi quietly
declared that he had just commanded the destruction of
this citadel and claimed that he would give them the
citadel if the work of devastation had not already
commenced. At once, he sent a message by pigeon to his
commander there ordering the immediate destruction of
the citadel. When the Batinis' envoy returned to Aleppo,
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he found that the destruction of the citadel had begun.
When the Batinis of Aleppo discovered 11-Ghazi's trick,
they denounced 11-GhazI's action. fl-Ghazi mollified the
7 7Batlnis by claiming that he would gladly have handed
over the citadel to them if they had re quested it
secretly and not in public. In Jumda II 515/began 18
August 1121, Il-Ghzi	 destroyed this strategic and
fortified citadel in Aleppo, probably in 	 order to
prevent the Batinis from establishing themselves in
Aleppo in the future. 22 According to Ibn al- e Adim, 11-
Ghazi ordered his regent in Aleppo, his son Shams al-
Dawla Sulaymln to destroy the citadel of al-Sharif in
the city of Aleppo and to dismiss all the soldiers of
Ridwan, the former king of Aleppo outside the city. 23 It
seems that the soldiers of Ridwan were Batinis.
When 11-Gh5z-i's nephew, N5r al-Dawla Balak Ibn
Bahram Ibn Artuq, became master of Aleppo in Rabi t I
517/began 28 April 1123, he treated the Batinis roughly,
which was at variance with his uncle's peaceful policy.
He arrested the agent of Bahram, the chief Da'l in Syria
and expelled the Batinis from Aleppo in 518, 24 on 19
-
Rabi l I 518/6 May 1124, Balak was killed by an arrow,
while he was besieging Manbij. No historian has accused
the B;tinis of killing him, but a fair inference would
be that they did indeed kill him, and that one of the
Bkinis shot him because he had expelled them from their
original centre in Alep po. Ibn al-Athir mentions that in
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the same year the people of Amid revolted against the
Batinis in their city probably in order to avenge the
killing of their great leader Balak."
On 8 DhEi'l-Hijja 520/19 December 1126, the Batinis
killed Aq-Sunqur al-Bursuql of Mosul and Aleppo. Ibn al-
-Oalanisi mentions that al-Bursuqi was cautious about the
Batiniyya. 26 According to al-Hifiz al-Dhahabi, al-Bursuqf
.	 .	
.
oppressed the BEtinis in Aleppo during his rule over
Aleppo from Dhii'l-Hijia 518/began 9 January 1125 till 8
DhU i l-Hijja 520/25 December 1126. According to Ibn al-
.
Athir, ten Batinis killed al-Bursuql in the main mosque
of Mosul during the Jum'a prayer. Investigation
subsequently revealed that these 13-tinis had come to
Mosul several years previously with the intention of
killing al-Bursuql, but they had failed several times
and only succeeded in killing him on that date. Ibn al-
Athir added that the prince of Antioch Bohemond II,
informed Mas'Ed Ibn al-:Bursuqi about his father's murder
before he received any official communication from his
_
father's commanders.	 Ibn al-Athir appears to	 have
thought that this news reached the prince of Antioch
through the Crusaders, who were working as spies among
the Muslims."
In 520/began 27 January 1126, Bahr -am al-'Ajami, the
leader of the B5tinis in Syria, succeeded in winning
many followers to his sect in Aleppo and Damascus.
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During his reign (511-516/1117-1122) il-Ghazi of Aleppo
was reluctant to try and persuade his father-in-law
Tughtekin of Damascus to allow Bahram to stay	 in
Damascus. But he asked Tughtekin to pay Bahram due
respect so as to escape the fate associated with
_
crossing the Assassins. Bahram requested that from Il-
Gh5zi, because he faced many difficulties from the
people of Aleppo especially the Twelver Shi'a who had
opposed the Bgtinis during the reign of Ridwg n of Aleppo
(488-507/1095-1112). Ibn al-Athir mentions that Bahram
might well have been able to occupy the city of
Damascus, but did not do so because the majority of the
7population of	 the city was	 Sunni, and hated the
B;tiniyya. Also, he mentions that Bahr5m did not trust
•
the people of Damascus precisely because they were
Sunnis. Then I1-Ghazi suggested to Tughtekin that he
give him
	 a fortress as a stronghold for his followers.
Whether or not Il-Ghazi managed to persuade Tughtekin to
surrender the city of B5nyas to the Batiniyya, the fact
that Il-Ghazi died four years previously to the handing
over of this city to the Batiniyya, makes it improbable
that il-Ghazi's suggestion played any part in the
matter. In Dhia 1 1-0a'da 520/began 18 November 1127, the
7
wazir of Tughtekin called Abii 'Ali Tahir al-Mazdaqani,
an ally of Bahram, suggested to Tughtekin the surrender
of the city of Banyas.28
According to Ab5 1 1-Mahgsin Yasuf Ibn Taghribirdi,
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al-Mazdacia-n1 was Sunni not Batini, but he was forced to
support to the B -atiniyya in order to gain the BatinTs'
support against his rival the chief of the Ahdgth
movement, the Ra'is of Damascus Thiqat al-Mulk Mufarrij
Ibn al-SEfI. 29 If this conjecture is right, this was a
further instance of the B gtini exploitation of the
internal problems of Damascus in order to establish
themselves in the city, just as they had previously done
in Aleppo, when they had supported King Ridwan against
his former Atabek Janah al-Dawla Husayn in 496/began 15
October 1102, as mentioned above. Tughtekin reluctantly
handed
	 over the city of Banyas, one of the main
strategic cities in Syria to Bahram. When Bahrm
received Banyas, in Dhii'l-Qa'da 520/began 18 November
1127, he assembled all his followers in this city and
refortified the citadel of Banyas. The Batinis in Banyas
became a serious threat to the people of Damascus,
because they used to waylay anybody passing near their
boundaries. According to Ibn al-Oalanisi, the people of
Damasucs especially the 'Ulam5 1 , pious people and amirs
suffered at the hands of the sect, but nobody dared to
say a word about this, movement because of their fear of
Atabek	 Tughtekin and of	 the "Batinis' revenge".30
-
Tughtekin was disturbed by the BatinIs' activities, but
he died before he had the opportunity to take effective
action against them.'
When on 8 Safar 522/11 February 1123, Bun i succeeded
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7his father as amir of Damascus, he continued
	 his
father's policy of not showing hostility towards the
Batiniyya. Ibn al-Oalanisi describes in detail the
anxiety of Burl who was very disturbed by this sect. He
tells us that Briri hid his plan to destroy this movement
even from his most trusted commanders. 32
 It seems that
Burl at that time did not have any power to suppress the
Batiniyya especially since this movement had attracted
many adherents among the people of Damascus. To suppress
the sect, he needed public support not only from the
_
Sunnis of the Emirate of Damascus but also from all the
other sects such as the Twelver Shi t is, Druzes and
-
Nusairis. Although Ibn al-Qalanisi does not mention in
detail BilrY's plan for suppressing of this sect, we can
infer its existence from the series of episodes later
on, when all those sects cooperated with Bur' against
the Batinis.33
In this year, Bahram killed one of the tribal
chieftains of Wadi al-Taym in the region of Hasbayya in
_
al-Biqa', called Burg Ibn	 Jandal with no apparent
justification, but according to Ibn al-Qalanisi purely
from his love of shedding the blood of innocent people.
It seems, however, that Bahram killed this amir to take
over his dominions.' The brother of this amir called al-
pahhak, now amir of W5d1 al-Taym, which was inhabited by
Druzes, Nusairis, Majlis and others, decided to avenge
the blood of his brother. Al-Dahhak with one thousand
.	 ..
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men suddenly attacked Bahram and his followers, who had
marched to counter al-Dahhgk i s forces in Wgdi al-Taym.
Bahram and his followers were slaughtered in 	 that
attack. One of al-Dahhak's warriors took the head of
• • t
Bahr:gm to Egypt to announce the good news of the killing
of the Bgtini leader in Syria. This warrior received a
robe of honours and expensive presents from the Fatimid
Caliph al-Amir bi-Ahkamii llah.' The historical sources
do not mention the exact number of Batinis who died in
this battle, but they declared that the B -g tinis suffered
great losses. After this battle, the Bgtinis succeeded
in recovering from this disaster and reestablished
themselves in the cities of Damascus and Banyas. Isma'll
al-'Ajami was sent from AlamGt to replace Bahram as the
new leader of the Batinis of Syria. Al-Mazdagani gave
more support to the new Bgtini leader than he had to his
-:predecessor Bahr gm. According to Ibn al-Athir, the wazir
al-Mazdaci gni appointed another Da'l in Damascus called
Ab5 al-Wafa' as Bahrgm's successor. This piece of
information does however seem doubtful as, in the normal
_ -
course of events, the selection process for a da'i of
the Bitiniyya could only take place in AlamUt itself.
Ibn al-Oal gnisi believes that Isma- ' 11 al-'Ajami became
the head of the Batinis in Syria and he mentions nothing
about Abr.i al-Waf g '. But it seems that Ibn al-Qalanisi
mentions Abu al-Wafa' by another name, Sh gdhi al-Khgdim,
who was executed later on in the massacre of Ba- tinis on
•
17 Ramadan 523/4 September 1129 in Damascus.' Ibn al-
.
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_
Athir mentions that the authority of Ab5 al-Waf5' in
Damascus became stronger than that of the Amir 13Gri
himself, after he received the help of the wazir al-
Mazdaq5n1. He adds that al-Mazdaq5n1 plotted with the
Crusaders to hand over the city of Damascus to them in
exchange for their giving him Tyre. The Crusaders agreed
to attack the city during the Jum'a prayer when all the
Muslims in Damascus were preoccupied; the B5tinis were
to stand guard at the doors of the mosques to stop the
people fighting the Crusaders as they entered the city.
When the news of this conspiracy was revealed, BGri
decided to get rid of his wazir and the B5tinis in
--Damascus as well. He killed his wazir and hung up his
head in the citadel of Damascus, then ordered the people
to kill every single B5tini in the city. On 17 Ramad5n
523/4 September 1129, ten thousand aitinIs were killed
in Damascus which constituted a purge of all the B5tinis
in the city.'
The population of Damascus in 543/began 22 May 1148
has been estimated at about 130.000 by Abia al-Fid5 Ibn
Kathir, the Damascene historian; thus the B5tinis
represented a sizeable minority grouping in the city.38
Ibn al-Qa15nisi gives an indication of the role of the
Ahd5th movement in killing B5tinis in Damascus. This
movement played a considerable role in the history of
Damascus from the fourth century/the tenth Christian
-
century. Among the 13-dtini leaders who were killed in
-
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Damascus was Shadhi al-Khadim, one of the followers of
Abrl Tahir al-Sa'igh who was mentioned above as the first
leader of the B5tinis in Syria. AbG TShir had
promulgated the Da e wa in Syria in the reign of King
Ridwan of Aleppo." After this disaster, Isma'il al'AjamI
of 13 -ányas feared his subjects would rise against his
followers as the people of Damascus had done and he was
also frightened that BGri of Damascus would attack the
city. For these reasons, and others unspecified, he
decided to hand over the city to the Crusaders. The
Crusaders took over Banyas in late 523/1129 and the
Batiniyya of Banyas left the city, whence they moved to
the Crusaders' territories. In early 524/1130 Ismatil
al-'Ajami died and Syria for a time was lost to the
Batiniyya, as far as providing any sort of base was
concerned. Ibn al-Qalanisi indicates that the Batinis
became scattered through the country and	 al-
'Ajami, who died in BJnyas in early 524/began	 15
December 1129, when it was under the Crusaders' control,
and some of his followers settled in the Crusaders'
territory. After the disaster of Batinis in Damascus in
523/1129, the cession of Banyas and the death of the
_	 -
Batini leader in the following year, the Batinis lost
all their power in Syria including Damascus. Although
two Batinis succeeded in injuring BUri on 5 Rajab 525/5
June 1131, these BEtinis did not come from Syria, but
rather they came directly from the headquarters of the
Bgtiniyya in Alamiat. 4° The Batinis were not to regain any
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foothold in Damascus during the reigns of Tughtekin's
descendants, and did not reemerge there until after
_
549/1154 when NOr al-Din took control of the city.
In Dha'l-Qa I da 523/began 16 October 1129, only two
months after the disaster for the Batinis in Damascus,
the city of Damascus faced a new attempt by the
Crusaders to occupy it. The importance of Damascus to
the Crusaders has been previously mentioned together
with their attempt to occupy the city in 519/1125 and
their failure to do so. The disaster suffered by the
Batiniyya in Damascus	 in 523/1129, has	 also been
mentioned as has the acceptance of Banyas by the
-
Crusaders from the BAtiniyya and the plot of the wazir
al-Mazdaciani to hand over the city of Damascus to the
Crusaders. There is more than one reason for the
invasion of Damascus in 523/1129 by the Crusaders, which
_
can be adduced. Ibn al-Athir, who is the only historian
of the time who mentions the plot of al-Mazdagani with
the Crusaders to surrender the city of Damascus in
return for Tyre by way of compensation, believes that
the main reason for this attempt was the failure of this
plot. On the other hand, Ibn al-Oal;nisl reveals that
the killing of the wazir al-Mazdagani, the Crusader
acceptance of Banyas and the disaster suffered by the
Batiniyya in Damascus after the killing of the ten
thousand Satinis, who had played an important part in
the armed forces of the Emirate of Damascus, all made
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the Crusaders believe that their chances of capturing
the city in 523/1129 would be more likely to succeed
than the preceding attempt in 519/began 7 February 1125.
William of Tyre gives us no direct reason for this
attempt. But he indicates that the issue of capturing
Damascus was adopted by Hugh de Payens, the leader of
the new Crusader military movement, the Knights of the
Temple. This commander was urged by King Baldwin II and
other Crusaders princes in the East to ask the Crusaders
of the West for help. All the Crusaders forces in the
East and the newcomers led by King Baldwin II marched in
523/1129 to lay siege to the city of Damascus.41
William of Tyre does not give us the estimated
numbers of the Crusader army in this expedition. He
probably omits this to depreciate the Damascene victory
and to diminish the Crusaders' discomfiture in this
battle. On the other hand, Muslim historians exaggerate
the number of the Crusaders in order to magnify the
extent of their triumph over them. Ibn al-Oalnisi
estimates the number of both infantry and foot soldiers
of the Crusaders about sixtythousand men. 42
 Ibn al-Athir
estimates the knights at two thousand men with
innumerable footsoldiers.42
It seems that the number in the Crusader army was
not more than thirty thousand men including two thousand
knights. If the estimated number of knights is correct,
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it means that the Crusaders were suffering from a
shortage not only of horses but also of knights at that
period. We do not have exact numbers for the Damascene
army in this battle from any of the main historians of
the time. Ibn al-Oal5nisi mentions many volunteers or
mercenaries from among the Turkomans and Arab "bedouins"
numbering in all some eight thousand troops. These were
to help the army of Damascus which was likely mostly of
Turkomans. We can also add some seven thousand men from
the city of Damascus itself. The whole army of Damascus,
therefore, would have numbered thirteen to fifteen
thousand men. In Dh5 1 1-Oa'da 523/began 16 October 1129,
the Crusaders advanced from B5ny5s towards Damascus,
descending on Jisr al-Khashab, six miles south west of
the city,	 and camped	 there. The Damascene	 army,
Turkomans, and Arabs headed by Murra Ibn Rabi'a advanced
in several detachments which faced the Crusaders
directly so as to be in a position to engage such of
their detachments, as might come forward to attack. The
Crusaders did not dare to start their assault for days.
The Damascene army discovered that the delay of the
Franks to start their attack was because they had sent
the pick of their army towards Hawran to collect
provisions. 44 William of Tyre tells us that the active
part of the army numbered one thousand knights headed by
William of Bures, Lord of Tiberias; he describes these
knights as "men of lesser rank". 4' Burl- sent his best
horsemen headed by Shams al-Khaw5ss with the 'Askar of
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Hama, Turkomans and Arabs to attack the part of the
Crusaders' army when they returned from Hawr5n in an
area called Bur5q, about twenty six miles south west of
Damascus. We have however no estimate of the numbers for
Shams al-Khaw5ss's forces.' William of Tyre describes
the army of William of Sures as incautious and
unprepared for danger. This army was forced into flight
and many of them were killed by the army of Shams al-
Khaw5ss. He does	 not give us the number of 	 the
Crusaders' casualties.' Ibn al-Athir mentions that only
William of	 Bures and	 thirty-nine other Crusaders
survived and escaped from the field of the battle.
According to Ibn al-Athir, however, three hundred
Crusader knights were captured and the Damascene army
took about ten thousand sheep as plunder." After this
disaster the main Crusader army decided to avenge their
losses in Bur5q, but according to William of Tyre,
because of bad weather, they were forced to give up the
siege of the city of Damascus.' On the other hand, Ibn
_
al-Athir and Ibn al-Oal5nisi believe that the disaster
of Bur5q and fear of the great army of Damascus were the
main reasons for the Crusaders' withdrawal.' Ibn al-
Galan's' indicates that the people of Damascus had been
in great fear of the Crusaders and that they had not
dared to leave their city. They had won this unexpected
victory in Bur5q by the "grace of Allah" and not by
their own powers.'
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It seems that the appearance of 'Im5d al-Din Zangi
of Mosul in 521/began 17 January 1127 as Atabek of Alp-
Ars15n Dawild Ibn Sult5n Mahmal, and as governor of
Aleppo in 522/1128, had a decisive effect upon the
course of events in the establishment of a united power
which was to affect the future of the Crusader States.
7
'Imad	 al-Din Zangi	 through the	 strength	 of his
personality	 and his bravery was able to prove to the
SaljElq Sultans and Abbasid Caliphs his 	 ability to
establish a strong power base in a few years and shake
the foundations	 of the Crusader	 States in Syria.
Furthermore, the appearance of this leader also
profoundly affected the future of the Emirate of
Damascus. During Bun's reign, Damascus lost Hama, one
7of its main cities, to Zangi. In 524/began 15 December
1129, Zangi sent a letter to Burl requesting help in his
campaigns	 against
	
the Crusaders.	 After	 several
messengers had been sent by Zangi to Burt. Bidri complied
7
with the request. But he required Zangi to swear not to
plot against the army, which Bilri proposed to send to
him. Ibn al-Oal5nisT who mentions this oath, does not
indicate why BITIri did not trust Zang' at that time. It
seems that BUri still remembered Zangi's plot against
the previous ruler of Aleppo after he had captured the
city	 in	 522/began	 6	 January 1128.	 During	 his
7consolidation	 of authority in Aleppo, Zang' killed
Khutlugh Aba, the previous Atabek of the son of Mas'Cld
Ibn al-Bursuqi." After he had taken the swearing of a
120
binding oath from Zangl, Burl sent his best five hundred
horsemen led by his commander the Amir Shams al-Khawass
plus the army of Hama led by his son Bah' al-Din
Sawinj. The armies of Damascus and Hama were well
7	 7
received by Zangi, but after a few days Zangi conspired
against them and imprisoned Sawinj and Shams al-Khawriss,
their commanders and some of their best troops. The
others were forced to flee. Then Zangi advanced towards
Hama, whose guards had deserted to help him. He captured
the city on 8 Shaww51 524/5 October 1130 without
fighting, after which he marched towards Hims, which was
under its independent ruler Khir-Kh gn Ibn Garija. Khir-
Khki Ibn Oarja had had offical recognition to rule Hims
as his ici t5 1 from 509/began 27 May 1115, during the
_
Sal jüq Sultan's campaign against Tughtekin and 11-Ghazi.
to Ibn al-Qa15nisl, Ibn Oaraja had made anAccording
alliance with Zangi against Sawinj and he had incited
7Zangi against him. Zangi however imprisoned Ibn Qaraja
and plundered his baggage and then ordered him to hand
over Hims for him. Ibn Garaja sent to his son and his
followers in Hims requesting them to hand over the city
-
to Zangi. The people of Hims refused this order from
their leader, as he was under duress. They resisted
Zangi's forces for forty days, with the result that
7Zangi was forced to give up the siege of Hims and went
back to Mosul with his prisoners Sawinj Ibn
BUrI and some of his commanders. He sent the other
prisoners to Aleppo.'3
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It seems that ZangI did not need any one to encourage
him to capture Hama. e Im5d al-Din Khalil in his study
'Im5d al-Din ZangT indicates that Zangi at that time had
ambitions to capture the whole of the Emirate of
Damascus. He started by taking Hama and Hims to weaken
the city of Damascus "like cutting off both wings of a
bird". In this way capturing the city of Damascus should
be made easy for him.54
B5ri sent many messengers to Zangi to remind him of
his oath to him and to ask him to release his son
Sawinj. Zangi required a vast ransom of some fifty
7thousand dinars for the	 release of Sawinj. 	 Zangi
probably demanded this ransom so as to exhaust Damascus
economically and to pave the way for its surrender to
himself in the future. BEri reluctantly accepted these
terms of ransom but he delayed the payment, probably
because he did not have this amount of money immediately
available. 55
 Zangi's plotting against Sawinj probably
proved to Burr and the people of Damascus, that Zangi
was serious about taking control of their Emirate. They,
therefore, became singularly cautious with regard to
7Zangi. It will become apparent how this hatred of the
people of Damascus for Zangi caused them to forge an
alliance with the Crusaders against him during the reign
7
of Mujir -al-Din Abaq 534-549/1140-1154 the last amir of
-
Tughtekin's family. Zangi's plotting was probably the
reason for his failure on two occasions to capture
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Damascus; he had engendered feelings of distrust amongst
the Damascenes and no one there preferred his rule to
that of Tughtekin's family.
Later on, B5ri tried his best not to get involved in
7any conflict with Zang'. This was due maybe to his loss
of the best of his horsemen and he, therefore, had not
7enough power to challenge Zangi's position in Syria.
_
Furthermore, it seems that Burl realized that Zangi's
ambition was to capture not only Hama and Mims, but also
the whole Emirate of Damascus. For all of these reasons,
7Burl was not prepared to risk fighting against Zangi,
the first Muslim leader in Syria at that time, and so
accepted payment of the vast ransom demanded for the
return of his son Sawinj. In 525/began 4 December 1130,
however, he managed to get back his son and the other
7commanders from	 Zangi without	 paying this ransom.
Circumstances gave Burl an opportunity to save his son
from prison. In this year, the news reached Damascus
from Hillat Maktiam Ibn Mism gr, east of al-GhlTita, that
Dubays Ibn Sadaqa of al-Hilla, who had recently been
defeated by the Caliph al-Mustarshid bi-- 1 11;h, passed
Hillat Maktilm Ibn Mismgr in order to take over Busrg,
and that he had got lost there while he was on the way
_
to Hillat Mari Ibn Rabl'a in the territories of Sarkhad.
•
Most of his troops had fallen and the rest abandoned
him, alone with a few guards, in Hillat Maktilm Ibn
Mismrir. Burl sent a group of horsemen to take Ibn Sadaqa
123
to the citadel of Damascus on 6 Sha'bn 525/6 July 1131.
Barr imprisoned Ibn Sadaqa and treated him generously.
He informed the Abbasid Caliph al-Mustarshid about his
capture of his rebel Ibn Sadaqa. Al-Mustarshid ordered
Bari to keep him in prison under heavy guard until he
could send an escort to take Ibn Sadaqa to Baghdad.' It
seems that Bari did this to gain credit with the Abbasid
Caliph as indeed his father Tughtekin had done before
him.
When the news of the capture of Ibn Sadaqa reached
7	 - 7Zangi, he suggested to Burl the surrender of Ibn Sadaqa
as a sufficient price for the release of Sawinj and his
commanders and that the previously fixed ransom should
be dropped. Bari accepted this offer to save his
"beloved son" from Zangi. 57 Ibn al-Athir added that Burl.
initially refused the offer, but he reluctantly had to
7
accept it when Zangi threatened him with laying siege to
Damascus and the plundering of its dominions." Bari did
7
not trust Zang', who had betrayed his son two years
before. He, therefore, did not release Ibn Sadaqa until
7Zangl had released Sawinj and his commanders." In this
year Sadid al-Dawla al-Anb5rI, the messenger of al-
Mustarshid, arrived at Damascus to discuss certain
matters with Burl_ It appears that the main matter of
concern was the surrender of Ibn Sadaqa to al-Anbari as
mentioned above. He was well received by Biari. Ibn al-
-.-Oarinisl, as was usual when he wrote about something of
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which he disapproved, writes briefly and ambiguously of
it. He mentions that Bilrl answered all the Caliph's
questions, but he does not mention any details of these
questions. Besides, Biiri gave this messenger lavish
presents for the messenger himself and for the Caliph."
It seems that Burl gave the messenger these gifts to
encourage him to make a favourable report on his tri p to
Damascus, and to present the Caliph with convincing
reasons for the surrender of his enemy Ibn Sadaqa,
without consulting him first. During that period, the
Caliph was keen to restore the sort of central power
excercised by the early Abbasids such as al-MansTir, al-
.
Rashid, and al-Ma i m-In. Burl wished probably to involve
the Caliph in conflict with Zangi, which would have the
effect of turning Zang]. s attention from the capturing
of the Emirate of Damascus. This was indeed what
happened when al-Mustarshid with thirty thousand
soldiers went in 527/began 12 November 1132 to try to
take Mosul from Zangi without success.'"
_ -
After the murder of the wazir al-Mazdaqani in
523/1129 Biiri tried his best to choose a new wazir.
According to Ibn	 Burl did not succeed in
7
appointing a suitable wazir. In 524/began 15 December
1129, Boni appointed Abil	 Thiqat al-Mulk al-
Mufarrij Ibn al-Hasan Ibn al-S6fi, Ra'is of Damascus as
the new wazir. Even though this new wazir was "weak in
writing and rhetoric, he was however rational, honest
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and experienced in accounting". Ibn al-Slifi did his best
to improve the situation in the Emirate, and he chose
honest and well qualified employees to assist him. In
Rabl.' I 525/began 12 February 1131, Bun r. dismissed him
because of doubts cast upon his honesty, imprisoned him
and some of his relatives, and dismissed him from the
Ri'asa of Damascus as well. He appointed Abr.' al-Fadl
Ahmad Ibn (Abdu'l-Razzq al-Mazdagni, a cousin of the
7previous wazir who is mentioned above. This new wazir
was successful in his management of the affairs of the
vizirate. Ibn al-Oal5nisi praises him by claiming that
7this wazir
	 had "great knowledge of	 administrative
history". On 5 Jumcid II 525/7 May 1131, the B5tiniyya
tried to kill BEri to avenge the killing of their
followers in 523/1129. He did not die immediately, but
was severely injured in his belly, although he did die
of this injury the following year.62
7As mentioned above, Sawinj was released by Zangi in
525/began 4 December 1130; he then asked his father to
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release Ibn al-S5fi, the previous wazir and Ra'is of
Damascus. Although Burl released Ibn al-Sufi and his
relatives, and appointed him to his previous position as
-_
Ra'is of Damascus, he did not make him wazir as he had
. been before the appointment of al-Mazdagni. Bur ." kept
his wazir al-Mazdaqani even though he had been accused
of complicity in an attempt by the Btiniyya to kill
Burl as mentioned above.63
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On 3 Rajab 525/3 June 1132, when BGrl felt that
death, because of his injury by Batiniyya earlier that
year, was near, he assembled his main commanders, head
officials and 'Ulama' to consult them about his
succession. He suggested to them his eldest son Abii al-
Fath	 Isma'fl. The	 candidacy of	 AbG	 al-Fath was
.	 .
unanimously	 accepted.	 The	 assembled	 dignitaries
confirmed their loyalty and obedience to his son
Isma i li.. They prayed to Allah for his recovery and long
life. After the acceptance of their arrangement, alrf
issued an ordinance to appoint his son Isma'll his
successor. He ordered those present to obey Ismaql.
Only one year after this meeting Burl died on 21 Rajab
526/6 June 1132. He was succeeded by his son Shams al-
Munk Abp al-Fath Isma'11.64
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CHAPTER IV
THE REIGN OF SHAMS AL-MULGIC
ISMA'IL IBN TAJ AL-MUL5K BaRi
(526-529/1132-1135)
After the death of his father and his succession on
21 Rajab 526/9 June 1132, Shams al-Mull:II< Isma t il Ibn Tia
BUri followed his father's domestic policy. He
gained the favour of his soldiers and commanders by
paying them increased salaries al-Jamakiyygt (regular
payments), and recognizing all iqta's. As his father had
done in keeping his father's wazir, Shams al-MulUk kept
his father's wazir al-Mazdaciani. But he deprived his
-
wazir of almost all the influence which he had wielded
during the time of 'raj al-MulEk BUrI. He bestowed all
the former powers of the wazir on his Shihna, YUsuf Ibn-
Fayriaz. 1
 Ibn Fayruz as mentioned above in Chapter III,
had played a great part in suppressing the Batiniyya in
Damascus. He and Ibn	 Ra'is of Damascus, had
.persuaded Taj al-Mul5k Burl of the advisability of
destroying the Batiniyya in Syria as a whole, as
mentioned in Chapter III.
Shams al-MulEk Isma'il did not take any action or
decision without consulting his Shihna first. It appears
that this is the first and the last time since the reign
of King Duclaq of Damascus 488/1095 that the Shihna and
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not the wazir of Damascus became the second man after
the Amir of Damascus. Internal difficulties however
beset Shams al-Muliik from his early days as a ruler.
Initially these problems involved his brother Shams al-
Dawla Muhammad of Baalbek. As mentioned above, Baalbek
was the main centre of revolution and rebellion for the
Emirate of Damascus. Muhyl al-Din Artash Ibn Sultâ'n
-
Tutush	 revolted	 in	 Baalbek against	 Tughtekin in
497/began 5 October 1103, as has been mentioned above in
-
Chapter II. Baalbek was also the centre of Kumushtekin
al-Khfidim al-Liji, the governor of Baalbek who revolted
against Tughtekin in 503/began 31 July 1109, with the
support of the Crusaders of Jerusalem, as mentioned
above in Chapter II. Shams al-Dawla of Baalbek proved
refractory within a short time from the accession of
Shams al-Mull-3k. Not only did he reject the authority of
his brother Shams al-MulEik, but also he took further
steps to establish his own independent authority in
Baalbek and its districts. He managed to induce the
garrisons of the fortress of both al-Labu'a, fifteen
miles north east of Baalbek, and al-Ra's, nine miles
north east of Baalbek, to hand over their fortresses to
him. When Shams al-Dawla did not reply to his brother's
request, Shams al-Mul5k pretended to ignore his
brother's disloyalty for a while.
Then in Dhi.cl-Hijja 526/began 15 October 1132, he
advanced with his well-equipped army to the north to
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make his brother Shams al-Dawla believe that he was
going to fight the Crusaders. Then, he changed his route
to the west towards the fortress of al-Labu'a. He
attacked the fortress so violently that its people
requested him to spare their lives. Shams al-MulTik
spared their lives and took over the fortress. Then he
marched to lay siege to the castle of al-Ra's. The
people of al-Ra's were spared by Shams al-MulUk as the
people of al-Labu'a had been before. After taking over
both fortresses Shams al-Muliik marched to subdue his
brother Shams al-Dawla Muhammad of Baalbek. Shams al-
Dawla fortified his city to resist his brother; he
attained much help from the farmers of the Biq' valley
and the surrounding mountains. It seems that the people
of Baalbek and the Biq' valley, who were Twelver Shi'is
encouraged Shams al-Dawla to rebel against his brother.
Shams al-Dawla despatched his troops to prevent his
brother's advancing army from laying siege to Baalbek.
Many soldiers of his force were killed or injured by
Shams al-Muliik's army and the rest fled to Baalbek.
Although we have no precise numbers of either army, a
possible estimate for this force could be about seven
hundred men and that of Shams al-MulGk about three
thousand men. Three days after this battle Shams al-
MulGic besieged Baalbek and bombarded the city using
catapults. When Shams al-Dawla discovered his brother's
resolve to take the city by force, he sent messengers to
his brother to beg forgiveness for all that he had done
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against him and requested him to let him continue to
rule the city under his authority.
	 Shams al-MulUk
accepted his brother's offer. In early Muharram
527/began 12 November 1132, he went back to Damascus
very pleased with his easy victories.2
His success in	 establishing his power in Baalbek
was followed by another victory in which he recaptured
Banygs from the Crusaders of Jerusalem. The
circumstances in the Latin States helped Shams al-Muliik
to achieve this without difficulty and without serious
losses. The death of Baldwin II of Jerusalem two years
previously on 25 Ramad5n 525/23 August 1131 is
considered to have been a great loss for the Crusaders.
His death deprived them of one of the most eminent
leaders of the early Crusading period. He strove
throughout his twelve years as King of Jerusalem to
unite all the Crusaders in Syria. His death enfeebled
the Crusader States in Syria. 3 The Crusaders rejected
the suzerainty of the new King Fulk of Jerusalem
(formerly Count of Anjou), Baldwin's son-in-law. Alice
of Antioch, who had reluctantly accepted the authority
of her father King Baldwin II, refused to submit to her
brother-in-law King Fulk. She again claimed to be regent
for her daughter Constance. The Count of Edessa Joscelin
II and Pons son of Bertram of Tripoli encouraged Alice
in her opposition to King Fulk. King Fulk managed to
force	 all these rebels into
	
submission, but this
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consequently left his forces exhausted although he
needed them to face the Muslim leaders in Syria.°
Furthermore, King Fulk faced more serious problems in
his kingdom later on. Civil war appeared imminent
between King Fulk on the one side and his rival Hugh of
Jaffa and his ally Roman of Le Puy on the other hand.
Hugh of	 Le Puiset, Lord	 of Jaffa, announced his
independence from King Fulk and captured some parts of
the Kingdom	 of Jerusalem which
	
threatened	 its
solidarity.
During the involvement of King Fulk in this
disturbance in his kingdom, his governor in Beirut added
a new problem. This governor of Beirut plundered the
great caravan of Damascus full as it was of valuable
goods. This action was a violation of a treaty between
the Crusaders of Jerusalem and Damascus concerning the
freedom of trade in transit in both countries. Shams al-
Mult:Ik wrote several times to the governor of Beirut
asking him to return the goods taken from the caravan,
but he received no answer from this governor. As has
been mentioned above, Shams al-Muliik used to keep his
future plans secret to surprise his enemies and probably
to save the considerable losses which would have been
incurred, if his plan had been known. He used not to
inform even his most trusted commanders and personal
retinue, in order to achieve a high degree of security
for his future plans. He prepared his army for the
137
recapture of B5nyas, ostensibly to avenge what the
Crusaders had done to the Damascene caravan. It seems
that this project had been well prepared in advance by
Shams al-MulEk, but it required a reasonable
justification, which he was given by the plundering of
the caravan. As has been mentioned in Chapter III,
13 .5nyas had been ceded to the Batiniyya in DhEt'l-Qa'da
520/began 21 November 1126, and the Batinis had handed
it over to the Crusaders of Jerusalem after their
massacre in Damascus on 17 Ramadan 523/4 September 1129.
In late Muharram 627/early December 1132, Shams al-Muliik
advanced with his army to lay siege to Banyas. On 1
Safar 527/11 December 1132, the numerous Crusader guards
were astonished by the arrival of the Damascene army.
Soon after the closing of the city's gates, Shams al-
Muliik dismounted, then his entire army dismounted also
and concentrated their bombardment on the same wall of
the city. According to Ibn al-Oalanisi, none of the
Crusaders dared to return the fire, but hid themselves
from the shower of arrows. The Damascene sappers managed
to destroy a part of the wall and entered through it.
The Damascenes were able to open the gate of the city
and they killed all the Crusaders who had not fled to
the castle or the towers of the city. According to
William of Tyre, King Fulk at that time was on the way
to fight his rival Hugh of Jaffa, and did not hurry to
rescue the city of Bany5s. Probably he considered that
the submission of his rival Hugh of Jaffa was more
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important than saving one city of his kingdom from the
Muslims of Damascus. The Crusaders hid themselves in the
castle and towers of the city, but were disappointed by
King Fulk, and so requested peace for themselves and
surrendered the city to Shams al-MulEk Ism5'il. He
agreed to their request, and took the Crusaders as
prisoners. Furthermore, he left reliable guards to
protect the city; then he turned back towards Damascus.
This easy victory, while it pleased the people of
Damascus, shocked all the Crusaders who had relied
greatly on the fortifications of the city and its
numerous garrison. As the Crusaders appeared to be
taking more account of the growing power of Damascus
under Shams al-Mult-ik, 5 and to be taking precautionary
measures to contain this power, Shams al-Muliik exploited
the chance to recapture the city of Banya's, afforded, as
it was, by the preoccupation of King Fulk with solving
his internal difficulties with Hugh of Jaffa. It seems
that Shams al-Munk was familiar with the movements of
the Crusaders especially those of the Kingdom	 of
Jerusalem, who were his closest neighbours.
After the death of Sultn Mahmild Ibn Sultan Muhammad
in Shawwl 525/began 28 August 1131, Saljiiq claimants
spent two years fighting each other until one of them,
Ibn Sultan Muhammad won the Sultanate in Safar
527/began 11 December, 1132.'
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The rivalry between these claimants will not be
discussed in detail as this lies outside the scope of
this study. What concerns us here is the effect of this
civil strife on Damascus during the period of Shams al-
MulUk's rule. During this period of internal strife in
the Sal jai house, Zang' of Mosul and Aleppo was involved
in the fighting.
Shams al-Mulak Isma i l.' used to seize opportunities
as has been mentioned above, when he had exploited the
fighting amongst the Crusaders to recapture Banyas. Now
7
again he used Zangi's involvement to recover Hama from
-
Zangi's regent called Sunqur, Ghulam of Salh al-Din al-
Yghisiyani, the eminent commander of Zangi. In Shatban
527/began 12 June 1133, the Abbasid Caliph al-Mustarshid
Bi-'llah, during his involvement in the struggle between
the rival SaliEq claimants decided with the consent of
Sultan Mas'ild to try and recapture Mosul from Zangl.
. In mid-Sha t ban of 527/27 June 1133, al-Mustarshid
marched with thirty thousand men to lay siege to Mosul.
-:Zangi fortified Mosul and marched out of the beleaguered
city with a part of his army to cut the line of supplies
-
to the Caliph to force him to raise the siege. Zangi's
regent in Mosul Nasir al-Din Jaciar managed to defend the
city with the help of Zangi. The siege of the city
lasted eighty days from mid-Sha t ban until 5 Dhi:1'1--
Oa'da/27 June 1133 till 6 September 1133, when al-
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Mustarshid withdrew to Baghdad without achieving his aim
of occupying Mosul. While Zang' was preoccupied with the
threat to Mosul, Shams al-Mul0k, who used not to reveal
his plans even to his trusted officials and his court,
was contemplating the recapture of Hama, but news of his
readiness to take Hama reached the governor there,
probably through Zangi's spies. According to Ibn al-
Athir, Zangi had spies in most of the important cities
of the Islamic world. The governor of Hama then prepared
to defend his city against Shams al-Multik.
The news of the governor of Hama's state of
readiness reached Shams al-Mull:1k, but it did not
prevent him from recapturing this important city and
reannexing it to his emirate.' He determined to surprise
the people of Hama in late Ramad5n 527/end of July 1133.
Although all his commanders advised him not to implement
this plan during the fasting month of Ramadan, he
insisted on attacking the city on the day of the 'id
al-Fitr, when the people of Hama would be busy
celebrating this most important festival for Muslims
everywhere. He launched a severe attack on the city on
the day of the 'Id, and defeated the guards of Hama
without meeting any real resistance. The guards fled to
the citadel as did the majority of the people of Hama
who reemerged and sued for peace, the guards meanwhile
remaining within the citadel. Shams al-Munk granted
them peace and rewarded them with robes of honour and
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returned such spoils as he had acquired. When the
garrison in the citadel saw that their army had been
defeated, most of them requested peace as the other
people had already done. When the governor saw his
people surrender, he was also forced to request peace
and handed over the city to Shams al-Mulak, especially
as he had despaired of any help from Zangl, who was as
has been noted, preoccupied with protecting his main
strategic city, Mosul, from the Abbasid Caliph. Shams
al-Muliik entrusted the city of Hama to a reliable
garrison and moved off towards Shayzar. He plundered its
territories and besieged the city. He raised the siege
when the amir of Shayzar Sultan Ibn Munqidh agreed to
accept the authority of Damascus and make payment of a
considerable sum to Shams al-Multik. 8 This was the first
time that Shayzar had come under the authority of
Damascus since the time of Sultän T5j al-Dawla Tutush
Ibn Sultan Alp Ars15n.
- Shams al-Munk started the new year of 528/began 7
November 1133, with a new project. This project was to
annex fresh land to his Emirate but not as he had done
when he recaptured 135nyas and Hama which had previously
been under the dominion of Damascus. According to 'Izz
al-Din Abil 'Abdu'll5h Muhammad Ibn Shaddad the writer of
al-A elZq al-khatira f.f dhikr umarg ' al-Shim wa'l Jazira,
the well fortified fortress Shaqif Tirun (Belfort), nine
miles north east of Sidon, had been under the control of
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the Fatimid Caliph. He adds that al-Dahh5k Ibn Jandal
•	 • •
al-Tamimi, Reis of the Wgd1 al-Taym, had taken this
fortress from the Fatimid al-Hgfiz of Egypt, shortly
before Shams al-Mulak captured it on 24 Muharram 528/24
November 1133, from al-Dahhk Ibn Jandal. Ibn Jandal
played a particular role in overpowering the forces of
the Batiniyya in Wa-di al-Taym in 522/began 6 January
1128, as mentioned above in Chapter Three. According to
Ibn al-Athir, Ibn Jandal used to play games with the
Crusaders and Muslims, because each was looking to win
his support against the other.'
Some authorities maintain that Ibn Jandal took
-	 T -Shaqif Tirun from the Fatimids on 6 Muharram 528/6
November 1133, but it seems that this date is incorrect,
because the Fatimids at that time had no authority in
Syria except in 'Asqalki which is more than a hundred
miles from this fortress. It can be suggested that Ibn
Jandal had taken over this fortress during the very
early years of the Crusades. Probably the reason for
Shams al-Muliik's capturing this fortress was that Ibn
Jandal at the time became an ally of the Crusaders; Ibn
al-Athir, therefore, believes that the reason why the
Crusaders attempted to plunder Hawrin later on in Dhl7C1-
Qa'da in the same year (began 27 August 1134) was in
retaliation for Shams al-Mulak's recapture of this
fortress lying in the hinterland of Sidon and Beirut.1°
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In this year, an assassination attempted against
Shams al-MulEk failed. In late Rabi t II/began 6 February
1134, one of his grandfather TughtekIn's slaves, called
Ilb5, tried to kill Shams al-Multik, while he was on a
hunting trip, in the vicinity of Saydn gyi and 'Asgl,
fifteen miles north of Damascus. Ilbi admitted that
nobody had incited him to kill his lord, and he claimed
that he had done this to relieve the poor people of
Damascus, such as the artisans and farmers, from Shams
al-Muliik's oppression and injustice. On the other hand,
he accused Shams al-Mulak of involving himself only with
the military services, and neglecting the civil
services. In any event he admitted that other members of
the Ghilmin, had plotted with him to kill their lord.
According to Ibn al-Gal gnisi, these Ghilmin were
innocent, but Shams al-MulEk believed the accusation
"without establishing any proof of guilt or the
"2., Ina, as he claimed, hadproduction of any evidence.
done this only for the sake of All5h; it is not clear
why he accused the Ghilm -an and Shams al-Mulak's brother,
Sawinj of complicity in this attempt on Shams al-MulUk's
life. It is possible' that ilba was a B.atinf as the
Bgtinls had made a practice of accusing innocent people
in order to create more problems for their enemies. This
was indeed the effect for Shams al-Muliak later on. He
killed his brother Sawinj and the others and "went to
excess in these evil and tyrannical actions and stopped
at no
	 limits", according to Ibn al-Gala-nisi.' No
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historian of the time has accused the aitinls of the
assassination attempt, but we can conclude from Ilbg's
behaviour, when he levelled accusations at innocent
people, that nobody else except the Batinis who used to
dissimulate and take any action they pleased. to achieve
their ends, could have commited this particular crime.
Shams al-Munk killed his brother Sawinj by locking him
in a jail and starving him to death."
As mentioned above, Shams al-Mulak recaptured Banygs
from the Crusaders in late Safar 527/began 11 December
T-1132 and took the fortress of Shaqif Tirun from the
Crusaders' ally, al-Dahhak Ibn Jandal. Both actions made
the Crusaders frightened of Shams al-Munk who
demonstrated his courage to them by challenging them in
southern Syria. Although his father T5j al-MulEk Burr
had caused the Crusader invasion of Damascus in 523/1129
to miscarry, he had not been able to prevent their
capture of Banygs in the same year. To avenge the loss
- -
of Banyas	 and the fortress of Shaqif Tirun, the
Crusaders determined to break their treaty with Damascus
to protect the transit trade in their territories. In
Dhi-i'l-Qa'da 528/began 27 August 1134, They assembled
their forces and advanced to ravage the provinces of
Damascus in the region of Hawrin, forty miles southeast
of the city itself. When news of the Crusaders march
towards the fertile territory of Hawran, reached Shams
al-Munk, he sent for the Turkomans from the whole of
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Syria. Ibn al-Galanisr, the only Muslim historian to
mention this event, does not give us an estimate for
both armies, but we can suggest that the Damascene army
numbered about five to six thousand men including the
volunteer Turkomans, and those of the Kingdom of
Jerusalem about the same number. Shams al-Mulak marched
and encamped opposite the Crusaders in Hawrin. Both
armies spent a few days showering each other with
arrows; the Crusaders did not attack the Damascene
forces probably because they had not expected to have to
face this great army in the field, nor indeed had they
expected to meet opposition to what had been essentially
a plundering expedition to Hawran. Shams al-Mull-1k seized
the opportunity offered, while the Crusaders were
engaged in this confrontation, and a considerable number
of his army advanced to raid the lands of the Crusaders
of Acre, Nazareth (al-N5sira) and Tiberias. He managed
to carry off numerous cattle, beasts of burden, women,
children and men according to Ibn al-Oalanisi, "laying
waste the countryside with fire and the sword". When
news of Shams al-MulEk's plundering of the
Crusaders'lands reached the Crusaders in Hawrâ-n, they
withdrew directly to their own territories to protect
them. The Crusaders had evidently reckoned that Shams
al-Mula would not dare to plunder and ravage within
their own territories; this was probably the first time
since Mawdrid's capaign of 507/began 18 June 1113 that
Muslims had attacked the Crusaders in the heart of their
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Kingdom. Shams al-Mulak returned after his successful
operation by another route called al-Sha'r5, and
rejoined his camp in yawran, because he was expecting a
retaliatory attack from the Crusader army as it
withdrew. The Crusaders turned back home, sore
aggrieved with what had happened to their lands and
people. The Crusaders' army was in disarray and each
soldier went back to his own territory. Then the
Crusaders of Jerusalem requested Shams al-MulUk to renew
the peace between them. Once again Shams al-Muliak had
contrived materially to discomfit the Crusaders and keep
the trade route safe. According to William of Tyre, all
the Crusaders who had been captured in Banygs early in
the previous year/began 12 November 1132, were to be
released under the peace treaty. 14
In this year, reports were continually received from
the neighbouring countries in the territory of the
At5bek Zang' concerning the extensive preparations he
was making for the siege and capture of the city of
Damascus."
On the first of Muharram of 529/22 October 1134,
Yasuf Ibn Fayraz, Shihna of Damascus, escaped from Shams
al-Munk. Ibn al-Oalanisi, attributes his need to escape
to reliable news from his close friends that Shams al-
Munk was plotting against him.But Ibn al-Galanisi does
not mention the specific reason for Ibn Fayraz's fear of
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Shams al-Multik. It seems that Shams al-MulDk, after the
failure of the assassination attempt on him, became
suspicious of everybody, even his own trusted Shihna.
Ibn Fayriiz fled to his iqta' in Tadmur (Palmyra). As we
mentioned above in Chapter II, Tadmur in 520/began 27
January 1126, during Tughtekin's reign, had become an
iqt5 4 of his grand son Shihab al-Din Mahmiad Ibn Tia al-
Mullak Biari. During his father's reign Shihab al-Din
begged his father Taj al-Multik Burl to disencumber him
of this iqta'. Taj al-Mulak accepted his son's request.
During that time Ibn Fayriaz seized the opportunity to
apply for the grant of Tadmur as an igt5i and persuaded
some of Taj al-Muliik's commanders and trusted friends to
accommodate him in this. Ibn Fayriiz received the city
during Taj al-MulUk's reign. He appointed his son as
agent in the city of Tadmur and fortified it. He sent
some of his trusted friends to help his young son, and
supplied him with every thing he might need in case of
siege. Ibn FayrUz took the city of Tadmur as a refuge in
case of emergency. This was what happened, when he
discovered that Shams al-Muliik Isma i li was conspiring
against him. He learnt this from his close friends in
Shams al-Mula's court, although he was provided with no
proof. Ibn al-Qalanisi mentioned that Ibn Fayrriz,
chamberlain (HAJib) as well as Shihna of Damascus,
escaped to Tadmur immediately upon learning that his
lord had left the city of Damascus. Ibn al-Qalanisi
claimed that Shams al-Multik had decided secretly to
148
confiscate the property of all his professional off ical
commanders and chamberlains including Ibn Fayrilz. It is
however hard to see why Ibn al-Gal .inisi gives no
examples of these confiscations to substantiate his
charge. Ibn al-Qa15nisI admits that Shams al-MulTik did
not persecute Ibn Fayraz's relatives when he refused to
return to Damascus according to his lord's order.
Therefore, if Shams al-Muliik were to have persecuted
anyone in his Emirate it could be presumed that he would
have started with Ibn FayrOz's relative. Although Ibn
FayrUz rejected the order of his lord to return to the
city of Damascus, he did not declare his independece. He
claimed that "he was in this position (in Tadmur) as a
loyal servant of Shams al-Munk to protect it".16
Muslim historians of this period agree that in this
year, 529/began 22 October 1134, Shams al-MulUk turned
from being a wise, brave and intelligent man to being
very	 cruel, foolish	 and	 unjust.	 Ibn al-Oalanisi
described his	 singular personality	 in detail.	 He
indicates that Shams al-MulUk at this time became
notorious amongst his intimates as well as the common
people for his wanton cruelty and unpredictable
behaviour which bordered on the insane. He began to
confiscate the property of his people including his
hitherto trusted officials and chamberlains. He also
committed all kinds of misdemeanours which Ibn al-
Gala-nisi claims to have been well known amongst the
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people. Ibn
	 al-Oalanisl adds	 that Shams	 al-Multak
"secretly proposed to confiscate the property of his
confidential secretaries, his domestic officers, and
personal attendants among the amirs and chamberlains",
and that he decided to start these confiscations with
his chamberlain Ibn FayrEz. If Ibn al-Qa15nisi was right
in this claim, it is difficult to see how this "secret"
came to be revealed to his officals, and to Ibn FayrEz.
Furthermore, Ibn al-Oalanisi accused Shams al-Mula of
being demented. It seems that Shams al-Muliak after the
flight of his Shihna to Tadmur, lost his authority in
most of his Emirate, having no power to control his
Shihna Ibn Fayrilz and those in revolt against him. When
he was 7informed of Zangi's determination to capture
Damascus he decided to surrender the 7city to Zangi and
to become his vassal. As has been mentioned above Shams
al-MulEk had used not to inform even his trusted
officials and amirs about his future projects. This
behaviour probably made his officials question the
appropriateness of their loyalty and sincerity towards
him.
He became as a dictator in Damascus contrary to the
ways of his predecessors. It is possible that the flight
of Ibn Fayrriz was the prelude to a projected revolt
aimed at overthrowing Shams al-Mulak's rule later on.
Ibn al-Oal'inisi believes that because of his mental
disease, Shams al-Mula had written several letters to
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zangl with his own hand, offering to surrender the city
of Damascus and stipulating that Zangi allow him to take
revenge on his disloyal officials in Damascus. Ibn al-
GalInisi's account suggests that Shams al-Multik at this
time was sinking into paranoia."
It seems that the situation in Damascus after the
flight of Ibn Fayrtiz was confused, and Shams al-Mul5k
could not restore stability. He appointed a Kurd from
Hims called Badran al-KA-fir (the infidel) to handle this
.	 .
situation. But Badran disappointed Shams al-Muliak by
more confiscations of people's property including that
of respectable officials.'" It seems that it was when
Shams al-Mullik discovered that Badran would not solve
his problems, that he decided to hand over Damascus to
zangl, the traditional enemy of the ruler of Damascus.
We cannot judge whether Shams al-Muliik did that to take
revenge on his rebellious officials or to save Damascus
from falling into the hands of the Crusaders. Shams al-
Munk warned Zang' if he would not hasten to take over
Damascus, he would surrrender the city to the Crusaders
and "the sin of the blood of its inhabitants shall be
-:upon his neck [Zangi's)"." It seems that what Shams al-
Munk was doing was neither more nor less than his
_grandfather Tughtekin had done in 498/began 23 September
1104, when he sent to Suqm -in Ibn Artuq to take over
Damascus, when he was ill, having decided to hand over
the city of Damascus to this leader, who would protect
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it from the threat of the Crusaders. Ibn al-Oalanisi had
not condemned Tughtekin's request, but he strongly
condemned that of Shams al-Multik. No Muslim historians
of the period have treated Shams al-Munk with justice
and most have repeated Ibn al-Oalanisf's description of
him. Shams al-Mullak appears to have had no doubts that
the fall of Damascus to Zane was just a matter of time.
He, therefore, wanted for both sides (the Damascenes and
Zang') to be spared inevitable losses associated with
armed conflict. When the news of the proposal of
surrendering the city was revealed, the rebel Ghilman
persuaded the Khgtan Safwat al-Mulk, mother of Shams al-
Mullik to kill her son in order that they might be saved
from the punishment which would be meted out by Shams
al-MulEk and Zangl. Safwat al-Mulk killed her son Shams
al-Munk Isma'il and appointed his brother Shihab al-Din
Mahm5d as amir of Damascus. It seems that the rebels
could have killed Shams al-Mulfik without calling upon
the assistance of his mother, but they wanted to prove
to the Damascenes that the killing of Shams al-MulUk was
the will of all Damascenes including the mother of the
7Amir of Damascus. On 14 Rabl e II 529/1 February 1135,
Shams al-MulGk Ism5'11 Ibn TAJ BUrl was killed
by his Ghilman and his wazir Badran al-Kifir had died
the day before because of a terrible disease. It is
possible that Badr gn was poisoned.2°
152
Notes
l Ibn al-CialniEti, pp. 234-235.
2Ibn al-Athlr, al-Kimil, p. 338; ibn al-Qalinisi,
pp. 235-236.
3Runciman, pp. 185-186.
` Ibid., pp. 187-190.
e Ibn al-Athir, p. 339; Ibn al-Galanisi, pp. 236-37;
William of Tyre, pp. 74-77; al-Dhahabl, p. 70.
6Ibn al-Athir, pp. 333-335, 336-337, 339-40.
7Ibn al- tAdim, p. 253; Ibn al- i Umrani, al-Inbg'
tarikh al-khulafi'. Ed. by Gasim al-Samarra'i. Second
Edition, (al-Riyad, 1982), pp.	 217-218; al-Dhahabl,
p.70. al-Dhahabi estimates the Caliph's army numbered
about twelve thousand men.
e Ibn al-'Adim, p. 253; Ibn al-Oalanisi, pp. 238-
239.
eIbn Shaddad, p. 154; Kenneth M. Setton, The
History of the Crusades: The First Hundred Years. Ed.
Marshall W. Baldwin, (Wisconsin, 1969), p. 572; Ibn al -
Attar, al -Kamil, p. 342.
153
10 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kämil, p. 342.
11 Ibn al-Galänisi, p. 241-242; H. A. R. Gibb, The
Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades. (London, 1932), p.
225. Gibb appears to have missed the sense of imtahana
al- rAskariyya wa 'l-Ra liyya, translating this as "have
wronged the troops and the civil population".
12 Ibn al-Oalänisi, p. 242.
13 /bid., p. 242.
14 Ibn al-Athlr, p. 342; Ibn al-Gal -Anis', pp. 242-
243; William of Tyre, p. 76; Gibb, p. 227. Gibb suggests
that al-Sha'ra is to the north of the Lake of Huleh and
Ounaitra.
15	 -Ibn al-Qalanisi, p. 243.
"Ibid., pp. 244-245.
17 Ibn al-Galanisi, p. 245; Ibn al-'Adlm, pp. 255-
257.
-le _ 	-Ibn al- e Adim, p. 255; Ibn al-Qalanisi, p. 245.
l'Ibn	 pp. 245-46; Ibn al- eAdim, pp.
255-256.
20 Ibn al- e Adim, pp. 256-257; Ibn al-Oalanisi, pp.
246-247; al-Dhahabi, p. 77.
CHAPTER V
THE REIGN OF SHIHAB
	 MAHMOD
IBN TAJ AL-MULOK BORI
529-533/1135-1139
After she had connived in the murder of her son
Shams al-Mulak Isma i li, Safwat al-Mulk Bint Jiwli Siciawa
of Mosul designated her other son Shih5b al-Din MahmOd
as the new prince of Damascus, and established herself
as de facto regent for her son who, despite his not
being a minor, was dominated by her. According to Ibn
al-Qalânisi, the commanders, chief representatives of
the soldiers, and notable persons, were not only sworn
to listen to Shihab al-Din MahmEd, but also to render
obedience to his mother.' But this situation would not
last for long and Safwat al-Hulk was to lose her almost
unlimited	 authority later on in 532/1138 when she
married Zangi of Mosul. Zangi had most probably imagined
that by getting married to Safwat al-Mulk, he would gain
full power in Damascus, but when he wedded her, he
discovered that her influence in Damascus had waned.2
The news of the assassination of Shams al-Munk Ismaili,
the former Amir of Damascus, had not reached ZangI as he
was on his way to take over supreme power in the city,
In accordance with the offer whereby Shams al-MulUk had
7
agreed to surrender his capital to Zangi, as mentioned
above.
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After he had crossed the Euphrates, Zang' sent his
envoys to the city of Damascus to reach an agreement for
the surrender of the city. His messengerS then were
shocked by the news of Shams al-MulGk's murder. The
TDamascene leaders greeted and welcomed Zang' , s envoys,
but they refused to surrender their city. Besides, they
had confirmed to the messengers the determination of the
people of Damascus to defend their city by all means
within their power. They also urged Zangl to withdraw
his troops unconditionally for the safety of both the
-.Damascenes and his own forces. Zangi rejected the offer
which he interpreted as meaning that the people of
Damascus were at variance with one another and were not
united to protect their city. On the other hand, it
_
seems that Zangi suspected that the leaders of Damascus
had bribed his envoys and thus encouraged them to give
him a distorted report about the situation in the city,
and for this reason, he resumed his advance towards the
city. In Jum 'ada I 529/began on 16 February 1135, Zangi's
great army camped in the territory of Damascus between
'Adhr5 and al-Oasir, which lie ten miles north east of
-:the city.° As Zangi approached the immediate vicinity of
Damascus the people of the surrounding countryside
deserted the villages and moved to the city in order to
support the Damascenes against the impending threat
-	 -
posed by Zangi. Zangi moved his camp to al-'Aqaba al-
Oibliyya, ten miles from the city to the south, to be
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able to observe the movements of the forces of Damascus.
He was astonished by the preparations of the Damascenes
for the defence of their city. The Ahdath of the city
played a significant role together with the regular army
of Damascus in the protection of their city.4
According to Ibn al-Galanis", the Great Mosque (al-
Masjid al-JAmi') and "all parts of the city were filled"
with volunteers prepared to defend their city against
Zane. It can be suggested that the Great Mosque played
a significant role not only on this occasion, but also
on many others for the launching of appeals to the
people to defend their city against its enemies. The
Damascene ambushes outside the city managed to cut off
Zangi's supplies, and to capture many of his horsemen.
TIt was because of those actions that many of Zang]. , s
troops surrendered to the Damascenes.'
When he failed to take the city by force, Zangi
suggested to the leaders of Damascus that they place
themselves under his authority and he demanded that the
Amir Shih5b al-Din Mahmal personally go to pay homage to
Sultan MahmEd's son Alp-Arslan, and in return Alp-Arslan
would bestow upon him a robe of honour and guarantee him
a safe return to the city of Damascus. Zang' ruled in
Mosul and Aleppo on behalf of Alp-Arslan Dawrid Ibn
Sultan Mahmiad as Atabek of this sult -an. Zang" seems to
have been aware that the Amir of Damascus would not
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accept being under his authority directly, and therefore
supposed that he might agree to being under the
authority of Sultan Alp-Arslan. This would have meant
that the amir of Damascus would be nominally responsible
to Sultan Alp-Arslan and not to Zangi. Shihab al-Din was
_
concerned at Zangi's many conditions, refused to pay
homage personally to Sultan Alp-Arslin and sent his
7younger brother Bahram to do so in his stead. Zang].
accepted Shihab al-Din's compromise. 6 Ibn al-'Adim
presents a conflicting picture of this story when he
claims that the Damascenes had suffered from a scarcity
of food and provisions, but he did not declare whether
it was these circumstances that forced the Damascenes to
_
accept Zangi's proposal.'
On the other hand, another explanation of this peace
agreement, asserts that the Damascenes had pledged (to
the Abbasid Caliph al-Mustarshid Bi2 llah) fifty thousand
dinars annually to persuade Zane to refrain from
attempting to take over their city. 8
 When Ibn al-
Oalanisi mentions the involvement of al-Mustarshid in
7the treaty between Zang' and Damascus, he does not say
anything about that. He declares that the association of
-
al-Mustarshid's envoy with the concordat between Zangi
and the Damascenes was a coincidence. He states that al-
_
Mustarshid commanded Zangi to relinquish the blockade of
the city, and to abandon his interference in the affairs
of Damascus. Besides that al-Mustarshid ordered Zangi to
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make the khutba for Sultan Alp-Ars15n, who was under
_
Zangi's tutelage. The reason for this suggestion of al- .
Mustarshid which would redound to Zangi's benefit was
7that he wished to acquire Zangi's aid during his future
contest with Sultan Mas'Eid." It seems that al-Mustarshid
•
_
exploited the blockade of the city of Damascus by Zangi
to get financial assistance from Damascus and to obtain
military aid from Zangl as well, at one and the same
time. By giving help to al-Mustarshid, Zang' gained the
first formal recognition for the Sultanate of Sultan
7Alp-Arslan who was under his guardianship. Zangi had
been striving to get that recognition (of the Sultanate
of Alp-Arslan) from al-Mustarshid for a long time, in
fact since he had gained the Atabekiyya of Mosul in
521/began 17 January 1127. Although Zangi won this
recognition, he would not be able to enjoy the situation
for long. His ally al-Mustarshid was to be defeated and
killed during his contest with Sultan Mas'Eld in Dhii'l
Ga t da 529/began 14 August 1135. 10 It is fair to suggest
that it was thanks to the struggle between the Caliph
al-Mustarshid and Sultan Mas'Ed, that the Emirate of
Damascus was rescued from early destruction at the hands
_
of Zangi.
On Friday 28 Jumada I 529/17 March 1135, the name of
Sultan Alp-Arsl 'in Ibn Sultan MahmEd was mentioned in the
khutba in the Emirate of Damascus for the first time,
instead of the name of Sultan Mas'Ed." This meant
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probably that the Emirate of Damascus was merely under
the nominal and not the real authority of Sult5n Alp-
Arsln, just as it had been under the nominal authority
of Sult:in Mas'ad. Therefore, the position of the Emirate
of Damascus was not materially altered. It is likely
that Zangi had accepted that as being the first step
towards the real subjection of Damascus in the future.
On the next day, Zangi withdrew to the north towards
Aleppo without achieving his main aim of gaining power
over the city of Damascus. When however he was on his
way towards Aleppo, he imprisoned Shams al-Khaw5ss, the
governor of Hama, who ruled the city on behalf of the
Amir Shihab al-Din of Damascus. Zangi replaced him with
the former ruler of Kafart -ib Salih	 al-Din al-
Yaghisiyanr. According to Ibn al-Qalanisi, Zangf
dismissed Shams al-Khaw4s owing to the many complaints
he had received from the inhabitants of Hama.'
The historical souices of the time do not indicate
that Shihab al-Din gave Hama to Zangi as the price for
giving up the siege of Damascus, but it seems that Shams
7
al-Khaw;ss of Hama had betrayed his weakness to Zangi
during Zang). s blockade of Damascus.
Ibn al-'Adim indicates that while Zangi was on his
way to lay siege to the city of Damascus, he had met
Shams al-Khawass. He added that Shams a1-Khaw5ss went
7
out of Hama to see Zangi, after Zang' had sworn not to
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plot against him; Zangi had then marched towards the
city of Damascus to lay siege to it. Ibn al-'Adim gives
no details about the meeting between Zangi and Shams al-
Khawgss. But it seems likely that Shams al-Khawass was
..	
—
_
coerced into accepting Zangi's authority, even before
Zangi's blockade of Damascus in early Jumada I,
529/began 18 February 1135." The historical sources of
the time state that it was because of the complaints of
people of Hama that he replaced Shams al-Khawass with
..
_
another governor, but they do not suggest that Zangi
occupied the city with armed forces. It was the second
..
time that Zangi had taken over Hama without resistance,
the first time being in late 524/late 1130, as mentioned
above, during the reign of T5j al-Mull:1k BOri."
In Rajab 529/began 18 April 1135, after his taking
over Hama, Zangl managed to recapture four fortresses
from the Crusaders without much difficulty. These
fortresses were al-Ath 'g rib, Tall Aghdi, about twelve
miles north west of Aleppo, Ma'arrat al-Nu t mgn, and
Kafart5b. These fortresses which were located near
Aleppo, had been the object of the Crusaders' attention
for two decades during which they had attempted to
7
establish their power there. Then Zang' marched south
towards Montferrand (Brin), thirty five miles north
west of films, which belonged to the Crusaders of
Tripoli," to invest it. But he resumed 	 his march on
-
films. Zangi surprised Hims in Sha'bk1 of 529/began 18
•	 -
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May 1135. The city belonged to the sons of Khir-Kh gn Ibn
_
Qargja, and Zangi plundered the surrounding
countryside."' Then he went back to the city of
Qinnisrin, fifteen miles south west of Aleppo, to help
its people against Count Pons, son of Bertram of Tripoli
who was on the verge of besieging it.
After he had managed to rescue Qinnisrin, ZangI
resumed his raid on Hims and its environs in the last
ten days of Shawwal in the same year. Then he returned
to Mosul the next month (DhU'l-Qa'da/began 14 August
1135).17
_
Zangi continued in his strategy of weakening Hims,
by plundering its districts and the countryside nearby
to reduce the likelihood of a protracted siege. Hims was
.	 .
not even officially under Damascene authority; it had
been formerly under the nominal rule of Damascus (in
Tughtekin's time) from 496 till 509/1103 till 1115 but
it still appears to have retained a special relationship
• with it. The Emirate of Damascus lost the city of Hims
during the SaljGq Sultn's expedition in 509/1115
against the Emirate, as mentioned above in Chapter II.
In 529/1135, the city of tams was ruled by a regent on
behalf of the sons of Khir-Kh:in Ibn Qar gja, the former
master of the city, called Khumirt-ash as an independent
city.
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When Khum5rt5sh realized that he had no power to
protect his city from the menace of Zangi, he determined
to hand over the city to Shihb al-Din Mahm5d of
Damascus, in return for due compensation. The person who
took the initiative in this deal between Hims and
Damascus, was the Chamberlain of Damascus Sayf al-Dawla
Y5suf Ibn Fayraz. Ibn Fayriliz was eager. to leave his
position as governor of Tadmur and to receive in
exchange a formidable city such as Hims." As mentioned
above the Chamberlain had fled from city of Damascus
during the time of Shams al-Muliik Ism5'11 in 529/1135.
He appealed to the new Amir of Damascus to grant him
permission to come back to the city, and to settle the
exchange agreement between Khumart7ish of Hims and Shih-ab
al-Din Mahmild of Damascus. Shihab al-Din authorized Ibn
Fayraz to do this. After long negotiations, it was
agreed that Shih-áb al-Din should receive Hims and its
citadel, and in return Khum5rt5sh would be compensated
by being given the city of Tadmur, which then belonged
to Ibn Fayraz." It was clear that ShihBb al-Din, at that
time, would encourage rivalries among his Ghilm5n
commanders, especially those who still remembered that
Ibn Fayrt5z had induced the former Amir of Damascus Shams
al-Munk to kill some of their followers, as mentioned
above in Chapter IV. For this reason, Shill'ib al-Din
designated the Chamberlain Ibn FayrUz not as the real
governor of the city of Hims but as a lieutenant of his
-	 -	 -
commander, the Amir Mu' in al-Din Anar. Shihab al-Din was
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certain that ZangI would not obstruct his project of
taking Hims, even if this meant that it would return to
being officially under his sway. Shihab al-DIn travelled
to Hims himself and took over the city. From Hims he
.	 .	 .	 ,
wrote to all his commanders throughout his Emirate, to
send military supplies to support Hims against the
threat posed by Zangi. In Rabl' I 530/began 9 December
1135, Shihab al-Din returned from Hims to Damascus,
after he had strengthened it.2° Because Zang' was
involved in the struggle between the new Caliph al-
R5shid and Sultan Mas'Ed after the murder of 	 al-
Mustarshid in 529/1135, he ordered his deputy in Aleppo
_	
-
the Amir Siwar and his governor of Hama the Amir Salah
al-Din	 al-Yaghisiyani to launch forays against the
environs of Hims. Later on after long negotiations,
Shihab al-Din and Zangi reached a truce for a specified
period but Ibn al-Oalanisi, the only historian of the
time to mention the truce, does not tell us how long it
was for.'
If the year of 530/began 11 October 1135, had been a
good year for the Emirate of Damascus, during which it
7had won a truce with its normal adversary Zangl; it was
on the other hand a year of internal dissension in the
Emirate. The conflict among the commanders and notables
that year, reached its climax. The rivalries extended to
the relatives of the Amir Shihab al-Din, who was
represented by his brother Shams al-Dawla Muhammad of
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Baalbek. The story of this struggle started when Shihab
al-Din and his mother Safwat al-Mulk allowed Ibn Fayrilz
to dwell in the city of Damascus; in return Ibn FayrUz
pledged not to intervene in the affairs of Damascus. It
seems that Shihgb al-Din summoned Ibn Fayr5z to act as a
_
counter balance to the power of the Amir Bazwij, who had
become the second man in Damascus after the
assassination of Shams al-Munk. Bazwaj and the Amir
Anar played a major role in conducting the affairs of
-:Damascus during the siege of the city by Zangi at the
end of the previous year, end of 529/1135. 22 Because of
their efforts at that time, they became the most eminent
leaders in the Emirate. It is likely that Shihab al-Din
had failed to check the power of Bazw gj by his support
of the Amir Anar and so, to counterbalance the influence
of Bazwgj he brought in Ibn Fayrriz who relied on the
And/. Anar for protection against the possibility of
plots against him in Damascus." It can be suggested that
Bazwaj understood the reasons behind the return of the
Chamberlain Ibn Fayrtiz and so he used the rivalry
between Shihab al-Din and his half-brother Shams al-
Dawla Muhammad of Baalbek to win the support of Shams
al-Dawla to obtain an undertaking from Ibn Fayiliz not to
interfere in the politics of Damascus. Furthermore,
Bazwij used the rivalry between Shihlb al-Din and his
half-brother Shams al-Dawla of Baalbek, to win support
from Shams al-Dawla, who had been in the habit of
revolting against his brothers, the rulers of Damascus,
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as mentioned above, when he revolted against Shams al-
Munk Ism5'il in Dh5'1-Oa i da 526/began 13 September
1132.
It seems that the murder of Shams al-Muliik at his
mother's instigation, and the accession of Shihab al-Din
had happened without any consultation with Shams al-
Dawla Muhammad. For this reason it appears that Shams
al-Dawla considered what had occurred to Shams al-Muliak
to be a plot against the legitimate amir of Damascus.
What increased the tension in Damascus in 530/began 11
October 1135 was the fact that the Chamberlain Ibn
Fayriaz did not keep his promise and did interfere in the
domestic affairs of Damascus. When Bazwaj discovered
this he became apprehensive that Ibn FayrEz might well
obtain the freedom of action in the time of Shihab al-
Din, that he had had during the early period of Shams
al-MulEk's reign, as mentioned above.
It seems that Bazwaj had warned Shihab al-Din
against giving Ibn Fayrz more consideration since Ibn
FayrUz appeared to be breaking his undertaking
concerning his role in the internal affairs of Damascus.
-	 -
ShiKab al-Din Mahmud however, instead of taking action
•
_
to satisfy the Amir BazwaJ and thereby reducing the
tension in Damascus, took further action to lessen the
power of Bazw3j and his followers.
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On 21 Jumada- I 530/27 February 1136, the Amir Shihab
-7
al-Din and his mother appointed the Amir Amin al-Dawla
Kumushtekin al-Atabeki, governor of Sarkhad, as his
AtIbek and Isfahsalar of Damascus. 24 It seems that the
-
Amir Shihab al-Din had not designated anyone till that
time to occupy these positions. By this means, Bazwaj
would be deprived of the position of being the real
second man in Damascus.
When Bazwaj observed these measures being taken
against him by Shihab al-Din, he hesitated before taking
any decisive action, and this hesitancy initially cost
him much of his influence in Damascus. After five weeks
from the appointment of the new Isfahsalar and Atabek of
Damascus, Bazwgj killed Ibn Fayriaz on 27 Jumada II 530/4
April 1136 in al-Mayan, a few miles south west of the
city of Damascus. He justified this action on the
grounds that Ibn Fayrriz had not honoured the undertaking
mentioned above.' After the assassination of Ibn FayrEz,
the members of the 'Askar of Damascus especially the
Ghilman declined to permit Bazwaj to come back into the
city unless he was at least prosecuted for this crime.
Not only did Bazwaj kill Ibn Fayrtiz but he also demanded
from the Amir Shihgb al-Din that he dismiss the Amir
Kumushtekin al-Atabeki from his ranks, and designate
himself as his replacement. When Shihab al-Din rejected
this demand from Bazwaj, Bazwaj summoned his adherents
and laid waste the farmland round the city of Damascus.
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Amir Shihab al-Din assigned considerable armed forces to
attack them, but they failed to bring Bazw5j and his
followers to battle.
While the conflict between Shihab al-Din and Bazwaj
was reaching its climax, the Amir Kumushtekin, the
Isfahsalar and At5bek of Damascus, was not involved. It
seems that he had realized that he could not defy Bazwaj
and so he took himself off towards Sarkhad. Shihab al-
Din entreated Kumushtekin to go back to the city of
Damascus as his ally against Bazwaj. Kumushtekin refused
to comply even though Shin/3 al-Din guaranteed his
safety and his position as his Isfahsalar and Atabek of
Damascus.
Since the majority of the 'Askar of Damascus refused
to let BazwAj return to the city and in addition Shihab
al-Din Mahmild did not give him permission to do so,
Bazw5j and his followers hastened to the city of
Baalbek. The Amir Shams al-Dawla Muhammad the governor
of Baalbek and half-brother of Shihab al-Din greeted the
rebels. Later on, many new Turkomans agreed to be under
the authority of Shams al-Dawla. Bazwaj's followers
began to interrupt the trade routes of Damascus, with
the result that Shih5b al-Din agreed reluctantly to
accept Bazw5j's conditions. By dint of a peace treaty
between Shihab al-Din and Bazw5j, Shihab al-Din
established Bazw5J as his Isfahsal5r and Atabek of
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Damascus instead of Kumushtekin al-Atabeki. In return
Bazwaj bound himself to give back what he had looted
from Damascus after his murder of Ibn Fayrilz. It emerges
that the flight of Kumushtekin had lessened the resolve
of Shihab al-Din to subdue the refractory Bazwj.26
Moreover, there is no evidence to show whether the Amir
Anar had done anything in retaliation for the killing of
his ally Ibn Fayriaz or to aid his Amir Shih-ab al-Din
against the rebel Bazwaj.
The domestic situation in Damascus was aggravated
when the Amir Bazwaj and the Chamberlain Sunqur killed
7one of the most loyal allies of Ibn Fayriiz called Muhyl
al-Din AIDE' al-Dhia'ad Ibn al-Hasan Ibn Husayn Ibn al-St-ifi
Ra'is of Damascus. It looks as though the Amir Shihab
7al-Din had been coerced into giving them permission to
kill the Refs, who had played a distinguished part in
the crushing of the Batinls in Damascus on 17 Ramadan
523/4 September 1129 as mentioned in Chapter Three. One
of the relatives of Ibn al-Safi, called the Amir Shuj-i'
al-Dawla, fled to Sarkhad, about seven miles east of
Busra, 27 after the assassination of Ibn al-Sufi, to gain
protection against Bazwaj from the Amir Kumushtekin al-
Atabekl, governor of Sarkhad and the former Atibek and
Isfahsalar of Damascus.'
The Emirate of Damascus was fortunate this year
-(530/began 11 October 1135) because Zangi, the long-
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standing opponent of the Emirate, was involved in the
conflict between the Abbasid Caliph al-Rashid and Sultan
Mas'ild. Zangl spent the winter of 530/began 11 October
1135 with al-Rashid in the district of Mosul." It seems
that Zangi was inclined to assist al-Rashid because of
his earlier obligation to his	 father al-Mustarshid
during his struggle with Sultan Mas'al. Although Zangi
had not fully discharged this obligation to support al-
Mustarshid, he entered into a more whole-hearted support
of al-Mustarshid's son. The reason for that was probably
-..that	 Zang). accused Sultan Mas'Ed of murdering al-
Mustarshid at the end of 529/end 1135. By the end of
_
530/end 1136, Zangi was released from his commitment to
al-Rashid, when al-Rashid was dethroned on 17 DhE'l
Oa'da of 530/17 August 1136. He was replaced by his
uncle al-Muqtafi bi.! Amri2111h. 3° Had Zangi not been
involved in this conflict, he would have been able to
conserve his energies for the purpose of taking
possession of Films and other dominions of the Emirate of
.	 .
Damascus.
By way of contrast, the year 531/began 29 September
1136 was a year of pacification and reconciliation in
Damascus. After long negotiations between the rebels of
Sarkhad headed by Kumeshtekin of Sarkhad and Shuja' al-
Dawla Ibn al-SEfI on the one hand, and the Amir Shih.,ib
al-Din, BazwaJ and Chamberlain Asad al-Din Akiz on the
other hand, Shihab al-Din's side allowed Kumushtekin of
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Sarkhad and Ibn al-Safi to come back again to the city
of Damascus. Besides that, they agreed to return all the
wealth of the rebels which had been confiscated earlier
by the Amir Shih5b al-Din. Furthermore, Shih5b al-Din
granted Ibn al-St-ifi the rank of Ra'Is of Damascus, which
had been left vacant since the assassination of Muhyl
al-Din Ibn	 the previous year.
In early Rajab 531/began 15 April 1137, the
Damascenes celebrated the arrival of these leaders in
the city of Damascus with a great festival. They all
thanked Allh for His notable success in achieving "that
marvellous reconciliation".31
Now that the Emirate had succeeded in putting an end
to its internal conflicts, it was ready to take part
again in the counter-Crusade with the particular
objective of the county of Tripoli whose territory was
immediately adjoining. Damascus had halted the offensive
against the Crusaders since the reign of Shams al-Muliak,
who had launched an attack on the Crusaders in
Oa‘da 528/began 24 August 1137, and managed to recover
Banys from the Crusaders of Jerusalem as mentioned
above in Chapter four.33
In Rajab 531/began 25 March 1137, the Amir Bazwgj,
the chief commander of the Damascus army, invaded the
territories of Tripoli. When Count Pons of Tripoli was
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informed about Bazwaj's advance into his county, he
hastened to meet him. Bazwaj defeated Pons's army after
a hard-fought battle near the castle of Saint Gilles
(Mount of the Pilgrims). Most of Pons's army succeeded
in escaping death, but he himself was captured. As a
result of a plot by the Syrian Maronites, who had
settled on the heights of Lebanon, Pons was killed.
William of Tyre gives no details as to how the Syrians
assassinated Count Pons. The Fatimid Caliph al-Hafiz li-
Dini-'llah sent his congratulations to the Amir Shihab
al-Din concerning his victory over the Crusaders of
Tripoli."
After his victory over the Crusaders, Baziolj managed
to take over the fortress of the Mount of the Pilgrims
(Qal'at Sanjil). Although he had achieved a great
victory over the county of Tripoli. Bazwaj's army was
not ready to lay siege to the city. Therefore, Bazwaj
confined himself to advancing to the north of Tripoli
plundering the country and capturing Hisn Yahmur which
was known by the Crusaders as Chastel Rouge, eleven
miles south east of Antart5s. This fortress had been
.	 .
established by the Banii al-Ahmar who had settled on the
mountain of al-Rawadif, it was therefore called after
the builders.34
It appears that the Syrian Maronites had imprisoned
Count Pons and identified him; they then appear Co have
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handed him over to Bazw5j or the Damascenes who killed
him. As usual with William of Tyre, when he reports a
Crusader defeat, he records that the majority of the
Crusaders who took part in the battle were from the
middle class and that few of them were noblemen; but he
does not give us an estimate of the casualties. After
the murder of his father, Raymond the new count of
Tripoli, avenged his father's death by going up to Mt.
Lebanon, with the remaining forces of the country, and
carrying out a massacre of the Syrians there. But no
chronicler of the time reports what steps if any Count
Raymond took in retaliation against the Damascenes, who
had eventually defeated his father. It was likely that
he did not have sufficient power to challenge the
Damascenes under their eminent leader Bazwaj. The
cooperation of the Syrians with Damascus gives us an
indication of the success of Bazwaj in manipulating the
strained relation between the Crusaders and the Syrian
Christians. It appears that it was the first time that
Damascus had used the Syrian Maronites against another
branch of the same religion namely western Christian
"Crusaders"."
In early Sheban of 531/began 1 April 1137, Zangi
resumed his attempts to take Hims. He marched with
forces from Mosul and crossed the Euphrates moving in
the direction of Hims. In addition he ordered one of his
most accomplished commanders Salah al-Din al-Ygghisiy5n1
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to precede him with the 'Askar of Hama to lay siege to
Hims. Zang1 had chosen this commander to invest Hims,
because he thought that such a gifted leader would be
abre to persuade the governor of Hims, the Amir Anar, to
let him take over his city without bloodshed. The Amir
Anar rejected the offer refusing to give up his city and
justifying his position on the grounds that he ruled the
city only as a regent on behalf of the Amir Shillb al-
Din and thus had no right personally to determine the
fate of the city. Furthermore, in Shaww51 of 531/began
22 June 1137, Zane mobilized five hundred foot-soldiers
from Hama and attacked Hims for several days; he was
however unable to wear down the resistance of the
defenders of the city.
According to Ibn al-'Adim, the Crusaders hurried to
the aid of Hims, with the result that ZangT lifted the
siege of the city. But Ibn al- t Adim does not report
whether the people of Hims appealed to the Crusaders for
aid. Ibn al-GalInisi on the other hand says that the
-reason for Zangi's withdrawal was the strong opposition
Of the people of Hims and he says nothing about help
from the Crusaders. It seems then that the people of
Hims did not ask the Crusaders for aid. If they had done
so, it is difficult to see how the Damascenes could have
cooperated with Zangi against the Crusaders in early
Dhii'l-Hijja of the same year 531/began 27 September
1137. This will be discussed below.'
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In the year 531/began 29 September 1137, the
Byzantine emperor John II Commenus began a great
campaign directed at the retaking of Antioch and its
adjacent territory from the Crusaders. John's pretext
was that the Crusaders had not honoured their oath in
490/1097 to his father, the emperor Alexius I Commenus,
by which they had undertaken to hand over Antioch to him
if they could succeed in recovering it from the Muslims.
What caused the emperor John to embark on the campaign
was the success of Raymond of Poitiers in gaining
control over Antioch. In 530/1136, Raymond managed to do
this when he got married to the legitimate princess of
Antioch, Constance, daughter of Alice, a consort of the
former prince of Antioch Bohemond II. At the same time
Emperor John II had been striving to dominate the county
of Antioch by arranging the marriage of one of his sons
to the Princess Constance. Thus, he had missed an
important opportunity to gain control of Antioch by
peaceful means. The Emperor, then, planned to reduce
Antioch by force of arms in DhT1 1 1-Hijja of 531/began 18
August 1137. Emperor John II recaptured Cilicia, which
was ruled by the Armenian King Leon I. His next step
would be to lay siege to the city of Antioch. In DhG11-
Hijja of 531/began 18 August 1137, John laid siege to
the city with a view to recovering it for the Empire.
The involvement of John II Commenus with the Crusaders
and his relations with the Emirate of Damascus are
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discussed below and the manner of his becoming involved
in northern Syria is a crucial element in his later
dealings with the Emirate.
While John was besieging Antioch, Zane gave up the
blockade of Hims on 20 Shaww51 531/11 July 1137, as
mentioned above. According to William of Tyre, Zang' had
raised the siege so as to be able to lay siege to the
strategic and fortified stronghold of Montferrand
"BOrin", which belonged to the county of Tripoli, when
he was informed about the defeat of the army of the
county of Tripoli by the Damascenes in Rajab in the same
year 531/began 25 March 1137, as has been mentioned
above. The report from William of Tyre emphasizes the
important role played by Damascus in weakening the
country of Tripoli. 37 Raymond, the new count of Tripoli,
and King Fulk, hurried to the relief of Montferrand.
7Zangi succeeded in defeating both armies, killed two
thousand men and took Count Raymond prisoner. King Fulk
escaped death and hastened to the fortress of
Montferrand to use it as a shelter for the rest of the
defeated forces of the Crusaders. King Fulk appealed for
assistance to Raymond the prince of Antioch and Joscelin
II Count of Edessa. Although his capital city Antioch
was under siege by the Byzantine Emperor John II,
Raymond hastened with a troop of his forces to save King
Fulk, and he left the remainder to defend the city
against the threat posed by the emperor. Josoelin 11 of
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Edessa with his armed forces and the rest of the army of
Jerusalem led by William, the patriarch of Jerusalem,
also hastened to their King's relief.
The Emirate of Damascus did not stand by as a
_
spectator of what was going on in Syria between Zangi
and the Crusaders. While almost all the Crusader forces
were engaged in rescuing their King and his followers in
the fort of Montferrand, the Kingdom of Jerusalem itself
was denuded of defenders, and so the 'Askar of Damascus
embarked on a campaign to enfeeble the Crusaders. Amir
Bazw;j led the Damascene forces, and advanced towards
Nablus, an unfortified city in Samaria (northern
Palestine). He succeeded in gaining great spoils, took
many captives and set fire to the countryside around the
city of Nablus. Later,	 he returned unmolested with his
forces having suffered no casualties to speak of.
TZangi, however, managed to prevent any news of
relief from reaching King Fulk in Montferrand. For that
reason Fulk thought that help from the Crusading forces
would not arrive when he needed it, with the result that
he capitulated under conditions and handed over the
fortress of Montferrand to Zangl. Furthermore, 	 he
reluctantly agreed to pay fifty thousand dinars as a
-:
ransom.
28 In return, Zangi guaranteed the safety of the
King and his troops,	 who were besieged in the
stronghold.
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One day after the surrender of Montferrand to Zang',
the Crusader's relief expedition reached the fortress.
The Crusader leaders blamed their king for his haste in
surrendering the fort. Then they returned home without
achieving their aim of defeating Zangi's army outside
Montferrand.
7While Zangi was investing Montferrand, he won an
easy victory against the Crusaders of Antioch. It seems
that it was a result of the preoccupation of the forces
in Antioch with the defence of their city against the
Byzantine army, that Zang' was able to recover Ma'arrat
al-Nu'man and Kafartab. The capture of Montferrand,
Ma'arrat al-Nu'man and Kafartab, meant that the entire
area between Aleppo and Hama was made secure from the
Crusaders'	 depredations and	 raiding.	 It	 can be
7
suggested that these new triumphs for Zangi over the
Crusaders contributed to his mastery over Syria and went
a long way to endorsing his claim to be the first man in
Syria.
After the crucial victory of Zang1 at Montferrand,
the Byzantine Emperor John II Commenus aborted his plan
to take the city of Antioch by force. He then inclined
towards joining the Crusaders in an alliance against
Zangi. It seems that Emperor John did so, after
realizing that the growing power of Zang' would not only
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threaten the Crusaders, but also his own interests in
Syria as wel1.40
The Emperor stipulated that Prince Raymond of
Antioch swear allegiance to him, in return for raising
the siege of the city of Antioch under the agreement.
Prince Raymond was obliged to let the Emperor enter the
city of Antioch and its citadel, whenever he liked. The
important condition, that was relevant to the Emirate of
Damascus, was that if the Emperor with the aid of the
Crusaders managed to occupy Aleppo, Shayzar, Hama and
Hims, he would give them to the Crusaders. In return,
Prince Raymond would hand over Antioch to the Emperor.'"
It seems then that had the alliance accomplished its
objects, the future of the Emirate of Damascus would
have been severely affected. Not only would Damascus
lose its principal cities, as for instance Hims, but it
would probably lose its independence into the bargain.
It seems clear then that the next step for the Crusaders
would be the city of Damascus itself. If the project
were to meet with success, it would be very difficult
for the city of Damascus to protect itself, even if
Zang1 assisted it with his forces from Mosul. Zangi's
supply route for his relief of Damascus would be very
long and not as efficient as if he were able to rely on
equipment passing along a relatively short route such as
Hama or Aleppo.
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In Dhii'l-Hijja 531/began 18 August 1137, the
Byzantine Emperor embarked upon his campaign against
Syria, by despatching messengers to Zang' to emphasize
to him that he had no intention of seizing his dominions
or any other Muslims' land. The Emperor's messengers
were at pains to reassure Zangi that the chief aim of
their lord was only to recover Armenia from its
rebellious ruler King Leo I. It appears that John was
adopting the same stratagem, as the leaders of the First
Crusade had adopted in 490/1097 when they asserted to
the Kings of Damascus and Aleppo that they had no desire
to conquer their land, and that their principal target
was the recovery of Jerusalem, as has been mentioned
above in Chapter Two.
Zang' trusted the Emperor's word, so he resumed his
enterprise of taking over Hims and the other lands of
.	 .
the Emirate of Damascus. In DhE'l-Hijja 531/began 18
August 1137, Zane advanced with his forces and
proceeded to pillage the countryside around Hims to wear
down the resistance of the city. Then he marched towards
Baalbek which was under the control of Shams al-Dawla
Muhammad, the brother of the Amir Shih5b al-Din Mahmtid
of Damascus. Shams al-Dawla was forced to pay a
reluctant tribute to Zang'. 42 After that Zangi moved
towards the Biqa' Valley and took possession of fort al-
Majdal, five miles north of 'llyn al-Jarr on the road
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between Baalbek and Wadi al-Taym, from the Damascenes,
probably without real resistance. Then he advanced
towards BAnyas to lay siege to it for the first time. It
appears that when Ibrahim Ibn Turghut, 14511 of EL;nyas,
had observed the humiliation of Shams al-Dawla of
Baalbek and the inability of the Damascenes to protect
the fortress of al-Majdal, he considered it politic to
hand over his town to Zangi peacefully.43
When Banyas was taken by Zangi without a struggle,
the Emirate of Damascus lost one of its most strategic,
strongly fortified and inaccessible cities. Banyas
became the first city in the Emirate of Damascus to
7
surrender voluntarily to Zangi's 	 sovereignty. Zangi
received the city of Banyas and kept Ibn Turghut as its
wali. 44 It is not improbable that Zangi induced this
7governor to surrender his town and in return Zangi
undertook to recompense him by keeping him on as
-
governor.
According to Ibn al- t Adim, Zangi spent the winter of
532/began 19 September 1138 in the lands of Damascus and
then went back to Hama, but Ibn al-'Adim
	
gives no
details of why Zangi had done this. It seems that Zangi
had spent the winter in Banyas and its districts in
order to establish his power there. From Hama he ordered
his lieutenant of Aleppo the Amir Siw .ar with the army of
Aleppo to join his forces in surrounding the city of
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Hims. Although the historical sources of the time give
.	 .
7
no estimate for the numbers of Zangi's armed forces, it
is likely that he had a considerable army and that he
had especially assembled the army of Aleppo at this
time. Although Zangi succeeded in overpowering the
people of Hims at some vantage points around the city,
.	 .
he could not conquer it. Again circumstances were to
save , Hims from the menace of Zangi. Reports of the
advance of a vast Byzantine army estimated at about two
hundred thousand men with their allied forces of
Crusaders in north Syria provided Hims with a further
breathing space. Information concerning the fall of the
7fortress of Buz'a'a, which was under Zangi's control and
was situated only some eighteen miles north east of
Aleppo, at the hands of the Byzantine and Crusader
7	 7forces shocked Zang'. At this time, Zangi discovered
that the Byzantine Emperor's promise not tc attack
Muslim territory in Syria was unreliable. Before he
T
abandoned the siege	 of Hims, Zang'	 commanded his
governor of Aleppo the Amir Siw.;r to hurry to defend his
city. Furthermore, he assisted his lieutenant with five
hundred soldiers including four Isfahsal-a-rs, (chief
commanders).45
On 9 Sha'b-an 532/22 April 1138, as the Byzantine and
the Crusader forces reached the territory of Aleppo,
--Zangi raised the siege of Hims and moved 	 towards
Salamiyya to disrupt their supply routes."'
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In early Sha`ban 532/began 15 April 1138, the
Byzantine and the Crusader forces marched towards the
city of Shayzar to lay siege to it. It seems that they
had changed their minds about laying siege to Aleppo
with a view to its capture when they encountered strong
resistance from the 'Askar and the Ahdth of Aleppo.
Therefore, they left the lands of Aleppo on 8 Shatban
532/22 April 1138 and they occupied al-Atharib the
people of which fled out of fear of the advancing host.
Then they advanced to invest the fortified city of
Shayzar in Sha`ban of this year. 47 According to Ibn al-
Oalnisi, innumerable forces of Turkomans, headed by the
AmIr Dwid Ibn Suqman Ibn Artuq of Amid and Hisn Kayfa
who had hurried to the relief of Shayzar, forced the
allied armies to abandon their siege and they went back
to Antioch. 49 William of Tyre ascribed their withdrawal
to the treachery of Emperor John, who appears to have
accepted tribute from Sultan Ibn Munqidh of Shayzar. 49 On
-
the other hand, Ibn al-Athir allots Zangi a leading role
in contributing to the failure of the allies to take
-Shayzar. He maintains that Zangi decided to employ
strategies to engender doubt among the allies. He
persuaded the Crusaders that if the Byzantine Emperor
achieved his objectives in this campaign, including the
capture of Shayzar, the emperor would destroy the entire
Crusader edifice in Syria."
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It is probable that it was for this reason that
William of Tyre also blamed the Crusaders for their
failure to play an effective part in siege of Shayzar.
7Zangi therefore does indeed appear to have played a
considerable role in frustrating this campaign,
especially in his supply of relief forces for Shayzar,
and in his cutting off his enemies' supply route, when
he was camping in Salamiyya as has been mentioned above.
As a result of the failure of this combined Crusader and
7Byzantine campaign, the position of Zang1 became so
strong in Syria that he was able to reaffirm his claim
to be the first Muslim leader in Syria.
This campaign then can be seen to have had
significant implications for the future of the Emirate
of Damascus. As has been said above the failure of the
campaign strengthened Zangi's position in Syria, and had
established his position as the protector of all the
Muslims in Syria including the Damascenes, whose leaders
continued to refuse acceptance of his authority.
It appears then that if the allies had begun their
campaign by laying siege to Hims, which was indeed one
of their objectives as mentioned earlier, this would
have forced the Damascenes to appeal to Zangl for help.
If this had happened, Zangl's authority in the emirate
of Damascus would have gradually increased. Furthermore,
if the allies had managed to take Aleppo, Hama, Hims and
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Shayzar, as they had planned, it would have been very
difficult for the Damascenes to protect even their
capital from the allied armies. Zangr would then have
been faced with helping the city of Damascus from Mosul,
-7
a feat which may well have proved beyond even Zangl's
considerable capacity because of the distances involved.
7
It appears then that Zang' was planning for a long
tussle with the allies as he had sent his baggage to al-
Raqqa on the Euphrates, as a precaution against an
allied success.
It then appears that the Emirate of Damascus was
considerably alarmed at this campaign and was aware of
the allies' objectives. It is probable that the
Damascenes feared that some of the territory of Damascus
(for instance Hims) might well be occupied in pursuance
of these objectives. For this reason the Emirate sent
the Häjib Hasan to the Byzantine Emperor, with the aim
of persuading the emperor to stop this campaign even
prior to his capture of Buz.i'a on 25 Rajab 532/9 April
71138. This messenger and Zangi's envoy to the Emperor
returned to Damascus on the second of Muharram of the
same year (20 September 1137) about seven months before
the occupation of Buz5'a and the beginning of the real
threat posed by the campaign.51
Furthermore, the Emirate of Damascus was not willing
to be a mere spectator of what was going on in Syria nor
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to stand idly by before the menace Posed by this allied
campaign. It therefore dispatched great numbers of its
'Askar to serve with Zangr's army. It seems that one of
the conditions of the truce, which had been concluded
between Zangl and Damascus in Shaww;1 of the previous
year 531/began 22 June, 1137, might have been that
Damascus should help Zangi in case of an emergency such
as that posed by the allied campaign. Even so there was
no formal condition to this effect, namely that the
7Emirate of Damascus should help Zangi whether the allies
succeeded or failed. Success of the allied expedition
would represent	 a serious threat to the Emirate. On the
other hand, were it to fail, the position of the leaders
in Damascus would be very critical, because they would
not have fulfilled the religious obligations of helping
those Muslims who were their immediate neighbours. If
7they did not help Zangi their claim to be the legitimate
rulers of the Emirate would lose credibility as they
would have failed to assist their neighbours, especially
, Shayzar which was only about twenty four miles north
west of Hims, where the territory of Damascus marched
with that of Shayzar.
Another interpretation of Damascus' help for Zang'
could be that, whereas it might be supposed 	 that
Damascus should have sent its aid directly to the amir
of Shayzar and not to Zang', the Damascenes
	 were
endeavouring to obtain credit with Zangi. That was,
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indeed exactly what Damascus
	 was to achieve	 the
-7following month in Ramadan, when Zangi made a generous
offer of peace to Shihab al-Din Mahmiid and his new
Atabek, the Amir Anar. On 17 Ramad gn 532/30 May 1138
7
after long negotiations between the envoys of Zang]. and
Shihab al-Din, the deputies reached an agreement.
Shihab al-Din consented to hand over Hims to Zangi
7	 7
and wed Zangi's daughter. In return, Zangi agreed to
compensate the Amir Anar, governor of Hims with three
fortresses namely Barin (Montferrand), al-Akama and al-
7Hisn al-Sharcii, and also agreed to wed Shih-ab al-Din's
mother, Safwat al-Mulk. As mentioned above, the fortress
of Barin "Montferrand", which was one of the most
strongly fortified and strategically placed forts in
_
Syria, had been recaptured by Zangi the year before in
Dhi.i'l-Oa'da 532/3 April 1138. It appears that the Am-ir
Anar, who was appointed as Atabek and Isfahsalar of
Damascus only one month before the peace treaty between
-..	
_	 7-Zang]. and Shihab al-Din pursued a new policy in his
dealings with Zangl. This policy in brief, aimed to gain
7Zangi's favour by dealing more tactfully with him, even
though Damascus was disinclined to offer him any further
concession. Anar presumed that, by his winning ZangT's
-.-favour, Zang' would alter his policy which was aimed at
annexing all the lands of the Emirate of Damascus to his
own emirate or, at the very least, he would leave the
leaders of Damascus alone to rule the city of Damascus
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and its surrounding territories. The appointment of the
7Amir Anar to his new positions was no accident. In the
middle of Jum5da I of this year/30 January 1138, the
Amir Bazwaj fled towards Crusader territory, after his
..	 7
relations with the Amir Shihab al-Din	 had become
severely strained as a	 result of his	 "arrogance,
treachery and barbarity'. Ibn al-Qalanisi, the only
historian to mention this event, gives no details as to
why Bazwaj had gone over to the Crusaders, but it is
likely that he begged them for help against Shiha. b al-
.:.Din. Bazwaj remained in Crusader territory for some
time, then he returned to the outskirts of the city of
Damascus. It is thus probable that the Crusaders could
not provide Bazwaj with the aid he sought. Later he
marched to the city of Damascus and camped there with
his followers. After long negotiations between the
envoys of Bazwaj and Shihab al-Din an agreement was
reached of which again Ibn al-Oalanisl gives no details.
It seems that Shih-ab al-Din consented to Bazw-aj's
conditions solely for the purpose of availing himself of
the opportunity of getting rid of this dictatorial
leader (who had taken decisions affecting the Emirate
without even consulting Shiha. b al-Din). Shih-ab al-Din
was presented with this opportunity when Bazwaj returned
to the city of Damascus with the aim of regaining his
position as AtEbek and Isfahsalar of Damascus. On 6
Sha t ban/20 April 1138, the Amir Shihab al-Din plotted
with a group of Bazwaj's bodyguards to kill him when he
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was staying in the citadel of Damascus.
The plan was well prepared, and Bazw gj's Armenian
body guards carried out the murder of Bazwgj. According
to Ibn al-Qa15nisi, the cause of Bazwgj's assassination,
was that "Shih gb al-Din bore a grudge against him on
account of a certain action of which he disapproved and
which had inspired him with an aversion towards him;
moreover, he appears to have played fast and loose with
public funds, squandering them in gratuities and
largess."' It sounds as though Shihgb al-Din Mahmtld had
decided on a reconciliation with Zangl, but he could not
do so without the approval of his Atgbek and Isfahsalgr
Bazwäj. Because of Bazwgj's rejection of the
reconciliation proposed, Shih gb al-bin determined to get
rid of his Afgbek by killing him. Ten days after
Bazwgj's murder, Shih gb al-Din bestowed robes of honour
on the Amir Mu'in al-Din Anar, and designated him to be
his Atgbek and Isfahsal'ar of Damascus. Moreover, Shihgb
al-Din restored the office of Chamberlain for the Amir
Asad al-Din Akiz. It seems that the Am -1r Bazwgj had
dismissed Akiz from his position as Chamberlain while he
was in power.'
Shih-ib al-Din appears to have compensated both Anar
and Akiz for the persecution they had suffered while
Bazwgj had had supreme authority in Damascus.
Furthermore, Shihgb al-Din gave both Anar and Akiz free
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power in the conduct of the affairs in his Emirate.
On 23 Shawwal 533/24 May 1139, the Amir Shihab al-
Din Mahmal was murdered in his bed by three of his
personal servants. The leader of the conspiracy was
called Albaghash, the Armenian, and the others were
Ylasuf al-Khadim and al-Kharkawl al-Farrash. Albaghash
succeeded in fleeing from the city of Damascus, but both
YUsuf al-Khadim and al-Kharkawl al-Farr -ash were arrested
and were crucified at the Ja-biyya Gate in the city of
Damascus.54
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CHAPTER VI
THE REIGN OF JAMAL AL-DIN MUHAMMAD
IBN TAJ AL-MULOK BORI
23 SHAWWAL 533-8 SHA T BAN 534/24 MAY
1139-10 APRIL 1140
This second	 murder involving	 another Amir	 of
Damascus, presented the Emirate of Damascus with new
problems. After the	 assassination of Shih -ib al-Din
MahmUd,	 the circumstances	 surrounding which	 were
7
obscure, Zangi welcomed the fresh problems faced by the
Emirate of Damascus as an opportunity to interfere in
its internal affairs. The Amir Jam5l al-Din Ibn BEiri,
half-brother of Shihb al-Din, and the AmIr Anar were
charged by Safwat al-Mulk, the mother of Shih5b al-DM,
with complicity in the murder of Shih"ab al-Din.' This
accusation is supported by the fact that, after the
assassination of Shih5b al-Din, the Amir Anar delivered
a letter to Jamá-1 al-Din Muhammad Ibn BErr, w5li of
Baalbek, inviting him to take charge of the Emirate.'
Furthermore, Jam51 al-Din rewarded the Amir Anar by
according him priority, at the expense of the other
commanders and notables of Damascus, by giving him
Baalbek as an igt5'. He kept the Amir Anar as Isfahsal5r
of Damascus and with the rank of Atbek of the former
7	 -Amir Shihl- b al-Din, even though he did not get married
to Shihlb al-Dln's mother as would have befitted the
195
rank.' Later however after the murder of Shihab al-Din,
the Amir Anar married Jamal al-Din's mother, and so
became the real Atabek of the Amir Jamal al-Din.4
No historical sources of the time give her name. As
_
mentioned above in Chapter V, Zangi got married to
Shih-ab al-Din's mother (Safwat al-Mulk) on 17 Ramadan
532/30 May 1138 with the object of gaining real power in
Damascus, but he could not secure his position as At5bek
of Damascus, because Anar had secured the position of
7Atabek one month before Zangi's marriage to Safwat al-
.
Mulk.'
It seems that because of the killing of Shih-ab al-
7	 7Din, Zangi lost all influence in Damascus, since he was
no longer the effective step-father of the Amir of
Damascus. There is some difficulty in determining the
precise qualifications for the position of At 'abek and
also in discerning the criteria for the appointment.
It seems however that the Amir Anar was the second
real At5bek of Damascus. As mentioned above in Chapter
II, in 488/1095 Tughtekin became the first real Atabek
when he got married to King Duqaq's mother also called
Safwat al-Mulk.6
It can be suggested that the revival of rank of Atabek
in Damascus	 in Jamal	 al-Din's	 reign proved	 his
incapacity to rule Damascus 	 alone. By getting the
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position of real Atgbek of Damascus, Anar reconfirmed
his position as unofficial amir of the Emirate of
Damascus, a position which he had held since Sha'bgn
532/began 15 April 1138.
The historical sources of the time do not mention
whether Shihab al-Din had sons or not. If, in fact,
Shihab al-Din had indeed had sons, no mention is made of
them, nor of whether any of such sons demanded to
succeed their father as Amir of Damascus. It would seem
then that if Shihgb al-Din did indeed have heirs, they
would have been too young to succeed their father and so
would have made no noteworthy impact on affairs.
Furthermore it seems nobody at that time was in a
position to defy Anar's will, and also no historical
source indicates whether Amir Bahram, the younger
brother of the Amir Shihab al-Din demanded to succeed
his brother or indeed whether Bahram was still alive at
that time.
Ibn 'Asakir, a contemporary historian of Damascus of
the time, confirms that no person in Damascus disputed
the succession to Shihab al-Din. All the leaders and
notables of Damascus accepted Jamal al-Din as successor
of his half-brother Shihab al-Din.7
It has been mentioned that Safwat al-Mulk accused
Jam31 al-DIn and Anar of killing her son Shih-ab al-Din.
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She appealed to her husband Zangi to retaliate against
7them.' Zangi, who was eager to annex Damascus to his
territories, accepted this appeal to intervene in the
affairs of Damascus, particularly as this request came
from the mother of the former prince of Damascus who in
_
addition was Zangi's wife. It seems logical that Zangi
would have marched to the city of Damascus to lay siege
to it, and to take revenge against Jamal al-Din and his
At-ábek Anar, who were living there.
7When the news of Zangi's march from Mosul towards
Syria reached Damascus, the Damascenes tried their best
to fortify their city and to provide whatever was needed
to resist the threat posed by Zangi. Zane however
avoided Damascus and made his way towards Baalbek. It
appears that Zangi marched to Baalbek, possibly to take
revenge on Anar, who was governor of Baalbek, as mention
_
above.' According to Ibn al-Athir, a favourite slave
girl of the Amir Anar was in Damascus. When he got
married to the mother of Jam5l al-Din, he sent the slave
girl to Baalbek. When Zangi was informed about the slave
girl, he sent several letters requiring Anar to
surrender the city of Damascus to him, and he would
grant such compensation in return as Anar might wish. It
can be suggested that when Anar refused to entertain the
7
suggestion, Zangi proceeded to insult Anar by conquering
Baalbek and capturing his beloved slave girl." On 20
DhE'l-Hijia 533/17 August 1139, Zangi with his vast host
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descended on Baalbek and laid siege to the city. He set
up fourteen catapults bombarding the city day and
night." When the seventy Turkomans, the only defenders
of the city, realized that they could not protect the
7
city from Zangi, they sued for peace. Zang' consented to
their appeals, but he plotted against and killed all
these guards, and captured many people including Anar's
slave girl.' It seems as though Zangi took possession of
this slave girl to put pressure on Anar and so induce
him to surrender the city of Damascus.
_
Ibn al-Athir indicates that one factor which would
in due course help to improve the relations between Anar
and Niar al-Din Mahmtid Ibn ZangI, was that NGr al-Din
'
returned this slave girl to Anar. 13 This goes further in
demonstrating how the capture of this slave girl
-:
worsened the relations between Zang). and Anar.
-7Zangi's betrayal of the defenders of Baalbek reminds
us of his intrigue against Sawinj and his forces in
524/1130 when Sawinj's father T5j al-MulUk BUri sent him
_
to fight with Zangi against the Crusaders." Now the
Damascenes found out yet again that Zangi was still not
the man to honour his obligations. They were confirmed
in the view that, if they gave in to Zang', as the
defenders of Baalbek had done, he would butcher them.
For that reason, they strove to protect their city; they
were even prepared to appeal for help to the Crusaders.I5
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After he had taken Baalbek, Zang' spent three months
in restoring the parts of the city which he had
devastated with his catapults. In Rabl' I 534/began 28
October 1139, Zang' embarked on a fresh stage in his
efforts to take over the city of Damascus. 16 He moved
down the Biqa' valley and sent his messenger to Jaml
al-Din asking him to surrender his capital; in return he
would grant him whatever compensation he chose. On 13
Rabi' II 534/8 November 1139, when Jam -61 al-Din had not
replied to his offer, Zangl marched towards Darayya, a
large	 town five miles south west of the city of
Damascus, and camped there. When he reached D5rayya,
_
Zangi advanced with his army and attacked the vanguard
of the Damascene army, and defeated it. The soldiers
from the Damascus army, who survived the attack fled to
the city, and left their killed and captured comrades to
';	 7Zangi's forces. Then, five days later on 18 Rabi' II
T534/13 November 1139 Zang' launched a raid on the city
from the south through an area called al-Musalla, a few
miles south of the city. He managed to overpower the
Ahdgth of Damascus and alita, and the city was almost
.	
.
7
captured by Zangi.'s army.
-.-According to Ibn al-Qalnisi, Zang]. was predisposed
towards taking over Damascus by peaceful means; he
therefore returned with the prisoners to his camp in
Darayya. Ibn al-Oalanisi states that Zangi suggested to
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Jam -51 al-Din that he give him Hims, Baalbek and another
city of his own choice in compensation for the city of
Damascus." On the other hand, Ibn al-Athir claims that
one of Zangi's commanders called Kamal al-Din Aba al-
.
Fadl al-ShahrazGri recommended that he attack the city
and assured him that some commanders of the Ahdath of
Damascus had promised him that they would open the gates
of the city if Zang' were to launch an attack. Ibn al-
Athir added that Zangi refused this proposal because of
his fear of the narrow streets of the city, which would
prevent his great army from maneuvering freely.'
According to Ibn al-Oalanisi, Jam5l al-Din
considered Zangi's offer carefully, and despite his
desire to surrender his capital to him, he was unable to
do so• 19 It seems that Jamal al-Din could not accept an
offer, which his Atabek Anar had rejected. None of the
Damascenes nor even their official Amir Jaml al-Din
could dare to challenge Anar's will. It seems also that
a contributory factor in Jam51 al-Din's decision not to
cooperate with Zang]. was that he had contracted an
7illness, a few days after his receipt of Zangi's offer
in early Jum5d; I of 534/began 24 December 1139. Jam51
al-Din's illness lasted four months, after which he died
on	 8 Sha t b5n of	 the same year (10 April 1140);
7
meanwhile, Zangi's forces meanwhile were still in camp
in D".arayy5.
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Jam;1 al-Din had reigned for a shorter period than
any other ruler of the family of Tughtekrn. He had ruled
Damascus for only about ten months, from 23 Shaww;1,
533/24 May 1139 till 8 Sha e b;n of 534/10 April, 1140.20
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CHAPTER VII
THE REIGN OF MUJIR AL-DIN
ABU SA I ID ABAO IBN JAMAL AL-DIN MUHAMMAD
534-549/1140-1154
After the death of Jam5l al-Din Muhammad on 8
Sha l b.in 534/10 April 1140, the commanders and notables
of Damascus unanimously agreed on the choice of his
eldest son 'Adb al-Dawla Abü Sa l ld Abaq (who was later
known as Mujir al-Din) as successor to his father.
According to Ibn al-Oalanisi, all the Damascene leaders
were prepared to listen to the new young Amir of
Damascus. 1 But at the same time they agreed in fact to
obey the At5bek Anar, who was the unofficial ruler of
Damascus and the de facto regent for Abaq in Damascus,
(as mentioned in Chapter VI there, there was nobody in
Damascus who dared to defy Anar's will).
As was by now .his usual practice after the
instalment of a new amir in Damascus, Zane launched an
attack on the city, thinking that division among the
Damascene leaders would obstruct their efforts to
protect their capital from his attentions. But on each
occasion the commanders and notables of Damascus
continued to unite with each other in foiling Zangl's
plans to exploit this kind of opportunity. Shortly after
the accession of Mujir
	 Abaq, Zangi attacked
Damascus,	 but the Damascenes especially the Ahdath
205
managed to foil his attempt to take the city by an
unexpected assault. Therefore, Zang' was forced to pull
back to his camp in Därayya, five miles south west the
city of Damascus. 7 Anar was convinced that Zangi would
not give up the siege of the city of Damascus until it
had surrendered or been taken by force. Therefore, Anar
appealed for help to the Crusaders of Jerusalem, who
twenty-four years previously had assisted Tughtekin of
Damascus in 509/began 27 May 1115 I against the expedition
of the Saljilq Sultan Muhammad to help him to make Zangi
withdraw from the city.° Anar was obliged in turn to pay
the Crusaders twenty thousand gold dinars monthly until
Zangi abandoned the siege of the city, and also to help
them to force Zangi to surrender Banyas with the
condition that the Damascenes hand over the city to
them. Further to establish his bona fides, he suggested
that he give the Crusaders some relatives of the
Damascene commanders as hostages while he was fulfilling
his side of the bargain. 4 The leaders of the Crusaders
were hesitant about this alliance. It seems they still
remembered the alliance of Tughtekin of Damascus and II-
Ghzi:
 of Mardin with their former leaders in 509/1115
against the SaljTiq Sultan, and how Tughtekin and 11-
Gha-zi had not lived up to Crusader expectations in
properly shouldering the responsibility of resisting the
Saljaq Sultan's campaign of 509/1115. Furthermore, the
Crusaders had gained nothing from that alliance, but
- -
Tughtekin and il-Ghazi had achieved what they wanted
•
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from it as mentioned in Chapter II. William of Tyre
asserts that there were two reasons which had made King
Fulk of Jerusalem accept the alliance: the first was the
fear of the Crusaders that the fall of Damascus into the
7hands of Zang' would increase his power; the second one
was the restoration of Banyas to the Crusaders, which
was one of the most heavily fortified and strategically
placed cities in Syria'
When the Crusaders of Jerusalem eventually approved
the alliance and had received the hostages mentioned
above, they hastened to send great numbers of cavalry
and infantry to assemble at the city of Tiberias for the
-7
rescue of the city of Damascus from Zangi, who was in
camp at Ra's (Ra's al-M5'), in the region of
Hawrän twenty five miles north the city of Sarkhad,
whither he had moved from Darayya. The report of the
Crusader march to Tiberias, thwarted Zangi's scheme of
taking Damascus. The Damascus army, headed by Anar,
marched out from the city to await the Crusaders in
Nawa, a village in the region of tlawran twenty miles
north the city of Adhru l'at (modern Dar'a in Jordan).
When Zang' learnt about the assembling of the Crusaders
of Jerusalem and the Damascene forces, he hastily
retreated from Ra's al-Ma', thirty fives miles south
east of Damascus, towards the valley of the Biqa'. The
withdrawal of Zangl was due to his inability to face
both the Damascenes and the Crusaders at the same time.6
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After the allies were assured of the withdrawal of
7Zangi's forces from the district of Damascus, they
agreed unanimously to implement the second step of their
agreement that of restoring Banyas to the Crusaders of
Jerusalem. As mentioned in Chapter IV, Bany5s had been
taken from the Crusaders of Jerusalem by the Amir Shams
al-Munk Isma ql on the first of Safar 527/11 December
1132. As mentioned earlier in Chapter V. the 1,411 of
Banyas (on behalf of Damascus) Ibrahim Ibn Turghut, had
plotted against his lord the Amir Shihab al-Din Mahmild
in Muharram 531/began 29 September 1136, and became
under the power of Zangi. According to William of Tyre,
because of the treachery of Ibn Turghut,the wall of
Banyas, the Damascenes preferred to restore this city to
the Crusaders of Jerusalem rather than have it
controlled by Zangl "whom they greatly feared and
distrusted". 7 This indication from William of Tyre
emphasizes for us that the Damascenes regarded the
threat of Zangi to them as more serious than the menace
of all their enemies including the Crusaders of the
East.
In Shawwal 534/began 20 May 1140, the Damascenes and
the Crusaders of Jerusalem invested Banyas closely and
cut the city off from any help. The Damascene troops
208
encircled the city from the east, and the western side
was blocked by King Fulk's forces. Before the siege the
-.Amir Anar and King Fulk agreed to request help from
Prince Raymond of Antioch and Count Raymond II of
Tripoli.e
Of the siege itself, William of Tyre, the only
historian of the time to give more details of this
expedition, writes: "From the hurling engines called
petraries they threw huge stones of great weight, which
shook the walls and demolished buildings within the city
itself." He goes on to say: "Even the defenders though
protected by walls and ramparts, scarcely ventured to
look upon the assailants without".9
The ceaseless raids on the city did not however
weaken the vigorous resistance of the people of B-any5s.
It became obvious that the allies could not occupy the
city until they had established a wooden siege-tower.
The materials of the tower were provided to the
Crusaders by the Damascenes. The arrival of immense
Crusader forces headed by Prince Raymond of Antioch and
Count Raymond II of Tripoli, aggravated the difficulties
faced by the besieged. Zangi's attempt at providing
relief for B;ny'as was brought to nothing because of the
strength of the forces involved in the siege. io When
Anar saw that the powers of resistance of the defenders
of the city had declined to a low level, he secretly
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sent his envoys to the people of Bänyas to induce them
to surrender their city. The leaders of Banyäs refused
at first, realizing that Zane's aid would help them to
withstand a long siege. But when they found out that
Zangi's relief force could not get through, they agreed
to surrender their town. But the governor of Bklyäs
stipulated that he must be compensated with other ic1C5';
also that a part of the revenue of Bany:is should be paid
annually to him, and that all the citizens of B5ny5s
should be given permission to leave the city with all
their goods and chattels. Furthermore, those who
preferred to stay in the city or in the surrounding
countryside should be allowed to remain and to keep
their houses and properties.11
Anar informed King Fulk about these arrangements,
which he had agreed on with the 14511 of lElny-5s.
According to William of Tyre, Anar gave the Crusaders'
leaders a well prepared report concerning the
negotiations which he had undertaken. And he "urged them
with all the eloquence in his power to agree on the
treaty." The Crusader leaders unanimously approved
Anar's agreement.1z
On 24 Shawwal 534 /13 June 1140, all the people of
Bgny5s departed from their city with all their
belongings, as had been approved by that agreement. The
governor of Bgny5s was compensated for his city, which
210
the Crusaders of Jerusalem had taken over, as had been
agreed with the Amir Anar. It appears that the siege of
Banyas lasted only about twenty two days; also Anar paid
the Crusaders of Jerusalem only twenty thousand gold
dinars. Forcing the surrender of the well-fortified city
in so short a time, if we compare its surrender with the
investment of the city of Antioch on 2 Shawwal 491/12
September 1097, till the end of Jumada I 491/June 1098
by the great armies of the Crusaders which (estimated
according to Fulcher of Chartres at three hundred
thousand men including their families) which lasted nine
months, can be considered a great achievement for the
Crusaders and the Damascenes. Anar's success in
arranging this agreement in such a short time was to
save the exchequer of Damascus a great amount of money."
The year 535/began 17 August 1140, was a year of
comparative calm, while 534/began 28 August, 1139, had
been a year of friction between the Muslims, including
the Damascenes, and the Crusaders settled in the Levant.
The only serious friction between the Muslims and the
Crusaders at this time was between the people of
'Asqalan and the Crusaders of Jerusalem. According to
Ibn al-Qa15nisf, the people of 'Asqalan thwarted the
Crusaders' attempt to capture 'Asqaln and killed a
group of Crusaders putting others to flight."
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The same thing can be said of the year 536/began 8
August 1141, when the only activity to occur was when
one of Zangi's commanders called Lujja al-Turkl, who had
-:deserted from Damascus to Zangi , s service managed to
defeat the Crusaders of Antioch in the field and killed
some seven hundred men.'
The year 537/began 27 July, 1142, was one of calm
Tfor Damascus, Zangi was involved during this year in
establishing his authority in the traditional Kurdish
territories by taking over the fortified castle there
called Ashab the greatest fortress of the Hakkari Kurds.
--In addition, Zangi's regent Simar in Aleppo was engaged
in preventing the Crusaders of Antioch from occupying
Buz5'a. There was however no conflict between Zang' and
Damascus that year.'
_
Although Zangi in 538/began 16 July, 1142, was
involved in establishing his rule in Diyar Bakr
especially over the Amir Ya l ciTib Ibn al-Sib' al-Ahmar,
Damascus did not enjoy a calm year." The internal
divisions in Damascus played a significant part during
the course of the year. As mentioned above, on 17
Shathan 532/1 May 1138) the Amir Anar and the
Chamberlain Akiz, became the unofficial rulers in
Damascus. Anar even gained the two major ranks in
Damascus those of the Atabekiyya and Isfahsalk.iyya;
meanwhile the Chamberlain Akiz managed to win many
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followers and began to challenge Anar's superiority.
Anar decided that his best course to eliminate the
authority of Akiz and his followers. He approached the
problem by methods other than those used traditionally
7by the amirs of Damascus who used to dispose of rivals
by killing them. His approach was to imprison his rivals
and blind them.
On 3 Jum5d5 I, 538/13 November 1143, the Amir Anar
arrested the Chamberlain Akiz and blinded him by having
his eyes gouged out. When Akiz's followers learnt about
what Anar had done to their leader, they were prompted
to desert Akiz.je
In 539/began 14 July 1144, the internal conflict
became worse than it had been the year before. Conflict
now broke out between Mu'ayyid al-Din Abii al-Fawaris al-
Musayyib Ibn al-St-ill Ra'is of Damascus on one side, and
on the other Aba al-Makarim the wazir of the Amir Mujfr
al-Din Abaq of Damascus and the Amir Usama Ibn Marshad
_Ibn 'Ali Ibn-Munqidh, presumably the assistant of the
-;wazir. The rivalry started when Abii al-Makarim and Usama
Ibn Munqidh defamed Mu'ayyid al-Din Ibn al-Siifi to the
-:Amir Anar. Furthermore, according to Ibn al-Oalanisi Abil
al-Makarim and Usama interfered in Ibn al-Sufi's
_business as Ra'is of Damascus.
On 21 Muharram 539/25 July 1144, Ibn al-S5ff fled to
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Kumushtekin al-Atabeki, governor of Sarkhad and the
former Atabek of the Amir Shihab al-Din Mahmad and
Isfahsalk. of Damascus,	 for the second time. As
mentioned above, Kumushtekin had been a former ally of
Ibn al-Saff. And in 531/began 29 September 1136, Ibn al-
Safi had escaped to Kumushtekin of Sarkhad, after the
murder of his relative al-Ra'is Muhyi al-Din Aba al-
phirad al-Mufarrij Ibn Hasan Ibn al-Safi (on 17 Ramadan
530/21 June 1136) the former Ra'is of Damascus. It seems
that the Amir Anar had realized that there was a plot
against Mu'ayyid al-Din Ibn al-Safi planned by Aba al-
Makarim and Usama Ibn Munclidh, so he decided to banish
them to Egypt and to allow Ibn al-stif1 to come back to
the city of Damascus as its Ras's.
On 13 Jumada I 539/30 November 1144, the city of
Damascus celebrated the deportation of Abu al-Makarim
and us5ma Ibn Munclidh and the return of its Ra'is Ibn
al-Sufi in gratitude for Anar's wisdom in solving this
difficulty."
On 26 Jumada II 539/23 December, 1144,
	 Zangi
restored the city of Edessa to the Muslims. The details
of the capture of this important city is not directly
relevant to the present thesis, but the importance of
this event and its effect on Damascus are outlined. This
great victory was the most important achievement of the
Muslims against the Crusaders since the beginning of the
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Crusades in 490/1097. Both the Abbasid caliph and the
Saljiiq Sultan sent their compliments to Zangi, and
Muslims throughout the Middle East celebrated this great
triumph.2°
There is no doubt that this great achievement would
_
have been used as support for Zangi's claim to being the
leading Muslim ruler in Syria and the protector of all
Syrian Muslims including the Damascenes. Furthermore, it
would strengthen any justification he might need for the
annexation of Damascus to his growing kingdom. Panic at
-
the growth of Zangi's power developed after the fall of
Edessa. Furthermore, after the recovery of Edessa by the
Muslims, the Crusaders of the east called for assistance
from Western Europe. We shall see that the main aim of
the Second Crusade of 543/began 22 May 1148 to 10 May
1149) would be the occupation of the city of Damascus,
and not the recovery of the city of Edessa which had
been understood as being its primary objective.21
About one year after his victory in Edessa, in early
Sha'ban 540/began 17 January 1146, reports reached
_
Damascus that Zangi had assembled a great army and had
gathered "great numbers of catapults and military
machines." Zangi announced that he was preparing for
J1125d, but he made no declaration about whom he would
fight. It seems that he did this to mislead the leaders
of Damascus, who would then not prepare themselves for
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the defence of their city. The Damascenes however did
strengthen their city and mustered all their forces to
7	 7thwart Zangi ,
 s attempt to conquer their city. Zangi
gathered his forces in Baalbek which is only about
twenty-five miles from the city of Damascus. But the
7
news of a plot against the authority of Zangi in Edessa
made him change his mind about continuing with his plan
to invade Damascus. Because of the conspiracy in Edessa,
7Zangi marched to restore order there. Before his advance
towards Edessa, Zangi ordered some of his commanders to
return with the catapults to Hints. It appears that Zangi
.	 .
was frightened that these catapults would be captured by
the Damascenes. Hims, being more heavily fortified than
.	 .
Baalbek, was a more secure place to leave them. Even
when Zangi had managed to restore order in Edessa, he
was forced reluctantly to postpone his plan to gain
control of Damascus until the following year.' But this
plan would not be put into operation during Zangi's
lifetime, because he was murdered on 6 Rabi' II 541/14
September 1146, while he was laying siege to Oal'at
Ja‘bar "Dawsar", on the Euphrates river between B5lis
and al-Raqqa.
7The kingdom of Zangi was divided between his older
sons Sayf al-Din Ghäzi and Mir al-Din Mahmud. Sayf al-
Din ruled Mosul and inherited his father's problems with
the Artuqids in Diy.ir Bakr, and Niir al-Din ruled Aleppo
and inherited his father's difficulties with the
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Crusaders and the Damascenes. According to Turkish
tradition, the elder son used to gain power after his
father's death. Because Niir al-an was not the eldest
son of Zangl, his position in Aleppo was not as strong
as it might have been. This was because his elder
brother Sayf al-Din regarded him as a refractory
opponent. We shall see the effects of this situation on
Niir al-Din activities especially against Damascus,
effects which lasted until Sayf al-Din's death in Jumada'
I 544/began 6 September 1149. It becomes clear that Niir
al-Din who was an experienced and subtle politician, was
unwilling to annex Damascus to his kingdom until after
his brother's death. In any event, the Emirate of
Damascus was unfortunate on this occasion because as the
neighbour of Nal- al-Din, it was faced with a greater
threat than his brother Sayf al-Din was likely to pose.
In Jumada II 541/began 5 November 1146, about two
months after the accession of Niir al-Din of Aleppo and
Sayf al-Din of Mosul, the Crusaders of Edessa headed by
Joscelin, the former Count of Edessa, and the Edessan
Armenians succeeded by conspiracy in recapturing the
city of Edessa from its few guards.' The details of this
event are outside the scope of this thesis, but it is
necessary first of all to assess the importance of these
events for Damascus. Niir al-Din's success in recapturing
Edessa easily by force within five days proved to all
7the Crusaders that Niir al-Din was no less dangerous to
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them than his father Zangi had been. It was supposed
that Sayf al-Din not NI-1r al-Din, ought to have hurried
to the relief of Edessa because Edessa is nearer to
Mosul than to Aleppo. The success of Niir al-Din in
recovering Edessa demonstrated that liar al-Din would
make the Muslim response to the Crusaders his own
special preserve; Niir al-Din kept Edessa for himself,
-
and his brother Sayf al-Din did not oppose him. 24 In
other words, the affairs of Syria including those of
Damascus would lie in Ntir al-Din's sphere of activity
and not in that of Sayf al-Din.
In Muharram 542/began 2 June 1147, Altun-T5sh,
governor of Busra. (Bostrum) and Sarkhad (Selcath),
during a visit to Jerusalem, suggested to King Baldwin
III, the new king of Jerusalem, and his mother and
regent Melisende that he hand over Busr5 and Sarkhad to
them and in turn they should compensate Altun-T5sh by
granting him a fief. William of Tyre considers that this
was due to Altun-M-sh's antagonism towards his master,
the Amir Mujir al-Din Abaq and his Atabek Anar, but he
gave no details about the reasons for this antagonism.
At the same time, William of Tyre, who was the main
historian of the time of this campaign, did not name the
fief which King Baldwin pledged to Altun-fash.2'
The army of Jerusalem led by King Baldwin III
advanced towards Tiberias, and camped near the Bridge of
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al-Sinnabra over the Jordan river at the southern end of
Lake of Tiberias.
.According to William of Tyre, Baldwin was obliged to
notify Anar formally, if he intended to enter the
territory of Damascus so that he "might have a
legitimate time, following the custom of the land, to
assemble an army". It would seem that sudden entry into
trucial territory "without official notice" was
"contrary to the law of treaties." 26 When Anar was
informed about the agreement between Altun-Täsh of Busr5
and King Baldwin III, he assembled a great army from
Damascus and its neighbourhood to recover Busrä and
Sarkhad for Damascus. King Baldwin III wrote to Anar
warning him not to assemble an army without getting
permission from him himself. Anar replied after one
month accusing King Baldwin III of breaking the terms of
treaty between them. Anar warned King Baldwin III not to
interfere in the domestic affairs of Damascus by
supporting his rebellious subordinate Altun-Tsh of
Busra. In addition, he asked Baldwin III to maintain his
good relations with the Damascenes and to keep his peace
treaty with Damascus. Furthermore, he promised Baldwin
III to compensate him for all the expenses which he had
incurred with regard to this campaign if King Baldwin
would refrain from taking part in the plan to assume
control of Busra and Sarkhad.27
King Baldwin III answered Anar's letter by stressing
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that he could not refuse the appeal of Altun-Tash who
was "sincere" in his reliance on the Kingdom of
Jerusalem. On the other hand, King Baldwin III showed
Anar that he was prepared to compromise. He proposed to
Anar that he let Altun-T5sh go back to Busr5. But if
Anar insisted on dismissing his governor of Busra" , he
was to compensate Altun-T5sh with a considerable iqta''.
If Anar did this, Baldwin III undertook to keep his
-
peace treaty with the Amir Mujir al-Din Abaq of
Damascus.' According to William of Tyre, Anar's desire
to adhere to the peace treaty with King Baldwin III was
due to his fear from the threat to his emirate from NUT-
al-Din, his son-in-law. Nar al-DIn had married Anar's
daughter in the previous year on 23 Shaww51 541/30 March
1147). This is why Anar proposed to compensate Baldwin
III for all the expenses which he had incurred regarding
expedition.' It can be suggested that even though Anar
had established this relationship by marriage with NUr
-
al-Din, he was sure that Mir al-Din would not abandon
his father Zangi's attempts to annex Damascus to his
emirate.
One of the commanders of King Baldwin III called
Bernard Vacher advised him to consent to Anar's proposal
and to return home. But the mass of the people, who
represented the majority of the army, accused Bernard
Vacher of being a traitor, and insisted on carrying on
with the march to take over Busr; and Sarkhad. Baldwin
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was reluctant to refuse the demands of the majority, and
he therefore resumed his advance towards Bur by
moving along the plain of al-Madiin, twenty miles north
west of Busra.
In al-Mada- n, the vast and well-organised army of
Damascus shocked the Crusaders, even those who had
previously insisted on proceeding with the march. The
Crusaders of Jerusalem established their camp and spent
that night on the alert. In the morning, the Damascene
forces succeeded in surrounding the Crusaders on every
side and halting their march. the Crusaders succeeded
with great difficulty in breaking through the middle of
the Damascene army and resumed their advance towards
"Trachonitis w , a region of northern Transjordan; the
Damascenes however continued to harass the Crusaders by
firing arrows at them. In that area, the Crusaders were
exhausted from the lack of water, especially since the
pools of the region had been spoiled by dead insects.
The reason for the fouling of these pools was that this
province had faced a terrible plague of locusts. When
the Crusaders approached the city of Adratum, probably
Adhru'at in Trachonitis (Transjordan), they anticipated
that they would find water to drink. But the people of
that city, who were fellow countrymen of the Damascenes,
strove to prevent the Crusaders from using the
reservoirs of the town. For four days during their stay
En the city, the Crusaders did not enjoy any rest, even
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during the night, because of the bombardment carried out
by the Damascene bowmen. Owing to this harassment, many
Crusaders sneaked out of their camp and deserted;
meanwhile, the Damascene forces increased in number. The
Crusaders tried to counter the Damascenes' missiles, but
In vain; indeed they made scarcely any impression at all
on the Damascene forces.3°
On the fourth day of the march, the Crusaders
painfully made their approach towards Busr. They
managed with many difficulties to get the water despite
the Damascene defence. They made their camp near the
town where they enjoyed a little rest that night as they
waited for the morrow. At midnight a bearer of bad news
for the Crusaders informed them that the wife of Altun-
Tsh, the governor of Busr5, had betrayed the town and
handed it over to the Damascenes. The Crusaders were
embarrassed by the news of the surrender of the city,
which they had suffered many difficulties in reaching,
with the express aim of adding it to their dominions.
The Crusaders now unanimously decided to retreat hastily
to their own territories whatever the cost. William of
Tyre, the only historian of the time who gives many
details about this event, describes the terrible
situation of the Crusaders by saying: "Now for the first
time the Christians [the Crusaders] felt the hardship of
their situation in double measure, for their great hope
now was gone, and they realized that their efforts had
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been all in vain"•31
On the following day, Wir al-Din's forces arrived to
support the Damascenes, because Anar had appealed to
him_ The coming of an enormous number of Nar al-Din's
troops added to the troubles of the Crusaders, who had
just started their withdrawal. The Crusaders decided
against leaving any of their dead behind as they
withdrew so as to make Anar and Nar al-Din believe that
they had no casualties, and so would refrain from
following them. When Anar and Mir al-Din found that
their efforts to capture the Crusaders were in vain,
they set fire to the land; the fire, fuelled by dry
thistles and grass, doubled the woes of the Crusaders.
But a change of wind in the direction of the Damascene
forces and those of Niir al-Din lessened the torment of
the Jerusalem army. The Crusaders intended to send an
envoy to Anar to agree on some compromise, the object of
which was merely to give them an opportunity to return
home safely. But the Crusaders' envoy perished at the
hands of the Damascenes before he had the opportunity of
presenting his message.32
When the Crusaders approached "Cavea Roab," after
several unendurable days, Anar dispatched messengers
affirming his good intentions to King Baldwin III and
proposing peace. William of Tyre, the only historian of
the time to mention these proposals gives no details,
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but he does mention that the Crusaders refused to
receive them. 3 It seems that Nor al-Din pretended to
have had no notion of this mission, so as not to worsen
his relationship with his ally and father-in-law, Anar,
because it would seem that sooner or later the Emirate
of Damascus would be his.
According to William of Tyre, an unknown horseman
guided the Crusaders on their return to their homes by
way of "Cavea Roab", where they had lost their way. 34 It
sounds as though Anar had provided the Crusaders with an
unidentified guide to demonstrate his good will and so
as not to lose prospects of alliance with them in future
against such time as NOr al-Din would try to annex the
city of Damascus to his Kingdom.
After the failure of the expedition mounted by the
Crusaders of Jerusalem to take over Busrä and Sarkhad,
the former governor of Busr,i Altun-lish went back to the
city of Damascus without getting a safe conduct,
thinking that Anar would forgive his disloyalty to him
and his rebellious activities. But Anar sentenced him to
be blinded as Altun-T5sh, while he was in power in
Busra, had done with his own brother. Anar confined him
to house arrest in Damascus.35
William of Tyre gives details of the extent of the
Crusaders' losses in this campaign. He says that "No one
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now living can remember any equally perilous expedition
during the period of the Latins in the Orient which did
not result in a decisive victory for the enemy".36
After the recovery of Edessa on 26 Jumäd5 II 539/23
-7December 1144, by Zang.", the Crusaders of Outremer sent
many messengers to persuade the Church in the West to
promulgate a new Crusade to save the rest of the
dominions of the Crusaders in the East. After great
efforts by Pope Eugenius III and Bernard, abbot of
Clairvaux, the Holy Roman Emperor Conrad III and King
Louis VII of France together with western princes agreed
to embark on the Second Crusade." The treatment of the
this Crusade here will be confined to its impact on the
Emirate of Damascus.
The reports about the number of the Crusader forces
embarked on	 this campaign have been
	 greatly
overestimated, particularly by the Muslim sources.
According to Ibn al-Oalanisi, the number of the German
and French armed forces combined was about one million.
It seems that the Crusaders put about this exaggerated
number in order to frighten the Muslims in Syria. Ibn
al-Oalinisi points out that this estimate originated
from the Byzantine Empire and the Crusaders." William of
Tyre estimated both German and French armies at about
one hundred and forty thousand men." In Jum:id II
542/began 28 October 1147, by the river Bathys near
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Dorylaeum the German forces lost a ninth of their army
at the hands of the Saljiiqs of Iconium. Only seven
thousand men, including Emperor Conrad, escaped death in
the disaster. After many difficulties, the fleeing
forces arrived safely in Nicaea. 4° The French army joined
the remnants of the German forces in Nicaea. Then both
armies resumed their advance towards Ephesus. On 14
Rajab 541/15 December 1147, in Ephesus, the German
emperor ordered his remaining forces to return to
Constantinople and he himself returned by sea also to
Constantinople.'"
In early Shathan 542/began 27 December 1147, another
catastrophe befell the Second Crusade near Laodicea.
(modern Denizli), when the French army was negotiating
Mt. Cadmus. The Saljticis of Rum exploited the separation
of the vanguard and rear of the French army; they
ambushed the rear of the French army and defeated it.
According to William of Tyre, some of these forces,
including King Louis succeeded in fleeing and then
joined the vanguard who had no idea about the disaster
which had befallen the rear of the army. As far as is
known, no historical sources of the time mention the
number of French losses precisely, but it is likely that
these were no fewer than thirty thousand casualties.
William of Tyre describes this tragic defeat for the
French in the following terms:
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"That day the glorious reputation of the
Franks was lost through a misfortune most
fatal and disastrous for the Christians; their
valour, up to this time formidable to the
nations, was crushed to earth" .42
At Attalia (Antalya), the French army was further
demoralized by the scarcity of food, and many who had
survived from the disaster of Laodicea particularly the
poor died of starvation. King Louis and his nobles and
commanders left their army to proceed on foot, and went
by ship the Port of St. Symeon, (al-Suwaydiyya.), which
belonged to the Crusaders of Antioch. 43 Raymond of
Antioch begged Ring Louis to help him to extend his
dominions, but King Louis refused to do so. Then King
Louis left for Jerusalem to perform his pilgrimage and
to discuss with King Baldwin III what they should do to
help the Crusaders of the East.'"
In Dha'1-0a Ida 542/began 25 March 1148, Emperor
Conrad and his forces landed at the port of Acre. His
ships had been provided by the Byzantine emperor Manuel
I Comnenus. According to William of Tyre, each of the
Crusader states in the East desired to use the Second
Crusade in its own interest alone without considering
the common good of the Crusaders in general. Each state
was eager to utilize the forces of the Second Crusade
with a view to enlarging its own dominions.4
In Muharram 543/began 22 May 1148, after lengthy
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arguments and discussions between the leaders of the
Second Crusade in Acre, they decided at last to try and
take the city of Damascus.' According to William of
Tyre, the reason for the choice was that this city was a
major threat to the Crusaders of the East.'" It can be
suggested that the real menace to the Crusaders of the
East at that time was not the Emirate of Damascus but
the threat posed by N5r al-Din of Aleppo. It seems that
Damascus at that time no longer represented any
considerable threat to its allies, the Crusaders of
Jerusalem. As mentioned above, Ntir al-Din made the
threat he posed to the Crusaders particularly clear when
he recovered Edessa in Jum'ad II 541/began 5 November
1146, and helped the Damascenes against the Crusaders of
Jerusalem in Muharram 542 /began 2 June 1147 when they
tried to annex Busr5 and Sarkhad to their dominions.
The Crusaders chose to launch their attack on the
city from the west. According to William of Tyre, the
Crusaders selected that direction for two reasons. The
first one was that, if they succeeded in dominating this
highly fortified area, it would be easy for them to
overcome the city. The second reason was that this
position would provide their forces with water and food,
especially fruits. But according to a modern Arab
historian Ahmad Zeal, the western side of the city was
the least fortified area of Damascus.' It seems that the
Crusaders selected this position to surprise the
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Damascenes who did not expect an attack from so great an
army from that direction for geographical reasons, as
that western side of Damascus is surrounded by
mountains. The Damascene forces managed to prevent the
advance of the Crusaders across the Barad5 River for a
while. But when the Emperor Conrad led the attack with
his German forces, he defeated the Damascenes and forced
them to flee to the city. By that victory the Crusaders
forced the river crossing and camped in "widespread
ranks around the city, and, without opposition, enjoyed
at pleasure the river and the orchards thus won by
force." 49 The Damascenes embarked on new tactics to stop
the advance of the Crusaders by placing tall beams of
immense size in the roads opposite the Crusaders' camp
as an obstruction. According to Ibn al-Gral5nisi, the
Crusaders achieved a position around the city which had
not been achieved by a non-Muslim aggressor since the
capture of Damascus by the Muslims in 17/638.° By
contrast, according to historians of the time,
the Crusaders started their siege of Damascus from the
South then moved to the East. si The western historians
of the time, including William of Tyre and Ibn al-'IbrI,
the Syrian historian, give the treachery of some of the
Crusader leaders of the East as a particular reason for
the failure of the expedition to capture the city. They
believe that Anar bribed these leaders to persuade the
Crusaders that they should leave their advantageous
position on the western side of the city and move to the
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eastern side. These leaders persuaded their sovereigns
that the eastern side was less well protected than the
western one; there were "no protecting orchards and
neither river nor moat to hinder the approach to the
fortifications." 52 It should however have been apparent
that the eastern side was in fact the most heavily
fortified side of the city. According to William of
Tyre, these "traitorous leaders" induced their lords to
move to the new position which did not provide the
Crusaders with enough water and food supplies, even for
a few days. The Crusader leaders discussed the matter of
returning to the position which they had been induced to
leave. But they discovered that the Damascenes had
hastened to re-establish themselves even more strongly
than before. The Damascenes now not only barricaded the
area with vast beams, but with immense masses of rocks
and positioned a large body of orchers there, so
preventing all possibility of entrance. The Crusaders of
the West who had trusted the Crusaders of the East
discovered their treachery. For this reason, they
decided to withdraw from Damascus without accomplishing
their objective of taking over the city. All the
Crusading forces withdrew towards Jerusalem over the
same road by which they had come. According to William
of Tyre, the Crusaders of the West then returned home to
Western Europe "without glory".3
There are various reasons canvassed in explanation
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of the failure of the Second Crusade. The first of these
suggests that the promise of Emperor Conrad, King Louis
VII and King Baldwin to bestow Damascus on Theodore
Count of Flanders before the siege of Damascus, let
alone its capture,	 provoked hostility among the
Crusaders of the East. Although King Baldwin III and
some of the Crusaders of the East accepted this
arrangement,	 many other Eastern Crusading leaders
rejected it. According to William of Tyre, those who had
rejected Theodore's request, "preferred that the
Damascenes should keep their town rather than to see it
given to the count" of Flanders.s4
The second suggestion is that Anar had bribed some
of the Eastern Crusading leaders to give up the siege of
the city, as mentioned above.ss
The third suggestion is that Anar tricked both the
Crusaders of the East and the West as well. He wrote to
the Crusaders of the West warning them that if they did
not give up the siege of the city, he would surrender
the city to Sayf al-Din of Mosul, who had assembled all
the forces of the Muslim East against them. At the same
time, he wrote to the Crusaders of the East threatening
them that they faced alternatives neither of which was
in their interest . The first of these namely that he
hand over the city of Damascus to Sayf al-Din, would
make it most difficult for them to retain their
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dominions in the East (including the holy city of
Jerusalem, the main prize of the Crusaders). The other
alternative namely that the Crusaders of the West would
capture the city of Damascus and establish a new
Crusader state in the East, would result in their
domination of all the other Crusader states in Syria.56
It seems that Anar bribed some of the Eastern Crusading
leaders to persuade their rulers to abandon the siege of
the city of Damascus. The final suggestion is that it
was the splendid resistance of the Damascenes and their
allies to the Crusaders during the siege of the city
which led to its failure. Although no forces arrived
either from Sayf al-Din of Mosul or NOr al-Din of
Aleppo, their promise of help for the people of the
Emirate of Damascus encouraged the Damascenes to resist
the major threat which the Crusaders posed to their
city. No contemporary historian denies the bravery of
the Damascenes in facing this grave threat.
The Second Crusade, of 543/began on 22 May 1148,
against the city of Damascus, and the co-operation of
the Kingdom of Jerusalem with the other Crusaders put
the continuing validity of the truce between Damascus
and Jerusalem in question.
After the withdrawal of the Second Crusade, the
Crusaders of Jerusalem began to plunder and loot the
dominions of the Emirate of Damascus, especially in
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Hawrih. In Muharram of 544/began 11 May 1149, Anar was
reluctant to march against the Crusaders of Jerusalem
despite their plundering and devastation in the Hawr5n
area. Anar appealed to the Bedouin to help him against
the Crusaders. His aim was to resume his truce with the
Crusaders of Jerusalem, because they had cut off the
trade routes of Damascus. The Crusaders of Jerusalem
were however compelled to renew their truce for another
two years and reduce the annual tribute on Damascus
after Anar had launched raids against them in Hawra-n.57
It seems that not only was keeping the Damascus road
open important for the leaders of the Damascenes, but
also their alliance with the Crusaders of Jerusalem was
an essential element in protecting them from the
threatened capture of Damascus by /Cr al-Din.
It can be suggested that Mir al-Din was aware that
Damascus would not abandon its policy of alliance with
the Crusaders of Jerusalem. To break that alliance, Nar
al-Din wrote to Anar offering his personal assistance to
the 'Askar of Damascus in their operations against the
Crusaders of Antioch.58
Although Anar's armistice with Jerusalem was not
related to Antioch, sooner or later this new alliance
between Anar and Mir al-DIn would indeed affect Anar's
alliance with Jerusalem. Furthermore, it sounds as
though Wir al-Din would be likely to exploit the
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Damascene involvement in Antioch to weaken both Damascus
and Antioch and to strengthen his own power in Syria
into the bargain. It seems that Anar was suspicious of
Wir al-Din's intentions in that, if he were to join the
army in person, Kir al-Din would have the opportunity of
imprisoning him; therefore on 10 Safar 544/19 June 1149,
Anar sent one of his eminent commanders, the Amir
Muj5hid al-Din Baz5n Ibn Wimin with a considerable
number of soldiers from Damascus to deputize for him.
Anar ordered Muj5hid al-Din to obey Nar al-Din, and
serve him with all the forces at his disposal. Anar's
justification of his own remaining in the city of
Damascus with the rest of Damascene army was that he
wished to settle the situation in Hawran where the
Bedouin were refusing to transport Damascus trade with
their own camels.'
On 21 Safar 544/29 June 1149, Mir al-Din with great
help from Damascus achieved a major victory, near the
fortress of Innab against Prince Raymond of Antioch.
Almost the entire army of Antioch was slaughtered
including their Prince Raymond who was well known for
his bravery among the Crusaders of the East. After this
victory, the combined armies of Mir al-Din and Damascus
laid siege to the city of Antioch, one of the most
heavily fortified cities at that time in Syria. Wir al-
-
Din thought that her people would surrender to him
because of the catastrophe suffered near Innab. the
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people of Antioch however declined to yield to Wir al-
Din as they imagined that the Crusaders would hurry to
their relief."
In Jumid I 491/June 1098, (fifty-three years
previously) about three hundred thousand Crusading
forces had taken nine months to capture this city' and
it sounds as though this was too difficult for Kir al-
Din whose mustered army was of only about six thousand
men. In spite of this, Wir al-Din left part of his army
to continue the siege of the city and marched with the
rest to lay siege to Af5m1ya (Apamea). He managed to
recover Af5miya without bloodshed and then came back to
Antioch to resume the siege. He endeavoured to induce
the people of Antioch to come out to fight his arm y in
the field as indeed their count had done earlier. But
the people of Antioch recognized this particular
stratagem. Therefore, they did not leave their city with
the result that they were successful both in limiting
casualties and saving Antioch. Nar al-Din did not give
up the siege until the people of Antioch recognized his
title over all the lands near Aleppo. The historical
sources of the time, howeverr, give no details about
this treaty between Ntir al-Din and the people of
Antioch. Then Mir al-Din turned back to Aleppo and the
Damascene forces went back home." Wir al-Din reaped the
benefit of his alliance with Damascus in his victory by
Innab.
235
During his campaign in Hawran, Anar had left his
forces in the field and he himself returned to Damascus.
It appears that some emergency had forced him to go back
to the city. While in the city, he suffered severely
from diarrhoea. Although he was sick, he insisted on
rejoining his forces in Hawr5n so as to complete his
mission there by way of reaching an agreement with the
bedouin of that region. While there he contracted the
dangerous disease of dysentery and returned to the city
_
of Damascus on 7 Rabi' II (14 August 1149), dying there
after twenty five days.6'
With the death of his Atbek Anar in early Jum5d5 I,
544/began 6 September 1149, the Amir Mujir al-Din had a
golden opportunity to reign freely in his emirate
without the interference of any strong official in
Damascus. It seems then that the reason for the assembly
of all the notables and commanders of Damascus after the
death of Anar, in the citadel 	 where Mujir al-Din
_himself was living was to gain support for Mujir al-Din
to rule independently. All the commanders and notables
of Damascus including Husain al-Din B515q, the Ra'is
Mu'ayyid al-Din Ibn al-Siifi and Mujâhid al-Din Biiz5n
_
.:agreed to listen to MuJir al-Din.64
7	 7It appears that Mujir al-Din was afraid of the
increasing power of MuLyyid al-Din Ibn al-Stifi, Reis of
Damascus, and his brother Zayn al-Dawla Haydara. It
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seems that Mujir al-Din had no power at that time to
remove these leaders. Therefore, he detained their
followers in prison to reduce their power in Damascus.
Mu'ayyid al-Din and Zayn al-Dawla assembled their
followers among the Ahdiith and the trouble-makers of
Damascus near their houses to protect themselves in case
Mujir al-Din attempted to imprison them. When mujir al-
Din saw their preparations, he sent to reassure them
that he had no intention of persecuting them. They did
not trust him however, so they marched the following day
with their followers towards the prison, broke into it,
and released such of their followers as had been
detained. When Mujir al-Din was informed about this
rebellious action, he assembled his forces to suppress
the malcontents. But his leading personnel persuaded him
to solve this problem by peaceful means.
In view of the length of the negotiations and the
measure of disagreement between Mujir al-Din and the
7
rebels, Mujir al-Din was understandably reluctant to
reappoint Mu'ayyid al-Din as Ra'is and WazIr of Damascus
as well, which would have confirmed him as the leading
7	 7person in Damascus. -Besides that, Mujir al-Din was
forced to dismiss some of the more distinguished
personalities in Damascus including al-Sall5r Zayn al-
Din Isma e il, Shihna of Damascus. 65
Meanwhile, the Crusaders devastated and plundered
Hawran, which was in the territory of the Emirate of
237
Damascus. It seems that N5r al-Din used these attacks by
the Crusaders of Jerusalem on Hawrän to test whether,
after the death of Anar, Damascus could maintain the
same cooperation with him against the Crusaders as had
operated in Muharram 543/began 22 May 1148 and in Safar
544/began 9 June 1149, as mentioned above. Furthermore
it seems that Mir al-Din exploited these raids of the
Crusaders of Jerusalem to force the Damascenes to break
their alliance with them. It could be supposed that the
rulers of Damascus would ask for help from N5r al-Din
against the Crusaders of Jerusalem. But what in fact
happened was the opposite. Mir al-Din wrote to the
Damascenes to send one thousand horsemen under a
reliable commander to fight the Franks in Hawrin. It
seems that N5r al-Din did this to bring pressure to bear
on the rulers of Damascus. Mujir al-Din, however,
rejected N5r al-Din's offer, whereupon Wir al-Din
marched towards the city of Damascus to compel the
Damascenes to help him. According to Ibn al-Oal5nisi,
the Damascenes had made a defensive alliance with the
Crusaders of Jerusalem. Therefore, the Damascenes
appealed for relief from the Crusaders of Jerusalem, who
were engaged at the time in rebuilding the city of Gaza
as a stronghold from which to attack 'Ascialkl. A part of
these Crusader forces reached Banys to assist the
Damascenes against N5r al-Din. Mir al-Din camped in
Man5zil al- l As5kir, a few miles south of the city of
Damascus. On 26 Dhii'l-Hi jia 544/25 April 1151, he sent a
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strong letter to Mujir al-Din and his Ra qs, stressing
his request for help against the Crusaders, and giving
more details about his policy towards Damascus. In this
letter, Wir al-Din mentioned another justification for
his request for Damascene help; it was to assist in the
deliverance of 'Ascialan and other cities occu pied by the
Crusaders. The Damascene leaders insisted on their
refusal to help N5r al-Din, and they warned him of the
power of their allies the Crusaders of Jerusalem, who
were ready to help them in the event of his attacking
them.'
When he received the reply, Wir al-Din determined to
advance with the intention of launching an attack on the
city of Damascus the following day. But heavy rain
prevented him from doing so. According to Ibn al-
-
0a1:inisi, certain reports reached Niir al-Din who
abandoned his intention of attacking the city of
Damascus. It seems the reports Wir al-Din received
suggested that the Damascenes would accept his authority
in Damascus. On 1 Muharram 545/30 April 1150, the
Damascenes reached an agreement with Wir al-Din. They
agreed to be under Nar al-Din's authority and pronounce
the khutba in his name. In turn, Mir al-Din bestowed on
Mujir al-Din and his Wazir and Ra'is of Damascus
Mu'ayyid al-Din robes of honour; then he returned to
Aleppo on 16 Muharram 545/15 May 1150. 67 As mentioned in
Chapter Five, in Jum5di I, 529/began 18 February 1135,
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Shihab al-Din Mahmild of Damascus had consented to
pronounce the khutba in the name of Zangi of Mosul and
zAleppo, but it did not mean that Zang]. , s authorit y in
Damascus was more than nominal. The same situation now
obtained as between Mujir al-Din and Nar al-Din.
By the beginning of 546/began 20 April 1151,
Damascus faced another and more serious threat of
capture from Nar al-Din. In this latest campaign NGr al-
Din assembled a great army numbered at about thirty
thousand men. In this campaign NTH' al-Din applied the
new strategy of exhausting the economy of Damascus. On
12 Muharram 546/1 May 1151) Ntir al-Din marched towards
Damascus and camped in the lands of al-Hajira and 11wiya
near *Adhra. Then he sent detachments to plunder the
crops of territory in the Ghtita of Damascus. During that
time, he wrote to the rulers of Damascus reminding them
that his object was not to destroy their country, but to
induce them to join forces with him in the campaign
against the Crusaders. This time, the Damascene leaders
did not reply to Kir al-Din. On 23 Muharram 546/12 May
1151, NUr al-Din moved his camp to the area east and
west of Masjid al-Qadam, and as far as the al-Qibli
mosque to the south of Damascus. According to Ibn al-
Oalânisi, no hostile forces had dared to advance as far
as this for some time past. During that time, the Franks
of Jerusalem advanced to relieve the Damascene leaders.
When the news of their march reached the people of
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Damascus, many of them especially the 'UlamP and pious
people were disappointed, because they would have been
happy to be under Niir al-Din's rule. In any event, on 25
Safar/12 June 1151, in the same year, Niir al-Din gave up
the siege of the city, when news of the Crusaders' march
towards Damascus reached him. He then advanced towards
al-Zabadani to induce the Crusaders to face his forces
in open combat there."	 In addition, Wir al-Din sent
four thousand horsemen towards Hawr.in to cut off the
supplies of the Crusaders there.' It appears that Wir
al-Din was informed that the price of the Crusaders'
help against him would be the fortress of Busra, which,
as has been mentioned, the Damascenes had striven to
save from the Crusaders in Muharram 542/began 2 June
1147 four years previously. Therefore, he dispatched
these forces to prevent the Damascenes and the Crusaders
from joining forces to compel the rebellious ruler of
Busra to give up his city in the Crusaders' favour.
After some days the Crusader forces headed by Ring
Baldwin III, arrived in the city of Damascus. Mujir al-
_ -
Din and his wazir Mu'ayyid al-Din Ibn al-Sufi were
•
disappointed with the small size of the force sent by
their Crusader allies. The Frankish forces preceded the
Damascene troops in the advance towards Busra. When the
•
Franks of Jerusalem were informed about the forces sent
by Wiz- al-Din to Hawr5n, they took refuge in Lujât
Hawr5n (the desert of north eastern Hawr5n). When the
Damascene forces Joined the Franks there, they marched
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to lay siege of Busra. It seems that the Franks and the
Damascenes were not ready for a long siege, and when the
governor of Busr5, one Surj51, confronted them with his
forces, they gave up the siege of Busr5. In the second
ten days of Rabi e I/began 27 June 1151, the Damascenes
and the Frankish forces went back home without achieving
their aim of taking Busr5.7°
On 21 Rabi l I 546/7 July 1151, within a few days of
the Damascene return to Damascus, N5r al-Din resumed his
policy of exhausting Damascus by plundering Hawran, Manj
al-Suffar and al-Gh5ta. Mujir al-Din appealed to his
people especially his troops and the Ahath to protect
their city, but few of them joined him to fight N5r al-
Din's forces, thereby departing from their earlier
practice of giving him firm support. No real fighting
took place between the two forces. On 24 Rabi' I 546/10
July 1151. NOr al-Din camped in area of al-Qat -1'a near
the city of Damascus. On 10 Rabl i II, 546/26 July 1151,
after protracted negotiations between both parts, Mujir
al-Din agreed to rule Damascus as a regent of N5r al-Din
for the first time. To confirm this arrangement Mujir
al-Din visited N5r al-Din in Aleppo on 12 Rajab 546/25
October 1151. 7' It seems that even Mujir al-Din accepted
N5r al-Din's authority, but he refused to abandon his
peace treaty with the Crusaders of Jerusalem. This is
supported by the fact that in late Sha i b5n of the same
year/began 14 November 1151, some Turkomans attacked
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Banyas, which belonged to the Franks of Jerusalem at
that time, and defeated its governor and his forces in
the field. The governor was the only person to escape
death in the attack. Mujir al-Din hurried with his
troops to punish the Turkomans. He was unable to catch
the main body of the Turkomans but caught up with some
of them encumbered by booty which they had taken from
the Crusaders. Mujir al-Din was able to return the
plunder to the Crusaders who took their revenge for the
Bgnyas incident by raiding in al-Bicia l in early Ramadan
in the same year/began 12 December 1151.72
548/began 27 March 1153, was an important year in
Crusading history. In this year, the Crusaders managed
to capture 'Ascialan, the last Muslim port on the
Levantine littoral.' The Crusader capture of 'Ascialan
however is only discussed here in the light of its
impact on the Emirate of Damascus. On 13 Muharram 548/11
April 1153, Mujir al-Din marched with his forces to join
Niir al-Din. Then they advanced towards the fortress of
Aflis (Afis), twenty miles north east of Ma'arrat al-
Nu'man on the road from Ma'arrat al-Nu'man to Aleppo,
and took it by force. After that they marched in the
direction of B5nyas with ten thousand men, but they
changed their direction and advanced to the river al-
A e waj, (fifteen miles south of the city of Damascus),
when the appeal for help from t Ascialan reached them.
According to Ibn al-Qalanisi, the capturing of Banyas
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which belonged to the Crusaders of Jerusalem, should
have been easy because most of the Crusaders of the East
were engaged in laying siege to the city of 'Asgalan.
But Niir al-Din's forces and those of the Damascenes
separated and returned home. Neither army succeeded
either in helping 'Asgal5n or in taking over B5nyas. Ibn
al-oalanisi gives no excuse for either of the leaders,
NOr al-Din or Mujir al-Din, for their failure in this
matter. The Damascene army arrived home on 11 Rabl' I
548/5 June 1153, and Niir al-Din's forces returned to
H1ms. 74 According to Abil Sh -Ama, the author of Kitgb
rawdatayn fi akhbar al-dawlatayn al-hariyya wa
Salahfyya, fighting had occurred between NOr al-Din's
•	 .
troops and those of Mujfr al-Din before they went back
home .7
About three months after the Damascene forces'
return to Damascus, friction seems to have broken out
once more among its leaders. This time the split
happened within the family of Ibn al-St-if- I. A rivalry
emerged between Mu'ayyid al-Din Ibn Ra'is and
Wazir to the AmTr of Damascus and his brother Zayn al-
.7	 7	 7Din Haydara. MuJir al-Din backed Zayn al-Din, therefore
the position of Mu'ayyid al-Din was shaken. On 19 Jum5d5
I/10 August 1153, this difficulty was resolved by the
deportation of Mu'ayyid al-Din to sarkhad. Then Mujir
al-Din appointed Zayn al-Din Ibn al-Stifi as his new
wazir instead of his brother Mu'ayyid al-Din. But Mujir
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al-Din discovered later on that the new wazir was
unreliable and dishonest to the extent of accepting
bribes; he, therefore, dismissed Zayn al-Din and
designated a new wazir, one 'Ata al-Khdim, the Druze
governor of Baalbek.' It seems that this is the first
time that a Durzi had become wazir in Damascus.
On 29 Jum5d5 I, 548/24 July 1153, 'Ascial5n fell into
the hands of the Crusaders peacefully despite an eight
months siege. It is not proposed to discuss the reasons
for the capture of this important city in detail, but
the role of Damascus in this disaster and its effect on
Damascus in the following year 549/began 18 March 1154,
will be indicated. As mentioned above, Dhir al-Din and
-
Mujir al-Din had intended to relieve 'Ascialan. It seems
that Damascus was not seriously committed to the
provision of real support for the campaign of Mir al-
Din, probably because it did not want to lose its
alliance with the Crusaders of Jerusalem. Therefore, Niir
al-Din was unable to face the Crusaders in a position
which was far from his supply routes, and indeed the
only power capable of doing this was Damascus.' Ibn al-
Athir considers that the fall of 'Ascial5n hastened Nar
7
al-Din's annexation of Damascus to his kingdom so as to
establish a united front in Syria to challenge the
Crusaders."
According to Ibn al-Athlr, Mir al-Din hastened to
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take over the city of Damascus, because he was sure that
the next step of the Crusaders would be to threaten the
7
city of Damascus directly. 79 On this occasion, Nar al-Din
facilitated his annexation of Damascus by inducing Mujir
7	 7
al-Din to get rid of his reliable new Druze wazir
al-Khadim which left Mujir al-Din to face him alone.
According to Ibn al-Athir, Nür al-Din would have been
unable to conquer Damascus if l Ata f al-KhAdim had been
in power. It was for this reason that NGr al-Din urged
7Mujir al-Din to get rid of this wazir. Ibn al-Athir
added that 'Ata' al-Kh&Iim asked Mujir al-Din before his
hanging not to kill him, because there was a plot then
.7	 7	 7	 7being hatched against MuJir al-Din. But Mujir al-Din did
not listen to 'At5* al-Kh5dim's advice and had him
executed on 25 DhU'l-Hijja 548/10 February 1154, only
forty days before Damascus fell to NGr al-Din."
7In addition, Niir al-Din had deprived Damascus in
DhG'1-Oa t da 548/began 23 January 1154, of the Aleppo
trade, which eventually caused a rise in the prices of
food and severe shortages in the city of Damascus,
probably for the first time since 488/1095. Many people
died in the city because of this shortage of food.'
While Damascus was suffering from this depressing
situation, Niir al-Din wrote to the Ahdäth of Damascus
requesting that they open the gates of the city to him
when he arrived with his forces. The Ahdath of Damascus
consented to this request of Nth- al-Din's, and when he
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marched towards the city on 3 Safar 549/18 April 1154,
they opened the gates of the city to him. Nür al-Din's
forces entered the city, and Mujir al-Din fled to the
citadel with his notables to protect himself. According
to Ibn al-Athir, Mujir al-Din promised his allies the
Crusaders of Jerusalem great tribute and the city of
Baalbek; however, while the Crusaders of Jerusalem were
on the way to help Damascus, MujIr al-Din surrendered
his citadel, and Nar al-Din gave him Hims as an iqt'.82
.	 .
The Crusaders had thus missed the last opportunity to
help their allies in Damascus, and Mujir al-Din lost his
position as Anal-. of Damascus for ever. The fall of the
city of Damascus to Ndr al-Din brought the Emirate of
-
Damascus in the line of Tughtekin to a close and a new
phase in the Muslim struggle against the Crusaders
opened with the Zangids in control of Muslim Syria.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE ARMY OF DAMASCUS
It is the purpose of this chapter, now that the
general history of the Emirate of Damascus has been
discussed, to look in more detail at the army of
Damascus itself. It has become clear that the
predominant activity of the Emirate during the period
under discussion was a martial one. The Damascene armed
forces played an effective part in the history of
Damascus during the period. In this chapter, the
following issues that are relevant to the army of
Damasucs will be dealt with:
a) The structure of the army.
b) The payment of the troops.
c) The main military ranks.
(A) The Structure of the Army: 
It is possible to say that the armed force can be
classified into five groups. This classification is not
only related to the origins of these groups, but also to
the nature of their services. Some of these groups
served as official regular troops, and others served on
a voluntary basis in case of emergency. The first group
was the Turkomans; the second, the Ahdäth; the third,
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the Kurds; the fourth, the Arab "bedouins"; the fifth,
the volunteers. Each group will be dealt with in turn.
The Turkomans:
It is essential to observe, firstly, how the
Turkomans came to be in a position of influence in Syria
in the political as well as the military system. The
emigration of the Turkomans to Khuras5n, Iraq, the
Jazira, Syria and Asia Minor from the 5th century/11th
century, while the Saljaqs were establishing their power
in the central lands of the Abbasid Caliphate, had a
significant impact on the history of the region during
the mediaeval period. These migrations would affect not
only Syria including Damascus, but also the Byzantine
Empire, and Latin Europe. Twenty six years before the
start of the Crusades, after the victory of the Saljaqs
at Manzikert on 20 Dha g l-Oa 4 da 463/8 August 1071, over
the Byzantines, the Turkomans managed to seize a large
portion of Anatolia from the Byzantine Empire.The
capture of Anatolia by the Turks was a distant omen of
the final collapse of the Byzantine Empire in 1453 at
the hands of the Ottomans.
By the time of the coming of the Crusaders in
489/began 31 December 1095, and their taking of parts of
Syria and the Jazira from the Saljaqs, the Turkomans had
become the main element in the struggle there.'
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It seems that the first groups of Turkomans that
entered Syria in 456/began 25 December 1063, (called al-
N5wkiyya) when 'Atiyya Ibn S5lih Ibn Mirda's the lord of
Aleppo appealed to them for help against his rebel
nephew Mahmad Ibn Nasr. This group of Turkomans who were
led by Harlin Ibn Khan succeeded in overcoming Mahmiid Ibn
Nasr. These Turkomans were not authorized to enter the
city of Aleppo at that time, but the renewed struggle
between 'Atiyya Ibn Mirdas and his nephew Mahmlid Ibn
Nasr helped them to get into the city of Aleppo. Their
leader Ibn Khan obtained great power in the city. The
appeal for help to the Turkomans by t Atiyya Ibn Mirdas
also was the beginning of a great political change not
only in Aleppo but in the whole of Syria including
Damascus. 'Atiyya Ibn Mirdas who was an Arab "bedouin"
from the tribe of Kilab used these Turkomans to maintain
his authority over his tribe. Even though he managed to
subdue dissenters in the tribe of Kilab by this
expedient, he could nbt check the ambitions of the
Turkomans, who were the coming power in Syria.2
We thus have a picture of how the Turkomans came to
be involved in Syria as an influential force, and the
question of how they established their position not in
Syria as a whole, but in Damascus in particular, must
now be addressed.
Al-N5wkiyya were the first of the Turkomans to
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migrate to Southern Syria and they settled in the city
of Tyre in 463/began 9 October 1070. This group of
Turkomans headed by Oarlii, the nephew of Ibn Khan,
entered Syria under the authority of the independent
ruler of Tyre, the Oadf Ibn 'Agri. This group were not
even under the authority of the Saljt-pg Sultan, but their
deeds in Syria would facilitate the recovery of Syria
for the Abbasid Caliphate. As mentioned above, the
migration of the Turkomans to Syria would weaken the
Arab tribes, which had been the main power in Syria at
that time. The rulers in Syria such as the Ban5 Mird5s
in Aleppo, employed the Turkomans to suppress such rebel
Arab tribes as the Bath Kalb around Aleppo, and the Bana
Kilab in the countryside surrounding Hama. After the
submission of the Arab tribes in Syria, the Turkomans
became the major power bloc in Syria.°
When the Turkomans inhabited North Syria, especially
Aleppo, they carried on ravaging and looting Asia Minor.
They made the city of Aleppo a centre to sell their loot
from the Byzantine Empire and in the years 459 and
460/1066-1168, the Turkomans sold seventy thousand
slaves and much other booty. The prices of slaves and
other commodities decreased sharply in Aleppo, a slave
girl was sold for only two dinars, and a buffalo only
for one dinar. 4 This is further evidence of the
increasing influence of the Turkomans in Syria, not just
in politics and military matters but in the economic
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sphere as well.
Between 461/1068 and 463/1071, the Byzantine Emperor
Romanus Diogenes led three campaigns to stop raids of
the Turkomans against Asia Minor (west Anatolia). In the
first two expeditions, Romanus Diogenes did not obtain
decisive triumphs and in the third campaign the
Byzantine army was completely defeated at Manzikert,
near Lake Van by the SaljOci army. In 463/began 9 October
1071, the Saljfici Sultan Alp-Ars15n, with only fifty
thousand men, defeated over one hundred thousand
Byzantines headed by the Emperor himself.5
During Sultn Alp-Arslan's campaign in 463/1071 to
capture Aleppo from the rebellious Mahmi-id Ibn Nasr Ibn
Mirdas of Aleppo, who was nominally under the rule of
the Saljaq Sultan, the al-N5wkiyya Turkomans left North
Syria for the South in the direction of the
Mediterranean coast especially the environs of Tripoli
and Tyre and other such places. They did so, because of
their fear of the anger of the Sultan whose authority
over themselves they refused to recognize.8
In 464/began 29 September 1071, Mahmild Ibn Nasr Ibn
Mirdsis of Aleppo called for help from the al-Nawkiyya
against the Byzantines who were threatening Aleppo. The
al-Nawkiyya headed by Qarlii managed to fend off the
Byzantine menace. Then the al-N -iwkiyya turned back home
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to south Syria, and left a garrison in Aleppo consisting
of one thousand cavalry led by Ahmad-Shgh.7
-
In 463/1071, Atsiz Ibn Uq a1-Khw5rizmi, one of the
main commanders of Sult5n Alp-Ars15n, assembled the
Turkomans in south Syria and marched to capture
Palestine from the Fatimids. He succeeded from 463/1071
till 467/1075 in capturing Ramla, Jerusalem, Tiberias
and Acre.' In 468/began 16 August 1075, the city of
Damascus was suffering from internal divisions, which
helped Atsiz to take the city peacefully in Dhli'l-Qa‘da
468/began 8 June 1076. The city of Damascus was restored
to the authority of the Abbasid Caliphate for the first
time since the occupation of the city by the Fatimids in
359/969.
In 469/began 5 August 1076, Atsiz marched with
twenty thousand men including Turkomans, Arab "bedouins"
and Kurds to invade Egypt to overthrow the Fatimid
Caliphate there. But his army was annihilated in east
Cairo in Rabi l I 469/began 3 September 1076.
After this catastrophe for the Damascene forces,
Atsiz succeeded in keeping his leadership of the
Turkomans and his authority in Damascus and most of
Palestine.
In 470/began 25 July 1077, Sultan Malik.-Shah granted
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his brother Taj al-Dawla Tutush all Syria as an iqta'.
It seems that this ordinance of Sultan Malik-Shah
deprived Atsiz of the leadership of the Turkomans.
Therefore, he was forced to hand the city of Damascus
over to Taj al-Dawla Tutush, when the city was being
besieged by the Fatimid army led by Nasr al-Dawla al-
Juy5shi, who had come to avenge Atsiz's attempt to
capture Cairo one year previously. Atsiz lost not only
the leadership of the Turkomans, but also his life when
Taj al-Dawla executed him a few days after his taking of
the city.' At the same time, the al-Nawkiyya lost their
leader Oarfa in 464/1072 who died in this year. Ahmad-
Shah succeeded this leader as chief of this group of the
Turkomans. In 467/1074, the al-N5wkiyya replaced the new
amir of Aleppo Shabib Ibn Mahmild Ibn Nasr with his elder
brother Nasr Ibn Mahmidd." After the death of Nasr Ibn
Mahm5d on 1 Shawwal 468/10 May 1076, his successor Sabiq
Ibn Mahmad Ibn Nasr ruled Aleppo under the regency of
Ahmad-Sh5h. During the struggle between Sabiq and his
brother Waththab Ibn Mahmtid, the tribe of Bana Kil5b
supported Wathth5b Ibn Mahmt-id against his brother Sabiq
with a view to overthrowing his rule in Aleppo. In the
region of Qinnisrin, only one thousand and five hundred
Turkomans headed by Ahmad-Shah defeated about seventy
thousand men from the Banid-Kilab." From this great
victory of the al-Nawkiyya Turkomans a certain
superiority of the Turkomans over the Arabs in Syria can
be inferred.
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After this misfortune, waththab Ibn Mahmad of the
Banil Kilab a ppealed for help from Sultan Malik-Shah Ibn
Sultan Alp-Arslan. In 470/1077, Sultan Malik-Shah gave
Waththab Ibn MahmOd Aleppo as an iqta t and granted the
rest of Syria to his own brother Taj al-Dawla Tutush.
Tutush marched with an immense army including the
remaining forces of the BanD Kilab and Muslim Ibn
Ouraysh who brought the army of Mosul to lay siege to
Aleppo. Muslim Ibn Ouraysh of Mosul, who was an Arab of
the Banii 'Acifl, sent secretly to Sabiq Ibn Mahmild of
Aleppo to encourage him to resist the forces of Taj al-
Dawla Tutush. Muslim Ibn Quraysh was opposed to the
alliance of the Arabs of the BanQ Kira') with the Turkish
Salj5qs against their Arab brothers of the BanG Kilab in
Aleppo. Then Sabiq Ibn MahmTid of Aleppo sent to the
Ban5 Kiläb, the allies of Tutush, suggesting that they
desert Tutush. He notified them that he intended to
guarantee their own lands and their good name but that
if Aleppo were lost to Taj al-Dawla Tutush, their power
in Syria would be eclipsed for good. The forces of the
Bana Ki15b who had joined Tutush agreed to withdraw from
the siege of Aleppo. Moreover, Muslim Ibn Quraysh with
his forces left the army of Tutush as had been agreed.
The majority of the Banta Kilab returned home and some of
them entered Aleppo to help Sabig Ibn Mahmtid.
The forces of Mosul withdrew to Mosul having sold
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supplies to the people of Aleppo in order to support
them against Tutush.When Tutush found out that he had
been betrayed, he abandoned the siege of the city. 12 The
establishment of Saljtiq authority in Syria, excluding
the Palestine Coast in the late fifth century/late
eleventh century, as has been pointed out in Chapter
One, effectively rendered the Turkomans supreme as a
military power in Syria.
Having established that the Turkomans were the
major military force in Syria as a whole, we turn to
their specific role in the army of Damascus. As has been
mentioned in Chapter Two, Tughtekin of Damascus was of
Turkoman origin; this seems to have helped him to
persuade many Turkomans to serve in his army. As
mentioned above in Chapter Two, in 487/1094 Tughtekrn
went during Tutush's time to Mayy5f griqin in Diyar Bakr
to be Atabek of Shams al-Mulak Duqaq son of Täj al-Dawla
Tutush. It appears that his presence in Diyar Bakr, the
main centre of settlement for the Turkomans, helped
Tughtekin to establish a strong relationship with the
leader of the Turkomans there. This good relationship
with the leader of the Turkomans was of invaluable
assistance to Tughtekin in emergencies. As mentioned
above in Chapter Two, after the Crusaders' capture of
Jerusalem in Sheban 492/began 16 May 1099, King Duqiiq
of Damascus and his Atabek Tughtekin marched with the
-
'Askar of Damascus to recover Mayyafariqin from a
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subordinate governor who had revolted against the
authority of Damascus. It sounds as though the
importance of Mayy5f5riqin as a main centre of the
Turkomans in Diy5r Bakr, being, as it was, a main
military source for the Kingdom of Damasucs, forced King
Duq5q and Tughtekin to undertake this expedition.'
Despite the fact that Diyar Bakr, including Mayy5f&riqin
would be lost to the Kingdom of Damascus later on (as
mentioned above in Chapter Two), this did not stop
Damascus requesting assistance from the Turkomans of
Diyr Bakr. It was therefore hardly surprising that
Tughtekin should make an alliance in 511/began 5 May
1117 with I1-Ghazi Ibn Artuq of Mardin and Hisn
.	 .
the main leader of the Turkomans in Diyar Bakr. In
addition, Tughtekin gave his daughter as a wife to his
ally /1-Gh5z1, probably to reinforce this alliance.
From the reign of Tughtekin, the Turkomans became
the main source of military power in the Emirate. From
Ibn al-Oalanisi, it can be inferred that the official
Turkoman forces, who were conscripted into the regular
army of Damascus, were known simply as Turks. On the
other hand, such Turks, as served in the Damascus army
on a voluntary basis were usually called Turkomans."
These volunteer Turkomans played an effective part in
helping Damascus, especially when under threat from
outside. The first mention we have of these irregular
-
forces is in 500/began 2 September 1106, when Tughtekin
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marched with the armed forces of Damascus including the
volunteer Turkomans towards the Saw5d of Tiberias and
managed to capture a fortress there from the Crusaders
of Jerusalem. Ibn al-Oalanisi is the only historian of
the time to mention this event but, does not name the
fortress.' Also in 510/began 16 May 1116, when Damascus
was being harassed by the Crusaders, Tughtekin appealed
for relief from the Turkomans. Two thousand volunteer
Turkomans hastened to Damascus to cooperate with the
regular army in the struggle against the Crusaders. Ibn
al-Oalanisi mentions that a great number of these
Turkomans launched several raids on the Crusaders in
Manj al-Suffar. Because of these assaults, the Crusaders
16
were constrained to withdraw and return home.
	 Also, in
523/ began 25 December 1128, during the course of the
siege of the city of Damascus by the Crusaders, the
Turkomans hastened to relieve Damascus, Although we have
no estimated number for the Turkoman volunteers, Ibn al-
Oalanisi states that one of the main reasons which
compelled the Crusaders to abandon their siege of the
city was their anxiety at the great number of Turkomans.
Ibn al-0.315nisi who does not usually give estimates of
numbers, reckoned the number of the Crusader forces in
this campaign at over sixty thousand troops. If sixty
thousand Crusaders had been terrified by the great
numbers of the Turkomans, this comment gives us some
indication of the importance of the Turkomans for
Damascus. Also, the historical sources of the time do
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not give us an estimate of the number of Turkomans who
had helped the Damascus army against the Second Crusade
during their siege of Damascus in 543/began 22 May 1148.
However, Aba al-Fid&" Ibn Kathlr, a Damascene historian
of the time points out that one hundred and thirty
thousand men from Damascus joined in the fighting
against the Crusaders." This seems however not to be an
estimate only of the forces involved in the fighting,
but of the whole population of Damascus. It seems that
a possible estimate for the Damascene force is only
about thirty thousand, and it also probable that over
ten thousand Turkomans came to the assistance of
Damascus. However, no historical sources of the time
give us any indication of the number of troops of
Turkoman origin in the regular army of Damascus; it does
seem however that about 80 per cent of the Damascus army
were of Turkoman origin. It appears that the regular
soldiers of Turkoman origin in the army of Damascus used
to live in the city of Damascus. On the other hand, the
volunteer Turkomans used to live in the districts
surrounding Damascus. le Furthermore, it would appear that
the majority of the commanders of the Damascene army
were Turkomans, because they had Turkish names such as
Siw5r, Lujja al-Turki, Bazw5J, Kumushtekin, etc. The
Turkomans served not only as regular and volunteer
troops in Damascus,but also as private guards of the
7
amirs of Damascus.le
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II. The Ahd5th: 
The movement of the Ahd5th in Syria was established
in the fourth/tenth century. The Ahdath were named by
Muslim historians of the time as al-Zanatira, al-Shuttar
and Zu'ar. This popular movement consisted mainly of
poor people. The history of the movement is problematic
because of the lack of sources dealing with it. The main
centres of the movement were the cities of Damascus and
Aleppo. It seems however that this movement did not
spread further than these two big cities, especially in
the fourth century/tenth century. It sounds as though
the reason for the establishment of the movement was the
weakness of the political authority in Syria during that
time. When the official government failed to establish
the situation in these cities and to maintain the rights
of the oppressed people by their own power, the people
of these cities founded the movement to secure their
rights themselves. The main objective of this movement
was to protect the poor people from oppression by the
rich. In time, this civil movement shifted to being a
military one, and became a considerable military power
in both Damascus and Aleppo. The Ahdäth in each city
worked independently of one another. 20
 Since this
research is concerned with the Emirate of Damascus, the
history of this movement in Damascus will be the prime
focus of our attention. In 359/969, the Ahdath of
Damascus almost thwarted the Fatimid attempt to capture
the city which at the time was nominally under the
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authority of the Abbasid Caliph. But the notables and a
group of Damascene traders disappointed the defenders of
the city by agreeing to surrender the city to the
Fatimid leader Ja'far Ibn Fal5h. Then the Ahdth
unwillingly halted their resistance and handed the city
over to Ja'far Ibn Falah.21
In 363/began 20 October 973, the Fatimid Caliph al-
Mu'izz bi-Dini-'llah acquiesced in the request of the
Ahd5th that Z5lim Ibn Mawhilb al- l Aqili be dismissed as
governor of Damascus. He then appointed a new 14511 Jaysh
Ibn Sams5ma instead of the former one.'
In 368/began 8 August 978, after the defeat of the
rebellious governor of Damascus Alptekln by the Fatimid
army led by the Fatimid Caliph al- 1 Aziz himself, the
leader of the Ahd5th in Damascus Oassa'm al-Tur5b managed
to dominate the city. He announced himself as governor
of Damascus, and recognized formal Fatimid authority
over the city. The Fatimid Caliph al- 1 Aziz, who had
probably realized the effective role of the Ahd5th in
Damascus pretended to confirm the new governor in his
position. But in the following year 369/began 29 July
979, al- vAziz sent four thousand warriors to recover
Damascus from the Ahd5th. But the Fatimid forces could
not crush the Ahdath. The Fatimid army withdrew from the
city when Oass'Lm al-Tur;b undertook not to surrender the
city to any ruler recognizing Abbasid authority. But two
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years later in 371/began 29 July 979, under the pressure
of the notables of Damascus, Gassam al-Tur5b was
compelled to surrender Damascus to the Fatimid forces,.
Even though the Ahd5th yielded to the Fatimid power,
they did not lose their special position as a
paramilitary movement in the city.'
In 388/began 3 January 998, Bish5ra al-Ikhshidi, the
new Fatimid governor, conspired against the leaders of
the Ahd5th. Two hundred members of the Ahd5th including
their twelve commanders were massacred during a party
which had been arranged by Bish5ra, who then ordered his
forces to kill members of the Ahd5th in Damascus, al-
Ghata and Manj al-Suffar. According to Ibn al-Qa15nisi,
three thousand members of the Ahd5th were killed in that
massacre_This event tells us how the Ahd5th had won a
great number of followers not only from the city of
Damascus but also among the surrounding areas such as
al-Ghilta and Manj al-Suffar. 24 It seems the calamity
which had befallen the movement of the Ahdath, almost
destroyed the movement as a whole. But there was
resurgence of the Ahd5th after the mid fifth
century/eleventh century. The main historical sources of
the time say nothing about this movement from the time
of the massacre until 458/began 3 December 1065. In this
year, the Ahd5th revolted against the Fatimid governor
Amlr al-Juy5sh Badr al-Jam511.. 25 It seems that unstable
Fatimid rule in Damascus, assisted the Ahd5th in
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securing a great number of adherents. Within less than
one century from 359/969, till 458/1066, sixty eight
Fatimid governors were appointed as wall of Damascus.'
In 468/began 16 August 1075, Damascus suffered from
famine and internal divisions between the Fatimid armed
forces and the Ahdath of Damascus. When the Turkoman
leader Atsiz Ibn Ug, who was under Saljtiq authority, was
informed about this situation, he hurried with his
Turkomans forces to lay siege to the cit y . It seems that
the Ahdath made the Fatimid wall Zayn al-Dawla Intisar
Ibn Yahya surrender the city to Atsiz. By this surrender
of Damascus, the city was restored to the Abbasid
Caliphate for the first time since 359/be gan 14 November
969.2'
In 489/began 31 December 1095, during the reign of
King Duciag Ibn Tutush of Damascus, 488-497/1095-1104,
the Ahdath played an effective role in protecting the
city in the face of an attempt by King Ridwan Ibn Tutush
of Aleppo to seize the city from his brother King Duclaq.
Although King Duciaq and his Atabek Tughtekin with the
'Askar of Damascus were involved outside the city, the
Ahdath of Damascus and the rest of the forces of the
city succeeded in foiling this attempt.'
In Shatha' n 503/began 25 February 1110, the Ahdath of
Baalbek endorsed Tughtekin against their rebellious
governor Kumushtekin al-Khadim al-Taii. 29 This shows us
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how the movement of the Ahdath had spread not onl y in
the city of Damascus but also among other cities of the
Emirate. Furthermore, it gives an indication that not
onlY the Sunnis in the Emirate were attracted by this
movement, but also other sects such as the Twelver
- 7Shi'is of Baalbek. Baalbek in the time under discussion
7 7
was one of the main centres of the Twelver Shi 	 i'is n the
Emirate_
It appears that the main duty of the Ahdath was to
maintain security in the cities of the Emirate as a form
of "people's army". But sometimes in case of emergency,
they helped the regular Damascene army outside the
cities. In 519/began 7 February 1125, the Ahd5th helped
the 'Askar of Damascus to frustrate the attempt of the
Crusaders of Jerusalem to ravage the region of Hawran
which belonged to Damascus.' On 17 Ramadan 523/began on
28 August 1129, the Ahdah played the major part in
the crushing of the Batinis in the city of Damascus. It
seems that the leader of the Ahdath was Ra i ls of
Damascus during the period under discussion. When Ibn
a4-0a15nisi mentions the massacre of the Batinis in
Damascus, in that year, he commended the role of the
Ra'is of Damascus Thiqat al-Mulk AbTi Ibn al-
Sal.' In Shawwal 534/began 22 June 1140, the co-
operation between the regular army of Damascus and the
Ahdgth was a major factor in thwarting the attempt of
Zang' of Mosul and Aleppo to take the city of Damascus.32
270
In Muharram 543/began 22 May 1148, the Ahdath, the
'Askar of Damascus and the volunteers (al-Mutatawwi'a)
stopped the Crusader expedition from occupying the city
of Damascus.' It seems that Wir al-Din Mahmal Ibn Zangi
of Aleppo realized that he could not hope to take
Damascus until he had won the support of the Ahda -th of
Damascus.It seems that many members of the Ahdath
movement preferred to be under Nar al-Din rather than
under the Amir Mujir al-Din of Damascus. According to
Ibn	 in 546/began 20 April 1151, during the
siege of Damascus by Wir al-Din's forces, only a few of
the Ahd5th joined the 'Askar of Damascus to defend the
city, contrary to their previous practice.' Only three
years later in 549/began 18 March 1154, the Ahdath of
Damascus plotted with Wir al-Din Mahmal against the Amir
Mujir al-Din and opened the gates of the city for the
army of Nt-Ir al-Din.' The end of the era of Tughtekin's
family was compassed by the hands of the Ahd5th who had
previously been loyal to this family.
It can thus be seen that the Ahd5th, who had
initially emerged as a movement identified as the
representation of disaffected and oppressed elements of
the population of Damascus itself, had developed into an
organisation of considerable formal influence, not just
In Damascus itself but in other cities of the Emirate as
well.
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III. The Kurds: 
The conscription of the Kurds into the Muslim armies
had started in the early years of the Salji-prgs (early
fifth/eleventh century).
Ten thousand Kurds joined the army of Alp-Arslan in
the battle of Manzikert on 20 Dhil'1-0a ida 463/8 August
1071, against the Byzantine Emperor Romanus Diogenes.
Their expertise in archery and their capacity to endure
harsh living conditions coupled with other military
virtues were the main reasons for the preference for
Kurdish troops in the Muslim armies. 36
 The first
indications of their service in the army of Damascus
date from 469/began 5 August 1076. King Atsiz of
Damascus assembled twenty thousand men including
Turkomans, Kurds and Arabs to invade Egypt and to
demolish the Fatimid Caliphate in Cairo. 37 The main
historical sources of the time do not mention anything
about the part played by the Kurds in the Damascene army
during the early period of the rule of Tughtekin's
family. The first mention of the Kurds is in 539/began 4
July 1144, when the only commander of the Kurds at that
period the Amir Mujahid al-Din BUzin Ibn Mamin
established a mosque near the gate of al-Farädis. This
shows us that a possible estimate for the number of the
Kurds in the Damascene army was some hundreds, because
that commander (Muj5hid al-Din Biizän) was the only
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Kurdish commander in the army of Damascus. This does
however, establish that a Kurd had won, the highly
military rank of amir under the Damascus Emirate and it
7
seems that an amir in the Damascene army, used to
command about one thousand persons. As mentioned above
in Chapter VII, the Atabek Anar sent this Kurdish amir
with a great number of the Damascene forces in 544/began
11 May 1149 to join Nar al-Din's forces of Aleppo
against the Crusaders of Antioch.38 It is however
difficult to infer more than that there were a
significant number of Kurds in the army of Damascus and
that they had a considerable reputation as archers and
as good soldiers in general.
IV The Ghilman: 
The Ghilman were the slave troops who used to serve
in the Muslim armies. Even before the time of the
preeminence of Tughtekin and his family in Damascus, the
Ghilman had served in the Damascene army during the
reign of King Atsiz of Damascus 468/1175 till 471/1079.
During King Atsiz's campaign to invade Egypt in 469/1076
seven hundred Ghilman deserted from Atsiz's army to the
Egyptian army, which was headed by Badr al-Jamali. This
number of Gh1lm5n was not the whole number of Ghilman in
the Damascene army, which altogether numbered some
twenty thousand men including the Ghilman. 39 Tughtekin of
Damascus conscripted many Ghilman into the Damascene
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army. These Ghilman were known as al-Ghilman al-
Atabekiyya after their master the At5bek Tughtekin. It
seems that the commanders of these Ghilman were also
slaves, usually called Hujjab. The influence of the
Ghilman increased so as to become an important element
during Shams al-Munk Isma'll's reign.
In 529/began 22 October 1134, they plotted with
Shams al-MulEik's mother Safwat al-Mulk to kill her son
Shams al-Mulak. 4° According to Ibn a1-Oal5nisI, Shams
al-Multlk had his own Turkish Ghilmin, who had played a
significant role in recovering Hama in 527/began 12
November 1132 from Zane of Mosul and Aleppo.' It seems
that the majority of Ghilman who had served in the army
of Damascus during our period were Turks.
V. Arabs or "Bedouins": 
As mentioned above,, the coming of the Turkomans to
Syria in about mid-fifth century/mid eleventh century,
had weakened the power of the Arabs there. It seems that
the Arabs rarely joined the Damascene regular army. The
Arabs had previously been accustomed to service in the
army of Damascus as volunteers. In 470/1078, the Arabs
of the BanTi Kilab helped the Sultan T5j al-Dawla Tutush
of Damascus to recover Syria and place it under the
authority of the Abbasid Caliphate.' In 487/1094, the
Bana Kilab led by Waththab Ibn MahmTid Ibn Salih marched
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with the army of Fakhr Ridwan, son of T5i al-
Dawla	 Tutush	 to support his	 father's forces	 in the
neighbourhood	 of Isfahan where he	 was	 focussing his
attempt	 to	 win the	 sultanate.'	 It	 seems	 that in
503/began 31 July 1109, the Arabs helped Tughtekin
during Mawdars campaign against the Crusaders.
According to Ibn al-Qalanisi, many people of Syria
assembled with the Damascene army. It seems that these
people of Syria were Arabs, as Ibn al-Qalanisi refers to
them as such. In 507/began 18 June 1113, while the
Sultan's army led by Mawdiid and the Damascene forces
were surrounding the Crusaders' armies near the
mountains of Tiberias, the Arabs of Tayy, KiLib and
Khafaja supplied the Muslim forces with water there.'"
Although these Arabs did not support the Damascene
forces with direct military assistance, it does seem
that they provided water for the army on this occasion
which was an essential service and supplied it with
weapons too. In Dhii'l-Qa'da 523/October 1129, the Arabs
led by Murra Ibn Rabl'a, played a significant part in
thwarting the Crusaders' attempt to invade the city of
Damascus as mentioned above in Chapter Three.' We
therefore see that Arab irregulars played some part in
reinforcing the regular forces but that in general the
role of the Bedouin was confined to providing logistical
assistance albeit this was of an essentially material
nature.
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The Volunteers (Al-Mutatawwi'a): 
The volunteers in the Damascene army played an
important part in protecting the Emirate against its
enemies. There is a difference however between the
volunteers ("Mutatawwi'a" and the "Ajn5d"). The Ajmid
(who do not merit a subsection of their own) were those
who either held Iqt5's or worked with the owner of an
Iqt5'. They served in the army of Damascus only when
they were ordered to do so by the ruler of Damascus.
Seemingly the Ajn5d were more regular troops rather than
voluntary forces. The voluntary soldiers however joined
the Damascene army willingly without any official
commitment to the Audr of the Emirate. It seems that the
Crusades had revived the spirit of "Jih .a-d" (the Holy
War) among the Muslims, especially the people of
Damascus. Moreover, the cruelty of the Crusaders during
their early years in dealing with the conquered Muslims
such as the people of Jerusalem, and Ma t arrat al-Nutman,
had made many of the inhabitants emigrate to safer
places. The city of Damascus was the favourite city for
these refugees to live in. When the Crusaders managed to
take possession of the city of Sidon in 504/began 20
July 1110, the entire population of the city moved to
Damascus including the army of Sidon. 46 The same thing
happened to the Tyrians in 518/1l24. seems that the
emigration of these citizens to Damascus increased not
only the population of Damascus, but also the regular
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and the voluntary troops in the Emirate. Ibn Kathir, the
only historian of the time to give an estimate of the
population of the city of Damascus during the period
under discussion, mentions that one hundred and thirty
thousand people joined in the resistance against the
Crusader expedition of Muharram 543/began 22 May 1148 to
take the city. It seems that estimate is not of the
forces of the city only, but rather of the entire
population of the city (including the armed forces as
mentioned above in Chapter Seven). Muslim historical
sources of the time praised the role of the l Ulam5' such
as the old scholar "Faqih" Abü al-Hajjaj Ytisuf al-
Findiläwi, who rejected the request of the AtAbek Anar
that he refrain from joining the fighting against the
Franks because of his seniority in terms of age. Thus he
fought against the Crusaders as a volunteer and was
killed on the battle field qualifying thereby for
martyrdom.' It appears that the valour of this old
scholar and other volunteers encouraged considerable
numbers of the Damascenes to join in defending their
city from the Crusaders. One group of volunteers, called
al-Harâmiyya, (the robbers) specialised in cutting off
the supply routes of the enemy. It can be suggested that
these Haramiyya did not receive any payment from the
Emirate, but whatever loot they managed to lay their
hands on was to be their reward. In 505/began 10 July
1111, Tughtekin formally authorized 	 al-Haramiyya to
plunder and pillage the armed forces of the Crusaders of
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Jerusalem who were laying siege to the city of Tyre.
This shows us that al-Haramiyya did not operate at will
but that they were to some extent under the control of
the amirs of Damascus.'
B. The Payment of the Troops: 
There were several methods of paying the Damascene
armed forces. The first one was Jamakiyyat (regular
payments) of the troops, probably monthly allowances
corresponding to a form of salary. Jamakiyyat were paid
only to the regular troops. Tdj Mari and Shams
al-Mula Isma e l- 1 increased these Jamakiyyat when they
won power in the Emirate of Damascus.' It appears that
the Jamakiyya"t" were not decreased during the period
when Tughtekin and his family were in power. The second
kind of payment was the military Iqt5'. The Amirs of
Damascus used to grant their commanders military Iqt5's
and in turn each commander was obliged to provide the
7Amir of Damascus with a certain number of soldiers in
case of need. These troops were called Ajnad, not 'Askar
(the regular armed forces). Each owner of a military
Iqta t had to provide his soldiers with all they needed
including their military supplies. The owner of an 1g-tat
used to spend two thirds of the revenue of his Icit5' on
the needs of his troops, and it seems that there was a
Diwdn of Iqta e s in the Emirate charged with distributing
and managing the affairs of these Icitd t s. All Ajn5d,
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including their commanders had to be registered in this
Diwan. 5' The historical sources of the time unfortunately
do not tell us how much each soldier of the 'Askar or
member of the Ajnad received monthly.
7It seems that the Amirs of Damascus distributed
Iqta's outside the city of Damascus; the historical
sources of the time suggest that the Amir of Damascus
did not grant military Iqta's in the city of Damascus or
in the immediately surrounding areas such as al-Ghiita,
the most cultivated region in Syria.' The historical
sources of the time give us some examples of these
military Iqta's. In Sha'ban 496/began 11 May 1103, King
Duqaq of Damascus gave his Atabek Tughtekin the city of
Hims as an Iqta'. In 500/began 2 September 1106, the
.	 .
Amir Tughtekin of Damascus granted a commander of the
Turkomans named Isfahbud al-Turkomani, Wadi Masa, on the
road from Damascus to the Hijaz), Ma'ab, (a city in the
region of al-Balqa' to the east of the Dead Sea,' al-
Jibal (north of the region of al-Shur -at (Guadarrama
Mountains), to the south of the Dead Sea,' and the
region of al-Balq5'.55
In addition, in 502/began 11 August 1108, Tughtekin
bestowed upon the Amir Fakhr al-Mulk Ibn 'Ammar, the
former ruler of Tripoli, the region of al-Zabadani and
its territories.'	 In 542/began 2 June 1147, the Amir
Mujir al-Din Abaq of Damascus granted his trusted
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Kurdish commander the Amir Muj5hid al-Din Haz5n Ibn
Wamin, Hisn Sarkhad in the region of Hawr5n south of
.	 .
Damascus, as an iqt5'.5'
C. The Military Ranks: 
The main military ranks of Damascus can be
classified into the following:
1. Al-Isfahsal5r
2. Al-Ra'is
3. Al-Shihna
1. al-Isfahsalär: 
Al-Isfahsal5r was the head of the army of Damascus,
and leader of the Damascene army in battle. As mentioned
above in Chapter Two, in 487/began 21 January 1094,
Sultan T5j al-Dawla Tutush of Damascus designated
Tughtekin as Isfahsal5r Of the army of Damascus. It can
_
be suggested that Tughtekin kept this rank during the
reign of King Duq5q Ibn Tutush of Damascus 488-497/1095-
1104. Tughtekin maintained this position for himself
when he was the ruler of the Emirate from 12 Ramadan 497
till 8 Safar 522/8 June 1104 till 11 February 1128. The
historical sources of the time do not indicate whether
the Amir T5j al-MulOk Buni of Damascus and his son the
_	
- 7Amir Shams al-Mull-1k Isma'll appointed any military
leader to this position during their reign. It appears
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that they also kept this	 important position to
themselves, as Tughtekin had done. Both of them used to
lead the Damascene army in person. But during the reign
of the Amir Shihab al-Din Mahmild of Damascus,
	 he
designated Amin al-Dawla Kumushtekin al-At5beki, a
governor of Busra and Sarkhad as Isfahsalar in Jumada I
530/began 6 February 1136. 58
 After the flight of this
Isfahsalar to the fort of Busra during the internal
disputes in Damascus in the same year, the Amir Shihab
al-Din Mahmild appointed the Amir Bazwaj as the new
Isfahsalar.' After the murder of the Amir Bazwaj in
Sha f ban 532/April 1138, by the Amir Shihab al-Din
himself, the Amir Shihab al-Din granted this rank to the
Atabek Mu'in al-Din Anar, a man of very strong personal
qualities. After the death of Anar on 3 Jumada I, 544/9
-September 1149, the Amir Mujir al-Din Abaq of Damascus
kept the rank of Isfahsalar for himself." It seems that
Mujir al-Din Abaq did not give this position to any
person, because he suspected that any holder of the rank
of Isfahsalar would obtain great influence in the
Emirate as Anar had done during Anar's de facto rule
over Damascus from 532 till 544/1138 till September
1149.
(2) Al-Ra'is: 
The Ra'is of Damascus was head of the Ahdath (the
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people's army), the immediate superior of the Shihna or
chief of police. 61 A
 brief background of the Ahdath has
been given earlier in this Chapter. Amin al-Dawla Ab5
Muhmmad Ibn al-S5fi was the first Ra'is of Damascus
during the reign of King Duciaq. After the death of this
Ra'is in 497/b egan 5 October 1103, Tughtekin of
Damascus designated Ab5 al-Majall Sayf and Ab5 al-Dh5'5d
al-Mufarrij, the sons of the former Ra'is as co-holders
of this position. It seems that later on Ab5 al-Dhl-Pad
al-Mufarrij won this position and kept it for himself
alone.	 Ab5 al-DhG'ad played a significant part in
-
assisting his lord the Amir Taj al-MulGk Burr of
Damascus to suppress the Batiniyya in Damascus on 17
Ramadan 523/4 September 1129." This Ra'is was appointed
also as the Wazir of Bari, in addition to his position
as Ra'Is of Damascus. In IRMA. ' I, 525/began 2 February
1131, 113Gri dismissed Ab5 al-Dh5'ad Ibn al-S5f1 from his
positions, both as Wazir and as Ra i ls of Damascus. In
Dhli'l-HiJja of the same year/began 24 October 1131,
after the mediation of Sawinj Ibn Taj al-Mul5k Burl,
Burl reappointed Abfi al-DM-Pad Ibn al-S5fi as sole Ra'is
of Damascus. Ab5 a1-Dh5'ad kept this rank until Ramadan
530/began 5 June 1136, when his master the Amir Shihab
-
al-Din Mahm5d of Damascus plotted with his Atabek Bazw5j
against this Ra'is and killed him. In 531/began 29
September 1136, one relative of the former Ra i ls called
-
the Amir Shuja' al-Dawla al-Musayyib Ibn 	 was
appointed as Ra'is of Damascus.' In 544/began 11 May
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1149, this Ra'is, who later on would be called Mu'ayyid
al-Din, forced his lord the Amir Mujir al-Din Abaq of
Damascus to designate him as his wazir.64 This
illustrates how strong the Ra'is was. In 547/began 8
April 1152, the Amir Mujir al-Din Abaq dismissed this
Ra'is from both his positions, and exiled him to the
fort of Sarkhad in Hawran. Mujir al-Din Abaq appointed
Zayn al-Dawla Haydara Ibn al-Safi (who later on would be
called Zayn al-Din), the brother of former Ra'is, as
Ra'is of Damascus. But Mujir al-Din executed this Ra'is
in 548/began 27 March 1153, probably on account of his
concern that the Ra'Is was conspiring against him.' Then
- -Mujir al-Din designated Radi al-Din Abi Ghalib al-Tamimi
•
as the new Ra'is of Damascus.This al-Tamiml was the
first Ra'ls of Damascus who was not from the family of
Ibn al-Safi, a family which had monopolized this rank
for a long time, namely since the reign of King Duqaq of
Damascus.
(3) Al-Shihna: 
The head of the police, during the period under
discussion was called the Shihna. The Ra'is of
Damascus was the immediate superior of the Shihna." The
duties of the police were to keep the internal situation
peaceful	 and	 to punish offenders.	 Hisn al-Dawla
.	 ,
Bakhtiyar was the first Shihna of Damascus during this
period and he had held office from the reign of Sultan
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Tai al-Dawla Tutush of Damascus.' He kept his rank until
his death on 15 Sha i ban 511/16 December 1117. His son
al-Sallar 'Umar succeeded him in this rank." In Rabl i II
516/began 10 August 1122, the Shihna of Damascus al-
Haiib Fayraz died. It seems that the former Shihna al-
.
Sallar 'Umar had been dismissed from this rank some time
before this year, and replaced by al-Hajib Fayraz.6'
Yasuf Ibn Fayraz was appointed Shihna after his father
Fayri-lz in 516/began 12 March 1122. Ibn Fayr5z with his
superior AbUI al-Dha'ad Ibn al-Safi, Ra i ls of Damascus,
played an important part in crushing the B:itiniyya on 17
Ramadan 523/4 September 1129. 3 This Shihna had been one
of the closest friends of the Amir Taj al-Mula Bari of
Damascus and later on of his son the Amir Shams al-Mula
Isma i li. But in 529/began 22 October 1134, Yasuf Ibn
Fayraz was suspicious of his master Shams al-Mula
Isma i li, and so he fled to the city of Tadmur. It seems
then that Shams al-MulUk Isma i li appointed al-Sallr
Zayn al-Din Isma i li as Shihna after the flight of Ibn
Fayraz. It seems then that the influence of this new
Shihna was not as strong as that of Ibn Fayraz,
especially when Mu'in al-Din Anar became Atabek of the
Amir Shihab al-Din Mahmild of Damascus and Isfahsarar of
Damascus from Shathan 532/began 15 April 1138 till 3
Jumada I 544/began 9 September 1149. After the death of
Anar, al-Sallar Zayn al-Din isma t il strove to challenge
_
the influence of his superior the Ra i ls of Damascus and
the Wazir Mu'ayyid al-Din al-Musayyib Ibn al-Safr, but
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he gave up. Then he fled to Baalbek fearing the tyranny
of Mu'ayyid al-Din Ibn al-Stif1. 71 There is no certain
information concerning the appointment of a new Shihna
after the escape of al-Sallär Zayn al-Din Ism5'I/.
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CONCLUSION
From its earliest days, the Emirate of Damascus
faced various challenges which threatened its
sovereignty. These dangers came from several quarters as
for example the Kingdom of Aleppo 488-511/1095-1117
Sultan Muhammad the Great Saljtaq particularly
	 in
509/1115 and the Crusaders of the Levant especially in
543/1148, and Zangl of Mosul and Aleppo (521-541/1127-
1146); furthermore, the Emirate was itself riven with
internal dissension. Because of these threats faced by
the emirate, it was compelled to pursue a series of
compromise policies to counter these various hazards,
and on occasion Damascus allied itself with former
enemies to face new ones. It cooperated with Sultan
Muhammad's campaigns against the Crusaders of the Levant
in 503/1110, 504/1111 and 506/1112. But when Sultan
Muhammad sent an expedition against Damascus itself, it
made common cause with its former enemies, the
Crusaders, against its nominal lord, the Sultan. In
addition, Damascus formed an alliance with NTir al-Din
MahmGd of Aleppo against the Crusaders. But when the
threat posed by NEIr al-Din to Damascus became more
critical than that posed by the Crusaders, Damascus
shifted its ground to gain the help of the Crusaders
against its former ally NUr al-Din.
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During the early years of the emirate, the major
threat to Damascus stemmed from its neighbour and rival
the Kingdom of Aleppo. By the time of the coming of the
Crusaders to Syria in 490/1097, and the establishment of
their power there, the menace of Aleppo had declined.
Aleppo's best endeavours were directed rather towards
the protection of its territories from the threat of the
Crusaders, than to any hostile plans against Damascus.
On the other hand, while Damascus was freed from the
threat of Aleppo, the danger to it from the Crusaders
became acute. To counter this Crusading threat, Damascus
strove to save the remaining dominions of the Fatimids
in Syria from falling into the hands of the Crusaders.
Damascus did this not to enhance the authority of the
Fatimids in Syria, but to weaken the growing power of
the Crusaders by using the Fatimids of Egypt. Thus
Damascus maintained its good relations with the wazir
al-Afdal, the de facto ruler of the Fatimid Egypt, until
his murder in 515/1121. For example, Damascus helped the
Fatimid dominions of Sidon in 502/1109, Tyre in 505/1102
and 518/1124, and 'Ascialan in 498/1104 and 511/1117,
against the Crusaders. Furthermore, Damascus entered
Into an alliance with the independent emirate of Tripoli
from 497 till 501/1104 till 1108 not only to secure the
sovereignty of Tripoli, but also to lessen the danger
which the Crusaders posed to itself, in that the
Crusaders at this time were planning to found a new
Crusader county in the region of Tripoli, which would
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march immediately with the Emirate of Damascus.
Most of the alliances of the Emirate of Damascus
from 490/1097 till 521/1127, were devoted to countering
the threat of the Crusaders to itself. By its compact
with il-Gh5zi of Aleppo and MardIn from 511/1118 till
516/1122, Damascus achieved with 11-Ghazi a great
victory over the Crusaders of Antioch at Bal5t in
513/1119. This triumph forced the Crusaders of
Jerusalem, the real threat to Damascus, to assist the
Principality of Antioch, which had lost all its armed
forces in this battle.
With the appearance of Zane. of Mosul and Aleppo
(521-541/1127-1146) as the main Muslim power in Syria,
and the emergence of his scheme to establish a united
front in Syria and the Jazira against the Crusaders, his
threat to Damascus became more serious than that of the
Crusaders themselves. Although Zangi managed to take the
main cities of the Emirate of Damascus such as Hims in
532/1138 and Baalbek in 534/1139, he still could not
annex the city of Damascus itself. The help afforded by
the Crusaders to the Damascenes was the principal factor
in the failure of Zane to annex the city to his
dominions. On the other hand, the Crusaders used their
alliance with the Damascenes to weaken the growing power
_.
of Zangi in Syria and the Jazira.
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The Crusader expedition of 543/1148 against the city
of Damascus, did not prevent the Damascenes from
maintaining their policy of alliance with the Crusaders
against the threat of Mir al-Din of Aleppo (541-
569/1146-1174). But the capture by the Crusaders of
'Asqafa'n, the last remaining coastal city in Syria in
Muslim hands in 548 /1153, made Mir al-Din hasten to
annex the city of Damascus in the following year
549/1154.
It can be suggested that the fall of the Emirate of
Damascus in 549/1154 was due to the following factors:
1. The threat of the Crusaders: 
The arrival of the Crusaders with great armed
forces, and the establishment of their principalities in
the Levant made it apparent that the scattered and weak
independent Muslim emirates in Syria such as Damascus,
Aleppo, Tripoli and Shayzar would not be able to make a
serious challenge to the position of the Crusaders nor
would they be able to makean effective response to the
threat which they posed. The only Muslim power which was
in a position to do so was the Sal jiiq sultanate itself.
But when Sultan Muhammad failed to achieve this through
his four campaigns of 503/1110, 504/1111, 506/1112 and
509/1115, it became clear that if the Muslims in Syria
could not unite to defend the rest of their dominions,
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they would lose all their territories to the Crusaders.
Damascus played a significant part in blocking the
menace of the Crusaders to the Muslims of Syria.
Damascus contracted alliances with il-Gh5zi of Aleppo
511-516/1117-1122 and Aq-Sunqur al-Bursuqi of Mosul and
Aleppo 518-520/1124-1126 and other Muslim powers against
the Crusaders.
These alliances among Muslim leaders in Syria were
not sufficient to win decisive victories over the
7Crusaders. With the appearance of Zang]. of Mosul and
Aleppo (521-541/1127-1147), this policy of alliances
among the Muslims of Syria was shifted to one of the
7Muslims of Syria and the Jazira under Zangi. The main
step in achieving this united front against the
Crusaders was the annexation of the "main" city in
7Syria, Damascus. Although Zangi failed to complete his
scheme by taking Damascus, his son Mir al-Din (541-
569/1146-1174) managed to do so in 549/1154. The
annexation of Damascus to the Kingdom of NUr al-Din,
opened the way to the union of Syria and Egypt in
564/1169. It seems that the coming of the Crusaders to
Syria not only hastened the fall of the weak independent
emirates in Syria including Damascus, and the
unification of the Muslims of Syria, but also helped
indirectl y in the recovery of Egypt for the Abbasid
Caliphate for the first time since Sha t b5n 358/began 30
April 969.
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2. The Geographical Expansion of the Emirate of
Damascus:
The geographical extension of the Emirate of
Damascus caused many problems in itself. In the early
years of the emirate, its geographical boundaries
expanded to include many regions very far from the city
of Damascus, the capital of the emirate, such
	 as
-
Mayyaf5riqin, and al-Rahba in the Jazira. These far-off
•
cities were the first to revolt against the authority of
Damascus. Mayy5fariqin revolted in 493/1100, and al-
Rahba rebelled in 496/1103. These cities revolted before
the nearer ones such as Busrä in 497/1104 and Baalbek in
503/1110. It seems that the weakness of the central
power in the city of Damascus over these distant cities
Induced them to rebel against the Damascene rulers. This
is why we see that when Damascus had lost its suzerainty
In these distant cities later on it did not try to
recover them. It also seems that the distance of Busr5
from the city of Damascus (about seventy-three miles)
was one of the main reasons for its regular rebellious
actions against the authority of Damascus. The city
revolted against Damascus on several occasions, e.g. in
497/1104, 542/1147, 546/1151. All these revolts
exhausted the Emirate of Damascus, and added further to
its burdens.
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3. Internal Dissension: 
The Emirate suffered from internal schism which
stemmed not only from the rebellious governors, but also
from its notables and commanders. Most main cities of
the Emirate such as Baalbek, Busr5, Sarkhad,
Mayyafariqin, al-Rahba and Hi ms rebelled against the
authority of Damascus at one time or another. Some of
these cities were well known for their rebellious
actions, such as Baalbek and Busra.
There was faction and dissension, however, not just
among the governors of the emirate, but also among the
notables, commanders and members of the royal family
itself. Shams al-Dawla Muhammad of Baalbek revolted in
526/1132 against his brother the Amir Shams al-Mull-1k
Isda t il of Damascus. In 532/1137, the Amir Bazwa j , one
of the more eminent commanders of Damascus, revolted
against his master the Amir Shihab al-Din Mahmlid.
Furthermore,in 544/1149, Mu'ayyid al-Din Ibn
Ra'Is of Damascus, rebelled against his lord the Amir
Mujir al-Din Abaq of Damascus. The murder of two aims
of Damascus, Shams al-Muliik Isma'll (526-529/1133-1135)
and Shihab al-Din mahmild (529-533/1135-1139) was another
example of the internal conflict among the Damascene
leaders. All these internal divisions, exhausted the
power of the emirate and added to its difficulties over
and above its external ones.
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4. The wise Policy of N5r al-Din Towards Damascus:
-:As mentioned above, Zangi failed to annex the city
of Damascus with his own armed forces. The reason for
this was that he could not obtain the support of at
least a portion of the Damascene population against
their rulers. Capturing a heavily fortified city such as
Damascus posed insuparable problems, unless help from
within the city was forthcoming. The Damascenes refused
the authority of Zangi because of Zangi's reputation for
clandestine plotting against them, as exemplified by his
plots against the Damascene forces in 524/1130, which
had come to join his army against the Crusaders. In
addition, in 534/1139 Zang' broke his oath guaranteeing
the lives of the garrison of Baalbek. His son Nar al-Din
however with his wise policy towards Damascus managed to
persuade many of the Damascenes to support him against
their master the Amir Mujir al-Din Abaq. As mentioned
above in Chapter Seven, with the help of the Ahdath of
Damascus, NOT' al-Din seized the city of Damascus in
549/1154.
It seems that the immediate reason for the fall of
the Emirate of Damascus (488-549/1095-1154), was this
subtle and successful policy of Wir al-Din directed as
It was towards engendering confidence and credibility
amongst the people of the city.
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A Chronicle of Principal Events
during the Emirate of Damascus in the Early
Crusading Period
359/969:	 The capture of Damascus by
the Fatimids of Egypt.
455/began 4 Jan. 1063
	
Oadi of Tyre,
	
revolts
against the Fatimids.
457/began 13 Dec. 1064:
	
Amin al-Dawla Ibn 'Ammar of
Tripoli	 announces	 his
independence
	 from	 the
Fatimids.
462/began 20 Oct. 1069: Mahmud Ibn Mirdas of Aleppo
announces his loyalty to
the Sal juqs.
463/began 9 Oct. 1070: Atsiz Ibn 0q, a Sal jai
commander recovers Ramla,
Tiberias and Jerusalem from
the Fatimids.
468/began 16 Aug. 1075:	 Atsiz recovers	 Damascus
from the Fatimids.
469/began 5 Aug. 1076: King Atsiz Ibn Gq of
Damascus fails to destroy
the Fatimid Caliphate.
470/began 25 July 1077: Malik-Shah grants his
brother Taj al-Dawla Tutush
Syria as an Iqta".
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471/began 14 July 1078: The Fatimids recover Ramla,
Tiberias and Jerusalem from
King Atsiz of Damascus.
471/October 1079: Taj al-Dawla Tutush takes
over Damascus from Atsiz
Ibn Oq.
471/began 14 July 1079: Muslim Ibn Quraysh of Mosul
captures the city of Aleppo
from Ibn-Mirdas.
477/began 10 May 1084:	 Sulayman Ibn Qutlumish of
Konya recovers Antioch for
the	 SaljTiqs	 from	 the
Byzantines.
480/began 8 April 1087: 7Qasim al-Dawla Aq-Sunqur
al-Hajib is designated as
governor for the Saljiiqs in
482/began 16 March 1089:
Aleppo.
The
	 Fatimids	 recover	 Tyre
from	 its	 rebellious
governors,	 sons	 of	 Q5d1
'Ayn	 al-Dawla	 Ibn AbI
-
'Aqil.
484/began 23 Feb. 1091: Tutush	 suppresses Khalaf
Ibn Mula t ib of Hims.
485/began 12 Feb. 1092: Tutush	 fails	 to
Tripoli
	
from Jalal
take
al-Mulk
Ibn 'Ammar.
485/began 12 Feb. 1092: Mahmild	 Ibn	 Sultan Malik-
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Shah succeeds his father as
the Sultan of the Saljiiqs.
Shawwal 487/began 15 Oct.
1094:	 Berkiyariaq	 receives
recognition as Sultan	 of
the	 Sal jiiqs	 from	 the
487/began 21 Jan. 1094:
17 Safar 488/1095:
Abbasid Caliph al-Muqtadi.
Al-Hasan	 al-Sabbah
establishes the movement of
the Batiniyya.
Sultan Tij al-Dawla Tutush
is defeated by his nephew
Berkiyariiq	 and	 his
488/1095:
dominions are divided among
his sons King Ridwan of
Aleppo and King Duqaq of
Damascus.
-
Tughtekin becomes Atabek of
King Duqaq of Damascus.
488/began 11 Jan. 1095: Batiniyya wins support of
King Ridwan of Aleppo to
occupy Damascus.
490/began 19 Dec. 1096:	 The failure of King Ridwan
of	 Aleppo	 to	 occupy
Damascus.
490/1097: The defeat of King Duqaq of
Damascus by his brother
King Ridwan of Aleppo near
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the river of Quwayq.
490/1097:	 The capture of Antioch by
the Crusaders.
_
Rabi' II 491/10 March 1098: Baldwin
	
of	 Boulogne
establishes	 the	 first
Crusader County in Edessa.
Sha' ban 491/began 3 July
1098:	 The	 Fatimids	 recover
Jerusalem from Suqman and
_	
- -.-Il-Ghazi sons of Artuq.
22 sha'bri 492/14 July 1099: The 	 Crusaders	 capture
Jerusalem	 from	 the
Fat imids.
14 Ramadan 492/14 August
1099:	 The Crusaders overcome the
Fatimids near 'Asqalan.
Safar 493/began 18 Dec.
1099:	 King Duq5q	 of Damascus
- -	 7
recovers Mayyafariqin from
his rebellious governor.
Rabi t I 494/began 4 Jan.
1101: The Crusaders of Edessa
defeat suciman Ibn Artuq and
capture Saraj.
Sha'bän 494/began May 1101: King Duqaq of Damascus
receives Jabala from Ibn
Sulayha.
494/1101:
	 Ibn	 'Amm5r	 of	 Tripoli
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recovers Jabala from the
Damascenes.
Late Jumäda II 495/early
April 1102: The Damascene forces are
defeated by the Crusaders
near AntartEs.
Shathan 496/late May 1103: Damascus 	 annexes	 urns,
after the murder of its
governor Janah	 al-Dawla
. Husayn by the 131..iniyya.
Jumada II 496/began 13 March
1103:	 Damascus recovers al-Rahba.
Sha‘ban 497/began 29 April
1104:	 The Crusaders of Jerusalem
capture Acre.
12 Ramadan 497/8 June 1104: King Duciag of Damascus dies
and is. succeeded by his
Atabek Tughtekin.
25 Dht-I'l-Hi j ia 497/18 Sept.
-:1104:	 Tughtekin appoints Artash
Ibn	 Sultan Ta-j 	al-Dawla
Tutush as King of Damascus.
497/1104:	 King Artash flees from
Damascus,
	
and	 Tughtekin
becomes	 the	 Azar	 of
Damascus.
Safar 498/began 22 October
1104:
	 Tughtekin sends help to the
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Fatimids	 of	 'Asqa1.5n
against the Crusaders of
Jerusalem.
498/1104: The Crusaders defeat the
Fatimids and the Damascenes
near Ramla.
498/May 1105:	 The	 death	 of	 Sult5n
Berkiy5rilq, he is succeeded
by his brother Muhammad.
Ramad5n 501/began 13 April
1108:	 The	 Fatimids	 recover
501/1108:
502/1109:
11 Dh5'1-Hi j ja 502/12 July
Tripoli from Fakhr al-Mulk
Ibn 'Ammar.
Tughtekin
	
defeats	 the
Crusader
	 governor	 of
Tiberias
	
Gervase	 of
Basoches.
Tughtekin helps people of
Sidon against the Crusaders
of Jerusalem.
1109:	 The	 Crusaders	 occupy
Tripoli from the Fatimids.
Sh'abBn 502/began 6 March
1108:	 The	 Crusaders	 capture
'Arqa.
Late 502/July 1109:
	
Tughtekin signs a truce
with the	 Crusaders of
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Jerusalem.
Muharram 503/August 1109:
	
The Crusaders seize Jubayl.
Sha'b5n 503/began 25 Feb.
111b:	 Tughtekin suppresses	 his
rebellious	 governor
_
Kumushtekin of Baalbek.
21 ShawwZ1 503/13 May 1110: The Crusaders of Jerusalem
occupy Beirut from the
Fatimids.
503/began 31 July 1109: 	 The failure of Mawdrld's
campaign	 against	 the
Crusaders.
Late Dha'l-Hijja 504/early
July 1111: TughtekIn forces King
Baldwin I of Jerusalem to
sign a new truce.
_
505/began 10 July 1111: Tughtekin helps people of
Tyre against the Crusaders
of Jerusalem.
506/began 28 June 1112: Tughtekin accepts the offer
of people of Tyre to take
over their city.
11 Muharram 506/29 June
1113:	 Mawdfid	 of	 Mosul	 and
Tughtekin defeat the
Crusaders of Jerusalem near
al-Usghuwäna.
18 Jum5d5 II 507/30 November
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1114: King Ridwan of Aleppo dies,
succeeded by his son Alp-
Arslan.
509/began 27 May 1115:	 Sultan	 Muhammad	 sends
Bursuq
	
Ibn Hursuq	 of
Hamadhan against Tughtekin
and il-Ghazi of Mardin.
Bursuq captures Hama from
Tughtekin.
Jumada II 509/began 21 Oct.
1115:	 Tughtekin	 recovers
Rafaniyya	 from	 the
Crusaders of	 Jerusalem.
Then he deserts it.
509/1115:	 Sultan Muhammad issues an
ordinance to confirm
Tughtekin's rule of the
Emirate of Damascus.
509/1115:	 King Baldwin I of Jerusalem
attacks al-Farama in Egypt.
510/1116:	 Bertram, Count of Tripoli,
builds fortress of Barin.
510/began 16 May
_
1116:	 Tughtekin and Aq-Sunqur al-
-:Bursuql	 of Mosul defeats
Count Bertram of Tripoli in
'Ayn al-Jarr.
_
511/began 5 May 1117:	 Il-Ghazi of MgrdIn receives
512/began 24 April 1118:
306
Aleppo.
Tughtekin helps	 'Asgal5n,
which	 belonged	 to	 the
Fatimids,	 against	 the
Crusaders of Jerusalem.
_
15 Rabi' I 513/26 June 1119: fl-Ghaz1
	
of Aleppo	 and
Tughtekin defeat Roger of
Antioch	 in Balat.	 Roger
himself is killed in the
battle.
515/began 22 March 1121:
	
The murder of al-Afdal,
_
wazir of Egypt.
516/began 12 March 1122: 	 The Fatimids recover Tyre
from Tughtekin.
516/November 1122:	 The death of il-Ghazi of
Aleppo and M5rdin.
Rabi l I 517/began 28 April
1123: Balak Ibn Bahram Ibn Artuq
captures King Baldwin II of
Jerusalem.
518/1124:	 Tughtekin receives	 Tyre
again from the Fatimids_
20 Rabl e I 518/8 May 1124:	 Balak Ibn Bahrim of Aleppo
is murdered.
23 Jumad5 I 518/7 July 1124: The Crusaders capture Tyre
from Tughtekin.
518/1124:
	
Aq-Sunqur	 al-Bursucii	 of
Mosul takes over Aleppo
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from Timurtash	 Ibn	 il-
Ghazi.
518/1124:
	 The death of leader of
Batiniyya	 al-Hasan	 al-
.
Sabbah.
3 Rabl' II 519/10 May 1125: Aq-Sunqur
	 al-Bursuqi	 of
Mosul	 and	 Aleppo and
Tughtekin recover Kafartab
from the Crusaders.
_
16 Rabi' II 519/23 May 1125: The forces of Aq-Sunqur al-
7	 7Bursuql and Tughtekin are
519/1125:
defeated by the Crusaders
of the East.
The	 failure	 of	 the
Crusaders'	 attempt	 to
capture Damascus.
Dh5'1-Gra'da 520/began 18 Nov.
1126:	 Bahram	 al-'Ajami,	 the
_	 -leader of the Batinis in
Syria,	 establishes	 his
power in Damascus,	 and
receives	 Banyas
	
from
Tughtekin.
8 Dhii'l-Hijja 520/26 Dec.
1126:	 The murder of Aq-Sunqur al-
Bursuqi by the Batiniyya.
8 Safar 522/11 Feb. 1128:	 The death of Tughtekin, and
his son Taj al-Mull-1k Burr
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succeeds him as AmIr of
Damascus.
522/began 6 Jan. 1128:
522/6 1128:
Zang'
	 of Mosul	 receives
Aleppo.
The defeat and the murder
of the leader of the
Batinls in Syria Bahr5m al-
e Ajami	 by al-pahhak	 Ibn
7Jandal, Amir of WSdi al-
Taym.	 Ismaql
succeeds Bahram as a leader
of the Bgtinis in Syria.
17 Ramadan 523/4 Sept.
1129:
523/began 25 Dec. 1128:
The murder of
Wazir of Taj
of	 Damascus
7
al-Mazdaciani,
B5ri
and	 the
massacre of Batinls	 in
Damascus.
The crusaders of Jerusalem
receive Banyas from the
Btinis.
Dhii'l-Qa'da 523/16 Oct.
1129:	 The	 failure	 of	 the
Crusaders to take Damascus.
8 Shawwal 524/5 Oct.
1130:	 Zang' captures Hama	 from
the Emirate of Damascus_
5 Rajab 525/5 June
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1131:
	
The B5t1nis fail to kill
BUri of Damascus.
6 Shathan 525/6 July
1131:	 Burr of Damascus captures
Dubays Ibn Sadaqa of Hilla.
Sha'ban 525/began 1 June
1133:	 The death of King Baldwin
II of Jerusalem. He is
succeeded by his son-in-law
Fulk.
Shawwal 525/began 28 Aug.
1131:	 The death of Sultan Mahmild
Ibn Muhammad and the
rivalry among his sons to
win Sultanate.
12 Rajab 526/began 6
June 1132: 135ri dies and is succeeded
by his son Shams al-Mula
Ismell.
Dhii'l-Hijja 526/began
15 Oct. 1132:	 Shams al-Mulak Ism5'11 of
Damascus suppresses 	 his
brother	 Shams	 al-Dawla
Muhammad of Baalbek.
Muharram 527/began 12
Nov. 1132:	 Shams al-Mula Isma t il of
Damascus recovers 116nya's
from	 the Crusaders of
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Jerusalem.
1 Shawwal 527/August
1133:	 Shams al-Mulak Isma'll of
Damascus recovers Hama from
-7Zang]. of Mosul and Aleppo.
Dhfi'l-Qa'da 527/began 22
June 1133:	 The Abbasid Caliph al-
Mustarshid Bi-'llah fails to
7
seize Mosul from Zang'.
Muharram 528/began 1 Nov.
1133:	 Shams al-Munk Ism5 t i1 of
Damascus occupies Shagif
Tirian taking it from al-
_
Dahhak Ibn Jandal, 	 Ra'is
Wadi al-Taym.
9 Rabi t II 528/6
February 1134: The failure of a murder
attempt against Shams al-
Mula Isma'il.
Dhil'l-Hijia 528/October
1134: Shams al-Multak of Damascus
plunders Acre and drives
the Crusaders of Jerusalem
to renew the truce with
Damascus.
Muharram 529/began 22
Oct. 1134:	 Mas'Ud Ibn Sultan Muhammad
obtains the Sultanate of
529/1135:
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the Saljaqs.
Shams al-Mull-1k Ism5'11 of
7Damascus
	
asks	 Zang].	 of
Mosul
	 to	 take	 over
Damascus.
14 Rabi' II 529/1 Feb.
1135:	 Shams al-Muliik Isma'il of
Damascus is murdered by his
mother K11 -à-tan Safwat	 al-
.
Mulk and is succeeded by
his brother Shihtab al-Din
Mahmad.
Jumada I 529/began 16
Feb. 1135:	 The Damascenes foil attempt
7
of Zang]. of Mosul to take
Damascus.
Jum5da I 529/began 16
_
Feb. 1135:	 Zangi takes over Hama from
Damascus.
Dhri'l-Qa‘da 529/began
14 August 1135:	 The murder of the Abbasid
Caliph	 al-Mustarshid
Bi-'11a. h by the Batinls.
Sha'ban 529/began 18
May 1135: Zangi fails to take Hims
from son of Khlr-Khan Ibn
Qaraja.
530/began 11 Oct.
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1135:	 Damascus receives Hims from
Khumartash i
 a regent on
behalf of the sons of Khir-
Kh5n /bn Oar5ja.
21 Jum5da I 530/27 Feb.
1136:	 Shihab	 al-Din	 Mahm5d
designates Kumushtekin al-
Atabekl as Atabek and
Isfahsal5r of Damascus.
Jum5da II 530/began 26
March 1136:
Rajab 531/began 25
March 1137:
The Amir Bazwaj, one of the
Damascene commanders,
becomes the Atabek and
Isfahsalar of Damascus.
Am 7ir Bazwaj plunders the
territories of Tripoli, and
defeats Pons of Tripoli.
20 Shawwal 531/11 July
1137:	 Zang]. defeats King Fulk of
Jerusalem and takes the
fortress of Montferrand.
DhiPl-Hijja 531/began
18 August 1137:	 Bany5s	 surrendered	 to
Zangi.
Sha i ban 532/began 15
April 1138:
	
The Byzantine and	 the
Crusader forces fail to
Shihab al-Din of Damascus
kills the Amir Bazwai. Anar
becomes	 Atabek	 and
Isfahsalar of Damascus.
7Peace treaty between Zangi
and	 Shih5b al-Din	 of
7Damascus.
	 Zang'	 receives
Hims from the Damascenes.
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capture Shayzar.
Sha‘b5n 532/began 15
April 1138:
Ramadan 532/June 1138:
23 Shawwäl 533/24 May
1139:	 Shih-Lb	 al-Di- n Mahm5d	 of
Damascus is murdered, and
succeeded by his brother
Jam51
	
al-Di
- n
	 Muhammad
(formerly Shams al-Dawla of
Baalbek).
20 Dhii°1-Hi j ia 533/17
August 1139:	 Zang].
▪ 	
takes Baalbek from
the Damascenes.
8 Sha'ban 534/10 April
1140:	 Jam51	 al-Din Muhammad of
Damascus	 dies,	 while
Damascus is besieged by
Zangi. His son Mujir al-Din
Abaq succeeds him under the
regency of the Amir Anar.
Shaww51 534/began 20
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May 1140:
	
The Damascenes with their
allies, the Crusaders 	 of
Jerusalem, capture Banyas
7from Zangi. The Damascenes
grant the Crusaders of
Jerusalem Banyas as the
price of their help against
7Zangi, who was trying to
capture Damascus.
26 Jumada II 539/23 Dec.
71144:	 Zang]. recovers Edessa for
the	 Muslims from	 the
Crusaders.
6 flab!' II 541/14 Sept.
71146:	 Zang."	 is	 murdered.	 His
kingdom is divided between
his older sons Sayf al-Din
Ghazi in Mosul and Niir al-
Din Mahan-id in Aleppo.
Jumada II 541/October
1146:	 Wir	 al-Din of	 Aleppo
recovers Edessa from the
Crusaders who managed to
recover the city for five
days.
Muharram 542/began 2
June 1147:	 AtLbek Anar and Mir al-Din
foil	 the Crusaders of
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Jerusalem's attempt to take
Busra and Sarkhad.
Muharram 543/began 22
May 1148:
	 The Second Crusade fails to
take Damascus.
Muharram 544/began 11
May 1148:
21 Safar 544/29 June
The Damascenes and the
Crusaders of Jerusalem
renew their truce and peace
treaty.
1149:	 Wir al-Din of Aleppo, with
help	 from	 Damascus,
achieves major victory near
the fortress of	 Innab
against Prince Raymond of
Antioch and his	 armed
forces,	 and	 recovers
Af5miya.
Jumada I 544/began 6
Sept. 1149:
Muharram 545/began 30
April 1150:
546/began 20 April
The death of Anar, Afábek
of the AmIr Mujir al-Din
Abaq of Damascus.
The Damascenes agree to be
under the nominal authority
of Niir al-Din of Aleppo.
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1151:	 The	 Damascenes with help
from the Crusaders of
Jerusalem thwart an attempt
of Mar al-Din to take over
Damascus.
IRMA. ' I 546/began 27
June 1151:	 The Crusaders of Jerusalem
fail to capture Busra from
the Damascenes.
10 Rabi II 546/began
26 July 1151:
Rabi' I 548/began 5
June 1153:
9 Jumada I 548/10 August
Mujir al-Din of Damascus
agrees to be under the
authority of NGr al-Din.
.7	 -
Mujir al-Din of Damascus
and Niir al-Din of Aleppo
fail to relieve the people
of 'Ascialan from the
blockade of the Crusaders.
Mujir al-Din replaces his1153:
-
wazir Mu'ayyid al-Din Ibn
al-Si-ICI with the brother of
7this wazir called Zayn al-
Din Naydara.
•
Jum5d5 I 548/August
1153:	 The	 Crusaders	 seize
*Ascialan from the FatImids.
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25 Dht-i'l-Hijja 548/10
7	 _
Feb. 1154:	 Mujir al-Din kills his new
_
Durzi	 wazir	 'Ata'	 al-
Kh5dim.
3 Safar 549/18 April
1154:	 The fall of Damascus at the
_
hands of NOr al-Din of
Aleppo, and the end of the
rule of Tughtekin's family
in Damascus.
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APPENDIX
Dates in this appendix are given with reference to the
Christian era only.
ABBASID CALIPHS:
al-Muqtadi bi-Amri-'11h
	
1075
al-Mustazhir bi-'11511	 1194
al-Mustarshid bi-'llah
	
1118
al-Rashid bi-'llah	 1134
al-Muqtafi bi-'llah	 1135-1160
Fat imid Caliph
al-Mustansir Abü Tamim
	 1035
al-Musta'li Abi al-Qasim
	 1095
al-Amir 	 A1i al-Mansiir 1101
al-Hafiz Abii al-Maymiin `Abdu'l-Majid 1130
al-Zafir Abi al-Manr 1149
iz	 al-Oasim 'isi 1154
Great Sal jiia Saltans:
Malik-Shah Ibn A 1 p-Ars.rn 1072-1092
Mahmiid Ibn Malik-Shah 1092-1094
BerkiyarTiq Ibn Malik-Shah 1194-1104
Muhammad Ibn Malik-Shah 1104-1118
Atimad Sardar /bn Malik-Shah 1096-1157
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Salji5q Sultans of Iraq
MahmtId Ibn Muhammad Ibn Malik-Shah 1118-1131
Dawfid Ibn Mahmiid 1131
Tughril lbn Muhammad 1132-1133
Mas'ad Ibn Muhammad 1133-1152
Mal ik-Shah Ibn Mahmiid 1152
Muhammad Ibn Mahmiid 1153-1159
Sal iuZis of Konya:
Sulayman Ibn Qutlumish 1081-1086
Oilij-Arslan 1092-1107
Mal ik-Shah Ibn Qi 1 i j-Ars1;in 1107-1116
Mas 'rid Ibn (Dili j-Arslan 1116-1156_
Artuqids of Hisn Kayfa and Amid:
.	 .
Suqma' n Ibn Artuq 1101-1104
Ibrahim Ibn Suqman 1104-1108
Dawricl Ibn Suqman 1108-1148
Qara-Arslan Ibn Da- 145d 1148-1174
Artuqids of Mardin:
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